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INTRODUCTION

Touted as a revolution in patient health care, existing electronic
health records (“EHR”) systems have failed to meet Congressional and
private aspirations for improving patient outcomes and recognizing
operational cost savings.1 A combination of technological shortcomings and
1.
See DUSTIN CHARLES ET AL., THE OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO. TECH., ADOPTION OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS AMONG U.S. NONFEDERAL ACUTE CARE HOSPITALS: 2008-2014 1 (2015); David Dranove et al., The Trillion

Dollar Conundrum: Complementarities and Health Information Technology 1, 3, 5 (Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
18281,
2012),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18281.pdf. The surveyed literature uses EHR and electronic
medical record (“EMR”) interchangeably. CHARLES ET AL., supra, at 1; Dranove et al., supra,
at 1. We follow the usage of the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information
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anticompetitive incentives to engage in information blocking has resulted in
a systemic failure of both health care providers and patients to reap the
promised beneficial yields of adopting comprehensive EHR systems.2
In this Article, we explore how utilization of distributed ledger
technologies, such as blockchain ledgers, can better promote interested
stakeholder’s interests in adoption of comprehensive EHR systems, as
blockchain ledgers improve patient outcomes, increase interoperability
between health care providers, generate cost operational savings to health
care, and simplify compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) privacy rule.3
In Part II of this Article, we address existing EHR systems.4 In
Section II.A., we develop a working technological framework of EHR.5 In
Section II.B., we explain Congressional efforts to promote comprehensive
EHR adoption through the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”) incentives program.6 In Section II.C.,
we summarize the HITECH Act amendments to HIPAA Privacy Rule as they
relate to the implementation of comprehensive EHR systems.7 In Section
II.D., we review the empirical literature, which demonstrates how the
adoption of existing EHR systems has led to marginal gains in patient
outcomes and generated significant operational costs to health care
providers.8
In Part III, we argue that blockchain ledgers, a nascent technological
system can remedy the technological and social failings of existing EHR

Technology and Congressional enactments, though there is no operative difference between
one nomenclature over the other. CHARLES ET AL., supra, at 1; Dranove et al., supra, at 1.
2.
See Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 3.
3.
See Tsung-Ting Kuo et al., Blockchain Distributed Ledger Technologies
for Biomedical and Health Care Applications, 24 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1211,
1213–14 (2017).
4.
See Swati Yanamadala et al., Electronic Health Records and Quality of
Care: An Observational Study Modeling Impact on Mortality, Readmissions, and
Complications, MED., May 2016, at 1, 1; discussion infra Part II.
5.
See Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 6; discussion infra Section II.A.
6.
See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13001, 123 Stat. 226, 246 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.); discussion infra Section II.B.
7.
See 42 U.S.C. § 17935(e) (2018); 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a) (2019);
discussion infra Section II.C.
8.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TOWARD PRECISION MEDICINE: BUILDING
A KNOWLEDGE NETWORK FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND A NEW TAXONOMY OF DISEASE 29–
31 (2011); discussion infra Section II.D.
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systems.9 In Part IV, we explore a number of blockchain-based EHR use
cases supporting our arguments in Part III.10
II.

THE PARADOX OF PRODUCTIVITY: CONTEMPORARY EHR SYSTEMS

A.

What Is EHR?

EHR is a broad term referring to all integrated aspects of clinical
information systems management.11 There is no consensus as to what
constitutes an EHR system.12 A health care provider may employ EHR
systems to handle any or all six major categories of functions: (1) physician
documentation; (2) clinical repository data, which combines disparate patient
information into a single file; (3) clinical decision support systems, which
implements diagnosis, treatment, and prevention plans based on clinical data
repository data sets; (4) generation of diagnostic and billing codes; (5) order
entry systems, which attempt to streamline basic intradepartmental
communications for equipment or scheduling purposes; or (6) computerized
provider order entry, which allow specialists within larger health provider
facilities to communicate with each other regarding a patient’s treatment and
history.13
Physician documentation and clinical repository data can include the
acquisition, use, creation, or permitted transmission of any of the following:
(1) patient demographics; (2) physician notes; (3) nursing assessments; (4)
problem lists; (5) medication lists; (6) discharge summaries; (7) advance
directives; (8) powers of attorney; (9) lab reports; (10) radiology tests; (11)
medication histories; (12) consultation reports and nursing orders; (13)
diagnostic tests; (14) genomic data; (15) institutional guidelines and policies;
9.
See Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1214; discussion infra Part III.
10.
See Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. and IBM Canada Announce
First of Its Kind Collaboration to Integrate Blockchain Technology into Clinical Trials, IBM
(Feb. 12, 2019), http://newsroom.ibm.com/2019-02-12-Boehringer-Ingelheim-Canada-Ltdand-IBM-Canada-Announce-First-of-its-Kind-Collaboration-to-Integrate-BlockchainTechnology-into-Clinical-Trials; Mike Miliard, Blockchain Use Case: Electronic Health
Records,
HEALTHCARE
IT
NEWS
(Dec.
14,
2018,
2:01
PM),
http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/blockchain-use-case-electronic-health-records;
discussion infra Part III; discussion infra Part IV.
11.
See Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S.
Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1628, 1630 (2009).
12.
Id. “[T]here is no consensus on what functionalities constitute the
essential elements necessary to define an electronic health record in the hospital setting.” Id.;
see also Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 6. “[T]here is no single technology associated with
EMR, and different EMR technologies may perform overlapping tasks.” Dranove et al., supra
note 1, at 6.
13.
Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 5–6.
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(16) regulatory compliance protocols; (17) drug allergy concerns; (18) drugdrug interactions; (19) drug dosing information and protocols; (20) treatment
protocols; (21) patient care protocols; and (22) triage protocols.14
Various technological and institutional barriers slowed institutional
adoption of EHR even as the Internet saw widespread adoption by the public
in the early 2000s.15 This prompted Congressional action and, in 2009, a
federal incentives bill was enacted to incentivize health care providers
toward adopting robust EHR systems for forecasted improvements to
efficiency and patient outcomes.16
CHART 117
BASIC EHR FUNCTIONS FOR ACUTE CARE HOSPITAL
ADOPTION OF BASIC OR COMPREHENSIVE EHR SYSTEMS
EHR FUNCTIONS REQUIRED

BASIC EHR

COMPREHENSIVE EHR

Patient Demographics
Physician Notes
Nursing Assessments
Problem Lists
Medication Lists
Discharge Summaries

✔

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔

14.
CHARLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. Federal guidelines define Basic EHR
systems as computerized functions relating to: “[P]atient demographics, patient problem lists,
electronic lists of medications taken by patients, clinician notes, orders for medications,
viewing laboratory results, and viewing imaging results.” Office-Based Physician Electronic
Health Record Adoption, OFFICE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. (Jan. 2019),
http://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/physician-ehr-adoption-trends.php; see also
Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Electronic Health Record Adoption in US Hospitals: Progress
Continues, but Challenges Persist, 34 HEALTH AFF. 2174, 2175 (2015).
A hospital with at least a basic EHR system reported full implementation
of the following ten computerized functions in at least one clinical unit of the
hospital: patient demographics, physician notes, nursing assessments, patient
problem lists, patient medication lists, discharge summaries, laboratory reports,
radiologic reports, diagnostic test results, and order entry for medications.

Adler-Milstein et al., supra, at 2175.
15.
See id. at 2174.
16.
See id.; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 1, 123 Stat. 115, 115 (2009) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645).
17.
See CHARLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 9; Office-Based Physician Electronic
Health Record Adoption, supra note 14.
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Advance Directives
Lab Reports
Radiology Tests
Medications
Consultation Requests
Nursing Orders
View Lab Reports
View Radiology Reports
View Radiology Images
View Diagnostic Test Results
View Diagnostic Test Images
View Consultant Report
Clinical Guidelines
Clinical Reminders
Drug Allergy Results
Drug-Drug Interactions
Drug Dosing Support
B.

✔

✔
✔
✔

[Vol. 44

✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔

The HITECH Act EHR Incentives Program

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”)
contained monetary grants to incentivize the implementation of EHR systems
by physicians and hospitals called the HITECH Act.18 Since 2011, $30.8
billion in incentive payments have been made to promote EHR adoption in
the United States.19 At the time of the HITECH Act’s enactment, adoption

18.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1; Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13001,
123 Stat. 226, 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
19.
Data and Program Reports: Regulations & Guidance, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES: REGULATIONS & GUIDANCE (May 14, 2019, 11:51 AM),
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/DataAndReports.html.
“More than $24.8
billion in Medicare [Promoting Interoperability Programs (“PI Program”)] payments have
been made between May 2011 and October 2018. More than [six] billion [dollars] in
Medicaid [PI Program] payments have been made between January 2011 (when the first set of
states launched their programs) and October 2018.” Id.
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rates of basic EHR systems among acute care hospitals in the United States
was a dismal 12.2%.20 By 2012, adoption rates had risen to 44.4%.21
The HITECH Act contains enabling provisions for prompting the
adoption of EHR systems through subsidies programs targeting demonstrated
meaningful use of certified EHR systems.22 The HITECH Act established
the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technologies
and its functions in establishing the HITECH Act.23 In 2011, the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) established Medicare and Medicaid
EHR Incentive Programs (now called the PI Program) to “encourage
clinicians, eligible hospitals, and [critical access hospitals] to adopt,
implement, upgrade . . . and demonstrate meaningful use of” certified EHR
systems.24 The CMS rules define meaningful use and establish the incentives
payment program’s guidelines, defining meaningful as “providers . . . using
certified EHR technology in ways that can be measured significantly in
quality and quantity.”25 CMS has advanced the incentives program for
certified EHR implementation in an ongoing, three stage implementation:
▪
Stage 1 established “requirements for the electronic capture
of clinical data,” and required provisions for “providing patients with
electronic copies of health information;”26
▪
Stage 2 established additional quality of review at point of
care and required exchange of certain clinical information between
providers;27 and
▪
Stage 3 simplified reporting requirements and added new
flexibilities for providers to make electronic health information available
20.
CHARLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1; Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act § 13001.
21.
See CHARLES ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
22.
Meaningful Use: Qualify for EHR Incentive Programs, NUEMD,
http://www.nuemd.com/white-papers/qualify-ehr-incentive-programs (last visited May 1,
2020); see also Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act §
13001.
23.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act §
13001(a).
24.
Promoting Interoperability, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES:
REGULATIONS
&
GUIDANCE,
http://www.cms.gov/regulations-andguidance/Legislation/EHRincentiveprograms/index (last visited May 1, 2020).
25.
Meaningful Use: Qualify for EHR Incentive Programs, supra note 22; see
also 42 C.F.R. § 495.4 (2019); Promoting Interoperability, supra note 24.
26.
Promoting Interoperability, supra note 24; see also 42 C.F.R. § 495.2.
27.
Promoting Interoperability, supra note 24; see also 42 C.F.R. § 495.22.
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when and where it matters most and for health care providers and consumers
to be able to readily, safely, and securely exchange that information.28
1.

Stage 1 Benchmarks

To qualify under Stage 1 of the PI Program, hospitals and eligible
professionals (“EP”) must demonstrate objectives established by the
HITECH Act.29 To achieve minimum meaningful use, hospitals and EP’s
must meet fourteen and fifteen core objectives respectively and five out of
ten menu objectives.30 Additionally, EP’s must meet a total of three Clinical
Quality Measures from an additional set of thirty-eight Clinical Quality
Measures, and hospitals must complete fifteen Clinical Quality Measures, as
follows:31
▪

Chart II – STAGE 1 OBJECTIVE SUMMARIES32

▪

EP Stage 1 Core Objectives: (1) Computerized provider
order entry (CPOE); (2) E-Prescribing (eRx); (3) Report
ambulatory clinical quality measures to CMS/States; (4)
Implement one clinical decision support rule; (5) Provide patients
with an electronic copy of their health information, upon request;
(6) Provide clinical summaries for patients for each office visit; (7)
Drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks; (8) Record
demographics; (9) Maintain an up-to-date problem list of current
and active diagnoses; (10) Maintain active medication list; (11)
Maintain active medication allergy list; (12) Record and chart
changes in vital signs; (13) Record smoking status for patients
[thirteen] years or older; (14) Capability to exchange key clinical
information among providers of care and patient-authorized
entities electronically; [and] (15) Protect electronic health
information.33
▪
EP Stage 1 Menu Objectives: (1) Drug-formulary
checks; (2) Incorporate clinical lab test results as structured data;
28.
See 42 C.F.R. § 412.1 (2019); 42 C.F.R. § 495.24; Promoting
Interoperability, supra note 24.
29.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE & MEDICAID EHR
INCENTIVE PROGRAM: MEANINGFUL USE STAGE 1 REQUIREMENTS OVERVIEW (2010); see also
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §
13001, 123 Stat. 226, 226 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 29.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
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(3) Generate lists of patients by specific conditions; (4) Send
reminders to patients per patient preference for preventive/follow
up care; (5) Provide patients with timely electronic access to their
health information; (6) Use certified EHR technology to identify
patient-specific education resources and provide to patient, if
appropriate; (7) Medication reconciliation; (8) Summary of care
record for each transition of care/referrals; (9) Capability to submit
electronic data to immunization registries/systems*; (10)
Capability to provide electronic syndromic surveillance data to
public health agencies.* *At least [one] public health objective
must be selected.34
▪
Hospital Stage 1 Menu Objectives: (1) Drug-formulary
checks; (2) Record advanced directives for patients [sixty-five]
years or older; (3) Incorporate clinical lab test results as structured
data; (4) Generate lists of patients by specific conditions; (5) Use
certified EHR technology to identify patient-specific education
resources and provide to patient, if appropriate; (6) Medication
reconciliation; (7) Summary of care record for each transition of
care/referrals; (8) Capability to submit electronic data to
immunization registries/systems*; (9) Capability to provide
electronic submission of reportable lab results to public health
agencies*; (10) Capability to provide electronic syndromic
surveillance data to public health agencies.* *At least [one] public
health objective must be selected.35
▪
EP Stage 1 Clinical Quality Measures: (1) Diabetes:
Hemoglobin A1c Poor Control; (2) Diabetes: Low Density
Lipoprotein (LDL) Management and Control; (3) Diabetes: Blood
Pressure Management; (4) Heart Failure (HF): AngiotensinConverting Enzyme (ACE) Inhibitor or Angiotensin Receptor
Blocker (ARB) Therapy for Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction
(LVSD); (5) Coronary Artery Disease (CAD): Beta-Blocker
Therapy for CAD Patients with Prior Myocardial Infarction (MI);
(6) Pneumonia Vaccination Status for Older Adults; (7) Breast
Cancer Screening; (8) Colorectal Cancer Screening; (9) Coronary
Artery Disease (CAD): Oral Antiplatelet Therapy Prescribed for
Patients with CAD; (10) Heart Failure (HF): Beta-Blocker
Therapy for Left Ventricular Systolic Dysfunction (LVSD); (11)
Anti-depressant medication management: (a) Effective Acute
Phase Treatment, (b) Effective Continuation Phase Treatment; (12)
Primary Open Angle Glaucoma (POAG): Optic Nerve Evaluation;
(13) Diabetic Retinopathy:
Documentation of Presence or
34.
35.

Id.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 29.
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Absence of Macular Edema and Level of Severity of Retinopathy;
(14) Diabetic Retinopathy: Communication with the Physician
Managing Ongoing Diabetes Care; (15) Asthma Pharmacologic
Therapy; (16) Asthma Assessment; (17) Appropriate Testing for
Children with Pharyngitis; (18) Oncology Breast Cancer:
Hormonal
Therapy
for
Stage
IC-IIIC
Estrogen
Receptor/Progesterone Receptor (ER/PR) Positive Breast Cancer;
(19) Oncology Colon Cancer: Chemotherapy for Stage III Colon
Cancer Patients; [20] Prostate Cancer: Avoidance of Overuse of
Bone Scan for Staging Low Risk Prostate Cancer Patients; [21]
Smoking and Tobacco Use Cessation, Medical Assistance: (a)
Advising Smokers and Tobacco Users to Quit, (b) Discussing
Smoking and Tobacco Use Cessation Medications, (c) Discussing
Smoking and Tobacco Use Cessation Strategies; [22] Diabetes:
Eye Exam; [23] Diabetes: Urine Screening; (24) Diabetes: Foot
Exam; (25) Coronary Artery Disease (CAD): Drug Therapy for
Lowering LDL-Cholesterol; (26) Heart Failure (HF): Warfarin
Therapy Patients with Atrial Fibrillation; (27) Ischemic Vascular
Disease (IVD): Blood Pressure Management; (28) Ischemic
Vascular Disease (IVD):
Use of Aspirin or Another
Antithrombotic; (29) Initiation and Engagement of Alcohol and
Other Drug Dependence Treatment:
(a) Initiation, (b)
Engagement; (30) Prenatal Care:
Screening for Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV); (31) Prenatal Care: Anti-D
Immune Globulin; (32) Controlling High Blood Pressure; (33)
Cervical Cancer Screening; (34) Chlamydia Screening for Women;
(35) Use of Appropriate Medications for Asthma; (36) Low Back
Pain: Use of Imaging Studies; (37) Ischemic Vascular Disease
(IVD): Complete Lipid Panel and LDL Control; (38) Diabetes:
Hemoglobin A1c Control (<8.0%).36
▪
Hospital Stage 1 Clinical Quality Measures: (1)
Emergency Department Throughput—admitted patients Median
time from ED arrival to ED departure for admitted patients; (2)
Emergency Department Throughput—admitted patients—
Admission decision time to ED departure time for admitted
patients; (3) Ischemic stroke—Discharge on anti-thrombotics; (4)
Ischemic stroke—Anticoagulation for A-fib/flutter; (5) Ischemic
stroke—Thrombolytic therapy for patients arriving within [two]
hours of symptom onset; (6) Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke—
Antithrombotic therapy by day [two]; (7) Ischemic stroke—
Discharge on statins; (8) Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke—Stroke
education; (9) Ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke—Rehabilitation
assessment; (10) VTE prophylaxis within [twenty-four] hours of
36.

Id.
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arrival; (11) Intensive Care Unit VTE prophylaxis; (12)
Anticoagulation overlap therapy; (13) Platelet monitoring on
unfractionated heparin; (14) VTE discharge instructions; (15)
Incidence of potentially preventable VTE.37

Stage 2 Benchmarks

2.

In 2014, Stage 2 guidelines and requirements to obtain certified EHR
status were implemented.38 Stage 2 compliant EHR systems include all
Stage 1 objectives and increase the requirements to twenty clinical functions,
as follows: Three optional functions, nine care coordination functions
including one optional function, three clinical quality measures, nine privacy
and security functions including one optional function, seven patient
engagement functions, four utilization functions, and three optional transport
methods for electronic data, as follows:39
Chart III—STAGE 2 OBJECTIVE SUMMARIES40
▪
EP Stage 2 Core Objectives:
(1) Use computerized provider order entry (CPOE) for medication,
laboratory and radiology orders; (2) Generate and transmit
permissible prescriptions electronically (eRx); (3) Record
demographic information; (4) Record and chart changes in vital
signs; (5) Record smoking status for patients [thirteen] years old or
older; (6) Use clinical decision support to improve performance on
high-priority health conditions; (7) Provide patients the ability to
view online, download and transmit their health information; (8)
Provide clinical summaries for patients for each office visit; (9)
Protect electronic health information created or maintained by the
Certified EHR Technology; (10) Incorporate clinical lab-test
results into Certified EHR Technology; (11) Generate lists of
patients by specific conditions to use for quality improvement,
reduction of disparities, research, or outreach; (12) Use clinically
relevant information to identify patients who should receive
reminders for preventive/follow-up care; (13) Use certified EHR
technology to identify patient-specific education resources; (14)
Perform medication reconciliation; (15) Provide summary of care
record for each transition of care or referral; (16) Submit electronic
data to immunization registries; (17) Use secure electronic
37.
38.
TIPSHEET 1 (2012).
39.
40.

Id.
See CTRS.

FOR

See id. at 8–9.
Id. at 8.

MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STAGE 2 OVERVIEW
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messaging to communicate with patients on relevant health
information.41
▪
EP Stage 2 Menu Objectives: (1) Submit electronic
syndromic surveillance data to public health agencies; (2) Record
electronic notes in patient records; (3) Imaging results accessible
through CEHRT; (4) Record patient family health history; (5)
Identify and report cancer cases to a State cancer registry; (6)
Identify and report specific cases to a specialized registry (other
than a cancer registry).42
▪
Hospital Stage 2 Core Objectives:
(1) Use
computerized provider order entry (CPOE) for medication,
laboratory and radiology orders; (2) Record demographic
information; (3) Record and chart changes in vital signs; (4)
Record smoking status for patients [thirteen] years old or older; (5)
Use clinical decision support to improve performance on highpriority health conditions; (6) Provide patients the ability to view
online, download and transmit their health information within 36
hours after discharge; (7) Protect electronic health information
created or maintained by the Certified EHR Technology; (8)
Incorporate clinical lab-test results into Certified EHR
Technology; (9) Generate lists of patients by specific conditions to
use for quality improvement, reduction of disparities, research, or
outreach; (10) Use certified EHR technology to identify patientspecific education resources and provide those resources to the
patient if appropriate; (11) Perform medication reconciliation; (12)
Provide summary of care record for each transition of care or
referral; (13) Submit electronic data to immunization registries;
(14) Submit electronic data on reportable lab results to public
health agencies; (15) Submit electronic syndromic surveillance
data to public health agencies; (16) Automatically track
medications with an electronic medication administration record
(eMAR).43
▪
Hospital Stage 2 Menu Objectives: (1) Record whether
a patient [sixty-five] years old or older has an advance directive;
(2) Record electronic notes in patient records; (3) Imaging results
accessible through CEHRT; (4) Record patient family health
history; (5) Generate and transmit permissible discharge

41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 38, at 9.

[Vol. 44

2020]

PATIENTS AS PEERS

301

prescriptions electronically (eRx); (6) Provide structured electronic
lab results to ambulatory providers.44

3.

Stage 3 Benchmarks

Stage 3’s main goal is to promote interoperability among various
care providers within the health care industry.45 Beginning with the 2019
calendar year, all EHR technology must comply with the 2015 Edition
Certified EHR Criteria.46 This stage seeks to improve interoperability by
adopting new and updated vocabulary and content standards for the
structured capture and exchange of health information.47 Additionally, the
new stage adopts a Common Clinical Data Set and a Consolidated Clinical
Document Architecture to ensure that data is consistently available
immediately when needed.48 Patients are also provided with enhanced
abilities to choose how they access and share their electronic health
information.49 The goal of these additional requirements is to make
interactions between multiple care providers and patients run more
efficiently.50 All necessary personnel need to be able to access important
health records to treat patients.51 A professional’s ability to quickly share
and view up-to-date patient records through this interoperability and
advanced technology should result in higher quality of care and better patient
outcomes.52 Stage 3 implementation also made a number of changes to the
HIPAA Privacy Rule in the context of Comprehensive EHR systems, which
we consider in the next Section.53

44.
45.

Id.
See ELISE SWEENEY ANTHONY & MICHAEL L. LIPINSKI, THE OFFICE OF THE
NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., 2015 EDITION FINAL RULE: OVERVIEW OF THE
2015 EDITION HEALTH IT CERTIFICATION CRITERIA & ONC HEALTH IT CERTIFICATION
PROGRAM PROVISIONS 2 (2015).
46.
45 C.F.R. § 170.315 (2019); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
2019 PROMOTING INTEROPERABILITY PROGRAMS: 2015 EDITION CERTIFIED ELECTRONIC
HEALTH RECORD TECHNOLOGY FACT SHEET 1 (2019).
47.
Bekah Witten, The HITECH Act and Electronic Health Records, USF
HEALTH (Feb. 13, 2018), http://www.health.usf.edu/is/blog/2018/02/13/the-hitech-act-andelectronic-health-records.
48.
Id.
49.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 46, at 1.
50.
See Witten, supra note 47.
51.
See id.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5565, 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at
45 C.F.R. § 164.524); discussion infra I.C.
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HITECH Revisions to EHR and HIPAA Compliance

Since 1996, the HIPAA has regulated the flow and access to health
care information.54 Stage 3 of the HITECH Act imposed four changes to the
HIPAA, including: (1) revisions to the HIPAA Privacy Rule for individual’s
access to EHR; (2) modification to the Breach Notification Rules; (3)
modification of the Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules to improve
enforcement and strengthen privacy and security protections; and (4) other
changes to Department of Health’s general authority under HIPAA.55 These
rule changes were designed to “increase workability and flexibility, decrease
burden, and better harmonize [compliance] requirements with . . . other
Departmental regulations.”56 The first three of these rule changes have the
most direct impact on EHR adoption, and we consider each in turn.57
1. Privacy Rule Modifications for Individual Access
Section 164.524 of the Privacy Rule was modified to incorporate
“[a]ccess of individuals to protected health information.”58 Section 13405(e)
of the HITECH Act strengthened the privacy right of access for individuals
with respect to entities that incorporate EHR technology.59 Patients now
have the right to obtain a copy of their patient health information in an
electronic format, and direct its transmission to any designated third party.60
The EHR entity may direct the health information electronically to the
individual’s designee, “provided that [the individual’s] choice [of designee]
54.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5567.
55.
Id. at 5566; Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13401–13411, 123 Stat. 226, 246 (2009) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
56.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5566.
57.
Id. at 5566, 5631.
58.
45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2019); see also 42 U.S.C. § 17935(e) (2018);
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules,
78 Fed. Reg. at 5566, 5631.
59.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5631; Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health Act § 13405(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 17935(e).
60.
42 U.S.C. § 17935(e); 45 C.F.R. § 164.524; Modifications to the HIPAA
Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5634. When
an individual requests EHR, the request must formally be made in writing, signed by the
individual. Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5634–35. The Privacy Rule already permits electronic
signatures to qualify as written documents. Id.
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is clear, conspicuous, and specific.”61 Section 13405(e) of the HITECH Act
also specifies that the fee to provide the electronic health information shall
not exceed the cost of labor in responding to the individual’s request.62 The
EHR entity must provide the individual with access to electronic information
in a format that is readily produced and accessible, or an agreed-upon format
between the entity and the individual.63 The readily produced format is not
specified, but HIPAA provides examples such as PDF, MS Word, Excel,
text, and HTML.64
2.

Breach Notification Modifications

In the event of a breach, the HITECH Act requires EHR entities to
notify the affected individuals and the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health & Human Services (“HHS”).65 The HITECH Act
increased the standard for notifying individuals of security and privacy
compromises of their protected health information.66 The new standard
requires notification of “significant risk of financial, reputational, or other
harm to the individual.”67 The prior standard was a general unauthorized
disclosure of information.68
3.

Security Standards

To ensure that an EHR system is secure, the HHS suggests three
measures to include: Access control, encryption, and an audit trail.69 HHS
recommends limiting access through the use of passwords and pin numbers
61.
42 U.S.C. § 17935(e); 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
62.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act §
13405(e); see also 42 U.S.C. § 17935(e).
63.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act §
13405(e).
64.
Id.; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5631.
65.
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2018); Health Information Technology for Economic
and Clinical Health Act § 13407; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security,
Enforcement, and Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5638.
66.
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act §
13407; Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5638–39.
67.
Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5639.
68.
See id.
69.
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS 2. As we established in Part II,
Blockchain readily satisfies all of these operant conditions. See Miliard, supra note 10;
discussion supra Part II.
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so only authorized personnel can access the protected health information.70
EHR data should be maintained in an encrypted state so that access is limited
to authorized personnel with a decryption key.71 Active monitoring of
persons accessing, altering or modifying the records, provides an audit trail.72
D.

The Medical Information Commons

In 2011, the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Research Council produced a detailed report titled, Toward Precision
Medicine: Building a Knowledge Network for Biomedical Research and a
New Taxonomy of Disease (the “Report”).73 In response to the United States
and other international efforts to incentivize adoptions of EHR systems to
improve clinical care and patient outcomes, the Report outlines goals and
guidelines to create and implement a medical information commons and
knowledge network for biomedical research.74 The information commons
will provide significant cost advantages by reducing research time,
advancing clinical care, and accelerating the implementation of EHR,
increasing EHR functionality, and providing a more expansive database of
genomic information.75 A database of such complexity would provide
physicians with an immense network of easily accessible and expansive
research.76
The Report outlines the proposed structure of the medical
information commons within the Report.77 The information commons would
create a unified system of biomedical research accessible through EHR.78
The information commons structure should be: (1) multilayered; (2) patientcentric; (3) highly interconnected; (4) flexible; and (5) widely accessible.79
One of the key features the information commons must incorporate is a
continuous validation system, which means that the system must be able to
identify if clinical data, results, and hypotheses have been confirmed
successfully by other sources.80 The presence of a continuous validation
system will enable physicians to learn about successful studies that relate to

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 69, at 2.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 1.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30–32.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 50.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 50.
Id. at 50–53.
See id. at 56.
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their patients’ symptoms and provide immediate possible treatment plans and
predictive outcomes.81
The practicality of implementing an information commons is not
without certain limitations.82 As we address in the next Section, there is
institutional resistance toward nascent, advanced technologies, and the
information compiled would be on a massive scale and timely to compile.83
The complexity and accessibility of centralized patient health information
poses serious privacy and HIPAA risks.84 Given recent data security
breaches at Equifax and Facebook, public concern over information security
is increasing.85 Privacy information regarding patients’ personal, financial,
and health information is of the utmost importance, and should remain
confidentially secured.86 A medical information commons system should
incorporate systems of accountability, in addition to the sanctions imposed
by HIPAA for the misuse of protected health information.87 The large
amounts of data collected and stored in a medical information commons are
ripe for abuse, consisting primarily of valuable aggregated clinical data and
results from patients who have claims in ownership rights to their protected
health and genomic information and privacy rights in protecting that
information.88
E.

Socioeconomic Failings of Existing EHR Systems

While EHR adoption should translate directly into tangible cost
savings to institutions and better patient outcomes, these predictions have
failed in practice.89 Many EHR adopting care providers experienced
81.
See id.
82.
See id. at 78.
83.
See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 60, 69; discussion infra
Section II.E.
84.
See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5565, 5570, 5581–82 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified as
amended at 45 C.F.R. § 164.524); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 67–68.
85.
Amy L. McGuire et al., Importance of Participant-Centricity and Trust
for a Sustainable Medical Information Commons, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 18 (2019).
86.
Id.; Amy L. McGuire et al., Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information
Commons, 47 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 62, 67 (2019).
87.
See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and
Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5582; McGuire et al., supra note 85, at 18.
88.
See McGuire et al., supra note 86, at 64 (expanding on the legal
perspectives on data ownership of medical records and genetic and genomic data).
89.
Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 6, 8. As explained in a 2012 National
Bureau of Economic Research report:
Nearly all of the information collected by EMR already resides in hospital billing
and medical records departments and in physicians’ offices. EMR automates the
collection and reporting of this information, including all diagnostic information,
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increases in information management costs, decreases in patient satisfaction,
and marginal gains in patient outcomes post-implementation.90 These
failures are caused by a number of factors, including: Technological
barriers, institutional resistance to investments, limited capital for
investments, and the skill and supply of the local information technology
labor market.91
The implementation of a robust EHR system also raises a number of
other public policy considerations recognized as important by Congress, such
as:
[F]urthering the availability of electronic health information as
needed for authorized and important purposes; protecting and
promoting patient safety; maintaining the privacy and security of
electronic health information; and protecting the legitimate
economic interests and incentives of providers, developers, and
other market participants to innovate and compete in ways that
ultimately enhance technology, [health care], and consumer health
and welfare.92

It is important, however, to distinguish between economic or technical
barriers to interoperability and concerted information blocking.93 Firms may
capture monopolistic or oligopolistic rents in the provision or utilization of

Id.

test results, and services and medications received by the patient. EMR can also
link this information to administrative data such as insurance information, billing,
and basic demographics. EMR can reduce the costs and improve the accuracy of
this data collection. Two components of EMR, Clinical Decision Support Systems
and Computerized Provider Order Entry, use clinical data to support clinical
decision making . . . . If implemented in ideal conditions and executed according to
the highest standards, EMR can reduce personnel costs while facilitating more
accurate diagnoses, fewer unnecessary and duplicative tests, and superior outcomes
with fewer costly complications.

90.
Id. at 3, 12. “We find that hospitals that adopted EMR between 1996 and
2009 did not experience a statistically significant decrease in costs on average. In fact, under
many specifications, costs rose after EMR adoption, particularly for the more advanced EMR
systems.” Id. at 3.
91.
Id. at 2. “EMR adoption is not correlated with unobservable cost factors
that are differentially trending in hospitals with locally available complementary inputs
relative to hospitals that lack these inputs.” Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 2.
92.
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH & DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON HEALTH INFORMATION BLOCKING
11–12 (2015).
93.
Id. at 11–12. “Information blocking occurs when persons or entities
knowingly and unreasonably interfere with the exchange or use of electronic health
information.” Id. at 11. Improper or unlawful information blocking requires a knowing act of
interference with an authorized persons access to information without a reasonable
justification for doing so. Id.
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EHR systems.94 To that extent, we focus on overcoming economic and
technical barriers, empowering patient’s participation, and improving patient
outcomes through technological solutions, and not on solving systemic
failures in polity, or correcting or punishing rent-seeking behavior by
entrenched market participants.95
94.
Id. at 13; see also Adam Hayes, Economic Rent, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 12,
2019), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economicrent.asp. “Monopoly rent refers to the
situation wherein a monopoly producer lacks competition and thus can sell its goods and
services at a price far above the otherwise competitive market price would be — at the
expense of consumers.” Hayes, supra. A 2015 report by the Office of the National
Coordinator for Health Information Technology on Health Information Blocking identified a
number of economic practices that may exploit interoperability failings to reap
anticompetitive profits, such as:
▪
Contract terms, policies, or other business or organizational
practices that restrict individuals’ access to their electronic health information or
restrict the exchange or use of that information for treatment and other permitted
purposes.
▪
Charging prices or fees (such as for data exchange,
portability, and interfaces) that make exchanging and using electronic health
information cost prohibitive.
▪
Developing or implementing health IT in non-standard ways
that are likely to substantially increase the costs, complexity, or burden of sharing
electronic health information, especially when relevant interoperability standards
have been adopted by the Secretary.
▪
Developing or implementing health IT in ways that are likely
to lock in users or electronic health information; lead to fraud, waste, or abuse; or
impede innovations and advancements in health information exchange and health
IT-enabled care delivery.

OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. & DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 92, at 13. Ultimately, market failures created by
concerted information blocking in EHR systems provision may require regulatory or
enforcement action. See Lucia Savage et al., Digital Health Data and Information
Sharing: A New Frontier for Health Care Competition?, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 593,
595 (2019).

Id.

[I]f firms perceive that control of these data confer competitive advantage, they will
be reluctant to share the data with rivals, even if sharing the data likely enables
better care to be delivered to patients. Holding on to data may allow market
participants to maintain, and in some cases enhance, their market position. [D]ata
blocking is already a barrier to choose and competition and can make it difficult for
new innovative organizations to successfully enter health care markets and
compete.

95.
See id. at 595; OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO.
TECH. & DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 92, at 11; Hayes, supra note 94.
While we propose several ways blockchain technologies may overcome some anticompetitive
information behavior problems, an in-depth discussion of antitrust law and its relations to
these topics are beyond the scope of this Article. See OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR
HEALTH INFO TECH. & DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 92, at 11; Savage et al.,
supra note 94, at 615–19 (suggesting FTC, DOJ, and OHS market interventions to
disincentivize health care providers from engaging in anticompetitive information blocking);
Hayes, supra note 94.
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Existing EHR systems are technologically cumbersome and
institutionally segregated, depriving health care professionals and patients
access to an integrated and universal system of patient records.96 EHR
systems were originally built for billing purposes, not for research, quality of
care, or patient outcomes.97 As a result, competing institutions are reluctant
or disincentivized to engage in information sharing with each other due to
technological constraints or anticompetitive information blocking.98
Coordination problems arise as a result of anticompetitive incentives and
technological barriers created by existing systems designed to maintain
patient data in centralized repositories.99 Further, many of the inflexible
certified EHR requirements found in ARRA impose heavy administrative
burdens on care providers in that they provide little discretion in
implementation of data inputs that may have little to no relevancy to patient
outcome.100 As one commentator notes, “EHR vendors will be creating
features that will most likely benefit the non-EHR user. For instance, a
complex immunization system for a nephrologist who most likely only
administers a seasonal flu shot. Who benefits from that?”101
The lack of a unified lifetime patient medical history often
necessitates practitioners reconstruction of medical histories from incomplete
data sourced from the patient’s imperfect oral recollection and a variety of
96.
See Rebecca Angeles, Blockchain-Based Healthcare: Three Successful
Proof-of-Concept Pilots Worth Considering, J. INT’L TECH. OF INFO. MGMT., Jan. 1, 2019, at
47, 50. Nearly half of reporting United States clinicians have no access to complete patient
histories, and patients report difficulty to have an integrated summary of their medical
histories. Id. Institutional segregation of access to records can also result in concerted
information blocking for intentional or unintentional anticompetitive purposes. Id.;
Yanamadala et al., supra note 4, at 5.
97.
Yanamadala et al., supra note 4, at 5; see also William R. Hersh et al.,
Caveats for the Use of Operational Electronic Health Record Data in Comparative
Effectiveness Research, 51 MED. CARE S30, S31 (2013).
98.
OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH. & DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 92, at 11–12.
99.
Id.
100.
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 1115, §1, 123 Stat. 115, 115 (2009) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645); Diana
Strubler, Regulation vs Innovation: The Battles of a Certified EHR in a Meaningful Use
World,
ACUMEN
PHYSICIAN
SOLUTIONS:
BLOG
(May
11,
2015),
http://www.acumenmd.com/blog/regulation-vs-innovation-the-battles-of-a-certified-ehr-in-ameaningful-use-world/.
[T]he heavy burden may ‘stifle innovation in our country and reduce the global
competitiveness for the entire United States Health IT industry by over-regulating
features and functions with complicated requirements that only apply to CMS and
[United States] special interests. And that the criteria are only designed to ‘accrue
benefits to people who aren’t feeling the opportunity cost.

Strubler, supra.
101.

Id.
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previous treating facilities (usually reliant upon the patient’s memory of their
various historical primary health care providers, treating hospitals, and
specialty providers).102 Existing EHR platforms were not designed with
management of interoperable, multi-institutional, lifetime medical records in
mind.103 Accuracy of redundant EHR is further complicated by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule, which allows providers sixty days to respond to requests to
update or remove erroneous delays.104 This two month lag time in data
correction can cause cascading problems in resolving errors in patient health
information accuracy.105
Further problems arise in exploiting patient health information for
clinical research.106 An estimated half of all clinical trials are unreported,
stunting the growth of aggregated knowledge capital, which in turn dampens
the progression of potentially life-saving scientific research utilizing
advanced data mining techniques.107 Even upon updating patient health
information, there are little to no technological systems that maintain or seek
additional updates to the data set beyond the recreation of the file on a
specific date or provide mechanisms for detecting and correcting data errors
within existing systems.108 As a result, most patient histories quickly
become fully or partially outdated without constant reevaluation of
voluminous amounts of diagnostic, treatment, preventative, curative, or
genomic updates to the patient’s medical history.109
The economic costs of implementing and maintaining existing EHR
systems are staggering.110 Industry studies suggest that existing EHR
systems have generally struggled to realize significant cost savings for
practitioners and health care providers.111 A 2015 study by the Center for
102.
Lise Poissant et al., The Impact of Electronic Health Records on Time
Efficiency of Physicians and Nurses: A Systematic Review, 12 JAMIA 505, 505–06 (2005).
103.
Hersh et al., supra note 97, at S30–S37; Yanamadala et al., supra note 4,
at 1.
104.
ARIEL EKBLAW ET AL., A CASE STUDY FOR BLOCKCHAIN IN HEALTHCARE:
“MEDREC” PROTOTYPE FOR ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL RESEARCH DATA 2
(2016); see also Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach
Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5565, 5565 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.524).
105.
EKBLAW ET AL., supra note 104, at 2.
106.
Id.
107.
Angeles, supra note 96, at 52.
108.
Id. at 60.
109.
Id. at 50–51.
110.
Id.
111.
See Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 29.
After three years, hospitals in IT-intensive locations experience a
(significant) 3.4 [%] decrease in costs after adopting basic EMR, and a marginally
significant 2.2 [%] decrease in costs after adopting advanced EMR. These benefits
are greatest in locations with a large number of HIT workers, though the benefits of
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Medicare and Medicaid services found that implementation of basic EHR
systems costs a single physician approximately $163,765.112 The average
cost of adoption of a new EHR system for an urban hospital has been
estimated in the 3 to 9 million dollar range, with estimates of $700,000 to
$1,000,000 in annual maintenance costs and nearly 70,000 hours in
information technology labor.113 Many early adopters of EHR systems did
not experience statistically significant decreases in costs on average, and in
some cases, costs rose after early EHR adoption.114 It has also been
estimated that EHR data breaches have cost the health care industry $50.6
billion between 2009 and 2015.115
Existing EHR systems have also, at times, negatively impacted
patient treatment and physician quality of life as well.116 EHR usage has
been found to adversely affect time allocation for patient visits, lower overall
patient satisfaction with their health care providers, and increase physician
error risk.117 A 2017 survey of family physicians found that 44.6% thought
they spent an excessive or moderately high amount of time working on EHR
files at home.118 A survey of ophthalmologists reported spending a mean
time of four hours, or twenty-seven percent of their day, inputting data into
their practice’s EHR system, reducing their patient interaction time.119 The

Id.

IT-intensive locations likely extend beyond local expertise in hospital IT. In
contrast, hospitals in other locations experience an increase in costs, even after
several years.

112.
Tara O’Neill Hayes, Are Electronic Medical Records Worth the Costs of
Implementation?,
AM.
ACTION
F.
(Aug.
6,
2015),
http://www.americanactionforum.org/research/are-electronic-medical-records-worth-thecosts-of-implementation/.
113.
Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 7; Strubler, supra note 100.
114.
Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 3. The authors of this survey suggest that
these implementation costs are often abated by the strength of the local information
technology markets. Id.

Id.

[H]ospitals in IT-intensive markets enjoyed a statistically significant 3.4 [%]
decrease in costs from three years after adoption of basic EHR and a marginally
significant 2.2 [%] decrease in costs from three years after adoption of advanced
EHR. These results are significantly better than the up to 4 percent increase in
costs after adoption by hospitals in other markets.

115.
Hayes, supra note 112.
116.
See id.
117.
Neda Ratanawongsa et al., Multitasking and Silent Electronic Health
Record Use in Ambulatory Visits, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1382, 1382 (2017).
118.
Monee Rassolian et al., Workplace Factors Associated with Burnout of
Family Physicians, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1036, 1037 (2017).
119.
See Sarah Read-Brown et al., Time Requirements for Electronic Health
Record Use in an Academic Ophthalmology Center, 135 JAMA OPHTHALMOLOGY 1250, 1254
(2017); see also Poissant et al., supra note 102, at 505 (finding an increase of 98.1% to
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billing and compliance focus of existing EHR systems has resulted in
physicians reporting widespread dissatisfaction with existing EHR systems
from burnout and a lack of patient first focus in existing architectures.120
Worse, existing EHR systems have had either little or negative
effects on improving patient outcomes.121 A 2016 survey published in the
Baltimore Journal of Medicine analyzed “patient outcomes, across six large
[and] diverse states for . . . medical and surgical care.”122 The survey
focused on “inpatient mortality, thirty-day all cause readmission rates,
[patient safety indicators], and length of stay.”123 The survey failed to find
improvements in patient outcomes based on EHR implementation,
concluding that:
Although EHRs have been extremely helpful for billing and
physician compliance measurements, direct improvement of
important patient outcomes have yet to be seen. A possible reason
for this is that EHRs thus far have largely served as a recording
mechanism after a patient care intervention rather than as an
effective checking mechanism during the actual execution phase of
patient care interventions. It has also been shown that while basic
EHRs are associated with gains in quality measures, less benefit is
associated with implementing advanced EHRs, suggesting that
initial adoption of EHRs may actually be counterproductive by
adding additional complexity into clinical settings. Additionally,
such improvements have yet to be translated to improvements in
mortality. Lack of improvement in other patient outcome
measures has also been demonstrated. For example, [one] study
demonstrated that although EHRs were associated with better rates
of cholesterol testing, this did not translate to improvements in
patients’ actual cholesterol levels. In another study of ambulatory
diabetes care in clinics with and without EHRs, patients at EHR
enabled clinics actually did worse in rates of meeting [two] year
hemoglobin A1c, cholesterol, and blood pressure goals.
328.6% of physicians time per working shift in data entry into an EHR computerized provider
order entry system).
120.
Cost Is Biggest Barrier to Electronic Medical Records Implementation,
Study
Finds,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND,
(Sept.
19,
2005),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletter-article/cost-biggest-barrierelectronic-medical-records-implementation.
121.
See Yanamadala et al., supra note 4, at 2.
122.
Id. at 3. The survey “utilized discharge data from the 2011 State Inpatient
Databases (SID), Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP), Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality from Arkansas, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Mississippi, and
New York.” Id. at 2; Donna P. Manca, Do Electronic Medical Records Improve Quality of
Care?, 61 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN, 846, 846 (2015).
123.
Yanamadala et al., supra note 4, at 2.
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Furthermore, data suggest that EHR implementation may actually
increase the amount of time spent by patients during clinic visits.
These studies suggest that EHRs, with their increased
documentation requirements, can have unintended consequences,
including clinic inefficacy.124

Other barriers to interoperability dampen effective EHR
implementation.125 Existing EHR systems segregate data on competing
platforms, often resulting in fragmented or overlapping and redundant data
sets and thereby reducing interoperability between providers on different
systems.126 Other data fragmentation may result from the institutional
learning curve experienced in adoption of nascent technologies.127
Implementing EHR platforms require changes in policy, personnel,
employee discretion, institutional knowledge and training, information
support systems and management, and communications systems between
employees and departments.128 New EHR systems may include gaps in input
or output systems, limiting or changing the availability of data sets once
available to providers.129 Adoption requires hardware or software systems
changes, which introduce noneconomic costs in the form of delays, lag times
in platform conversion, breaks or loss of interoperability, and additional
administrative concerns into ongoing treatment and preventative care, the
cost of which is ultimately borne by patients.130 Further, rural areas or areas
with undercapitalized labor markets in information technologies may lack
necessary technological knowledge to support adoption of new systems,
thereby increasing socioeconomic barriers to implementation.131
A new technological advancement, blockchain ledgers, offers a
solution to these technological and socioeconomic problems, which we
consider in the next part of this Article.132

124.
Id. at 5. The survey notes that “changes in quality of care after the
implementation of EHRs may be attributable in part to non-EHR factors, which cannot be
fully accounted for in our analysis.” Id.
125.
See Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 7.
126.
Id. at 6–7.
127.
Id. at 13.
128.
Id. at 9–10.
129.
See id. “[A]t one ophthalmology unit at a teaching hospital, the
physicians could not find a way to put their traditional hand-drawings into the new formats.
They found that the new electronic formats sometimes reduced the richness of the information
they could record.” Dranove et al., supra note 1, at 10–11.
130.
See id. at 11, 13.
131.
See id. at 12.
132.
See Allison Berke, How Safe Are Blockchains? It Depends, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.hbr.org/2017/03/how-safe-are-blockchains-it-depends.
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A NEW MODEL: PATIENTS AS PEERS

Blockchain Basics

There is no agreement as to what constitutes a blockchain, as
blockchain ledgers have multiple optional functionalities.133 Broadly
speaking, blockchain is a type of distributed ledger that has certain definable
technological components.134 A distributed ledger is a computerized record
that is stored on a peer-to-peer computer network.135 What is novel about
blockchain ledgers are the technological components that maintain, input,
update, and utilize the ledger data.136
These technological components include:
A distributed and
decentralized digital ledger or database in which blocks of data are shared
between a network of peer-to-peer computers; the digital ledger or database
data is distributed on a public or private computer network; the chain of
blocks are uniformly ordered and chronological in nature; the records are
either immutable or substantially immutable; the records are redundantly
maintained and processed by a consensus of the networked public or private
computers in the chain to guarantee the consistency and nonrepudiation of
the recorded transactions or other data; and the ledger’s immutability is
maintained by cryptographically policing the ability to alter informational
content in the blockchain.137
Access to a blockchain requires a public key, which is shared by
users (those uploading data and those accessing data) on the network, and a
private key which is used by the patient.138 These keys may be passwords,
two-factor authentication access, or decryption controls.139
Blockchain is a novel general-purpose database system, with
applications beyond commonly known applications like cryptocurrency.140
The technological operations of a blockchain-based record system offer
133.
HEALTHCARE INFO. & MGMT. SYS. SOC’Y, CONSIDERATIONS FOR
POLICYMAKERS: THE APPLICATION OF BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY IN HEALTHCARE 1 (2019);
see also WILLIAM BIBLE ET AL., BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE
AUDIT AND ASSURANCE PROFESSION 8 (2017).
134.
HEALTHCARE INFO. & MGMT. SYS. SOC’Y, supra note 133, at 1; Kuo et al.,
supra note 3, at 1212–15.
135.
Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1212–13; Berke, supra note 132.
136.
See Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1212; Berke, supra note 132.
137.
See Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1212; Berke, supra note 132.
138.
See Tanya, Public and Private Keys, BLOCKCHAIN SUPPORT CTR. (Jan. 6,
2020, 2:27 PM), http://support.blockchain.com/hc/en-us/articles/360000951966-Public-andprivate-keys. “[P]ublic keys . . . are publicly known and essential for identification, and
private keys . . . are kept secret and are used for authentication and encryption.” Id.
139.
See id.
140.
BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 8.
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several benefits over traditional database management systems.141 These
benefits, in turn, incentivize interested stakeholders to behave differently in
their interactions with the data stored on the blockchain ledger.142 Data on a
blockchain ledger is not stored in a centralized location but, rather, is
distributed on a peer-to-peer network of individual nodes.143 Each node must
reach agreement at a certain level of predefined consensus before changes
can be appended to the blockchain ledger.144 This agreement is reached
through advanced mathematical calculations utilizing encryption protocols
which confirm that a record is what a particular node says it is.145
A blockchain ledger stores a permanent, unalterable, and indelible
historical record of every transaction recorded on the blockchain.146 This
immutability reduces the ability for single actors to commit fraud against the
ledger, and automates the creation of an audit trail.147 Trust in a blockchain
ledger is disintermediated and distributed among the nodes that maintain the
ledger records.148 Put differently, trust in a traditional database is inherent in
the institution that maintains the database.149 Blockchain ledgers however,
incentivize independent nodes to maintain the accuracy of the ledger for the
node operator’s benefit.150 Finally, the records stored on a blockchain ledger
are pseudo-anonymous, in that the identity of private keys is kept anonymous
from the other nodes on the ledger.151
It is important to distinguish the decentralized structure of a
blockchain ledger, and the centralized structure of a traditional database
platform from social, and institutional controls over a blockchain ledger.152
We are not arguing that health care records should never be stored on a
publicly accessible blockchain ledger.153 Rather, we propose that vetted and
qualified institutions can be granted permissioned access to a blockchainbased EHR system, or medical information commons.154
141.
See id.
142.
Berke, supra note 132.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
See Emily Kotow, What Is Blockchain Hashing?, HEDGETRADE (Feb. 26,
2019), http://www.hedgetrade.com/what-is-blockchain-hashing/.
146.
Kurt Yaeger et al., Emerging Blockchain Technology Solutions for
Modern Healthcare Infrastructure, J. SCI. INNOVATION MED., Jan. 24, 2019, at 1, 4.
147.
Id. at 2–4.
148.
Id. at 4.
149.
See id.
150.
See id.
151.
Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 2–5.
152.
See Kotow, supra note 145.
153.
See Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 2–3.
154.
See id.
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Beneficial Modalities of Blockchain Based EHR
1.

Security, Privacy, HITECH, and HIPAA Compliance

Blockchain based EHR offers five key benefits over traditional
database management systems, such as Structured Query Language (“SQL”)
systems like Oracle, and open source NoSQL databases systems like Apache
Cassandra.155 First, decentralizing management of the database from a single
institution or entity disincentives information blocking and anticompetitive
rent-seeking behavior, as we discussed in Section II.D.156 Second, the
creation of an immutable audit trail eliminates the risk of institutional or
individualized fraud against the ledger’s records.157 Third, data provenance
allows ownership and control of records to be altered only by the exact
authorized person to do so, either the patient or the treating physician, while
automatically maintaining a record trail of the author of the change.158
Fourth, blockchain-based EHR offers robustness and availability, in that the
underlying distributed ledger eliminates virtually all single-points-of-failure
inherent in traditional database systems, either in the form of data loss at the
sole storage point, breach in access to the patient’s EHR, or in abuse of the
authorization to make alterations to the patient’s EHR.159 Finally, there are
significant security gains realized by implementing 256-bit SHA
asymmetrical encryption over traditional security architecture to protect
access, and verify permission to any blockchain-based EHR system.160
Blockchain, by virtue of its technological nature, already complies
with the HITECH incentives reporting requirements, HHS’s certified EHR
security standards, and HIPAA in most respects.161 The immutable nature of
a blockchain ledger provides a consistent and redundant audit trail for
reporting compliance.162 Blockchain systems generally rely on asymmetric
155.
Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1214.
156.
See id. at 1214; discussion supra Section II.D.
157.
Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1214.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 1211–12, 1214.
160.
Kotow, supra note 145.
161.
Howard Burde, The HITECH ACT — an Overview, 13 AMA J. ETHICS
172, 172–73 (2011); Certified EHR Technology, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVICES:
REGULATIONS
&
GUIDANCE,
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Certification (last updated Mar. 22, 2020);
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES (July 26, 2013),
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html.
162.
See BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 9–10. “[A] transaction recorded in a
blockchain may still be: unauthorized, fraudulent or illegal; executed between related parties;
linked to a side agreement that is off-chain; [or] incorrectly classified in the financial
statements.” Id. at 10.

316

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

encryption based on SHA-256 hash functions designed by the National
Security Agency, which is considerably harder to compromise than
traditional computer passwords.163
These technological components offer a way for care providers to
comply with the Stage 3 objectives of the HITECH Act and the privacy,
security, and reporting requirements of the amended HIPAA EHR rules.164
However, as with every secured data platform, human interaction creates fail
points in blockchain security, in terms of lost, forgotten, or stolen access to
the blockchain ledger.165 As a result, a number of objections have been
raised to blockchain-based EHR, which we address each in Section III.C.166
2.

Permissioned Patient Consent and Clinical Data Mining

Additionally, there are significant potentials for improvements in
patient outcome, patient satisfaction, and interoperability realized from the
use of a patient permissioned EHR blockchain system.167 An EHR
blockchain system can send out auto-generated updates to individual
patients about their medications and individual problems.168 A blockchainbased EHR system offers a unique way for patients to consent to
permissioned access to all or portions of their medical histories on a
provider-by-provider basis.169 An “open-source, community-wide trusted
ledger” could be used such that additions and subtractions to the EHR are
“well understood and auditable across [health care] organizations.”170 Since
blockchain can be configured as a smart contract operable between multiple
163.
See Kotow, supra note 145. “This function expresses the possible
combinations or values that results from the given input data. SHA stands for Secure Hashing
Function, and 256 expresses the numerical quantity of the fixed bit length.” Id. For valuable
blockchains, such as cryptocurrency, 2048 RSA encryption is used. Id.; EMERGING TECH.
FROM THE ARXIV, How a Quantum Computer Could Break 2048-bit RSA Encryption in 8
hours,
MIT
TECH.
REV.:
TOPICS
(May
30,
2019),
http://www.technologyreview.com/s/613596/how-a-quantum-computer-could-break-2048-bitrsa-encryption-in-8-hours/.
164.
HITECH Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj–300jj-52 (2018); ANTHONY & LIPINSKI,
supra note 45, at 36; see also Codrin Arsene, The Global Blockchain in Healthcare Report:
The 2019 Ultimate Guide for Every Executive, HEALTHCARE WKLY. (Jan. 10, 2020),
http://www.healthcareweekly.com/blockchain-in-healthcare-guide/.
165.
See Berke, supra note 132.
166.
See Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1217; David Gerard, Medical Records, but
on the Blockchain — the History of a Bad Idea, DAVID GERARD: BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Apr. 20,
2019),
http://www.davidgerard.co.uk/blockchain/2019/04/20/medical-records-on-theblockchain-the-history-of-a-bad-idea/; discussion infra Section III.C.
167.
See Miliard, supra note 10; Witten, supra note 47.
168.
Miliard, supra note 10.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
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health care providers, the collection and integration of EHR from different
databases into a single accessible database provides significant
interoperability to the existing distributed and distinct EHR databases.171
These smart contracts are implemented in the blockchain as “lines of code
that define self-executing and/or self-enforcing clauses, running only if
certain conditions are met” and are used to link a patient’s private key to the
EHR system.172 Further, diagnostic tools and machines can be coordinated
to automatically append and transmit diagnostic records and images to a
patient’s blockchain record.173 Thus, the presence of smart contracts in the
blockchain increases the efficiency of any patient-focused EHR blockchain
system.174
Advancements in predictive analytics and artificial intelligence offer
another developing use case for maintenance of a universal, lifetime EHR
file for patients.175 Machine learning and analytics can be added to datamine anonymized blockchain-based EHR repositories for disease
surveillance, genomic and epidemiological monitoring, prescription abuse
access or other long-term treatment based on forecasting of known or
unknown trending and other statistically significant data points.176 These
predictive algorithms can also be utilized to track patient outcomes across
treatment groups, population demographics, treating providers or other
clinical controls in real time.177 Blockchain-based EHR, by virtue of its
technological safeguards, can be utilized to anonymize portions or all of a
patient’s health information, at the patient’s decision, so that clinicians can
be limited only to relevant portions of a patient’s history for mining
purposes.178
171.
See Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 2–3.
172.
Id.
173.
See id. at 5; Miliard, supra note 10.
174.
See Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 2; Arsene, supra note 164.
175.
See Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 5; Arsene, supra note 164; Fred
Donovan, Rensselaer Researchers Use Blockchain to Boost Medical Image Sharing, HIT
INFRASTRUCTURE (June 25, 2019), http://www.hitinfrastructure.com/news/rensselaerresearchers-use-blockchain-to-boost-medical-image-sharing.
176.
See EKBLAW ET AL., supra note 104, at 10.
177.
See id.
178.
See id. at 8; Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 5. The statistical impact on
data relevancy created by patient consent to access relevant health information on clinical data
mining, fragmentation caused by gaps in given consent, or transparency in the consent process
is beyond the scope of this Article. See Shomona Gracia Jacob & R. Geetha Ramani, Data
Mining in Clinical Data Sets: A Review, INT’L J. APPLIED INFO. SYSTEMS, Dec. 2012, at 15,
21; Miliard, supra note 10.
Cios and Moore have posed a dispute that data problems in [health care]
are the result of the dimensionality, intricacy and assorted nature of medical data
and their low mathematical characterization and nonconformance to a certain
protocol. Moreover ethical, legal and social issues encountered in CDM also have
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Autonomous Algorithmic Fraud Accounting

Medical billing fraud can be curtailed by a system-wide, patientcentric EHR blockchain system.179 A pharmaceutical supply blockchain can
reduce counterfeit drugs introduced in the supply line because genuine drugs
can be tracked from their origin to the end-user with a blockchain that lists
every entity handling the pill bottles, the entity’s location, and a date code.180
Medical fraud often occurs when paper records or EHR are stolen and these
medical records are used to bill for services that were never rendered, or the
records are altered and fabricated medical claims are submitted to insurers
using patient data as the backdrop.181 The United States “based National
Healthcare Anti-Fraud Association estimates the loss owing to [health care]
fraud [is] about $80 billion annually.”182 These losses occur notwithstanding
that the United States spends about twenty-percent of its GDP on health
care.183
Basic blockchain ledgers used to track inventory in supply chains are
currently used for tracking international shipments of goods, such as
mangos.184 These supply chain blockchain ledgers automatically track
sourcing, shipping, and other detailed logistics data, without the need of
human input.185 A similar blockchain ledger constructed to track drugs from
their point of origin to the end user and through all the transportation and
warehousing points, the retail chain and ultimately to the end-user would
reduce counterfeiting, diversion, and the opportunity for fraudulent
billings.186 Counterfeit drugs cost the American public around $200 billion

to be appropriately handled. The issue of obtaining patterns of diverse nature on
exhaustive mining of data needs to be deliberated upon. Extensive research may
reveal many interesting patterns and relationships not necessarily valuable.

Jacob & Ramani, supra at 22 (internal citations omitted).
179.
See Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 2; Miliard, supra note 10.
180.
Yaeger et al., supra note 146, at 5; Matt Leonard, SAP Debuts Blockchain
Solution for Counterfeit Drugs, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Jan. 23, 2019),
http://www.supplychaindive.com/news/blockchain-curtail-counterfeit-medicine.
181.
The Challenge of Health Care Fraud, NAT’L HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD
ASS’N,
http://www.nhcaa.org/resources/health-care-anti-fraud-resources/the-challenge-ofhealth-care-fraud.aspx (last visited May 1, 2020).
182.
Sukant Khurana, Blockchain for Medical Records, MEDIUM (Apr. 22,
2018),
http://www.medium.com/@sukantkhurana/blockchain-for-medical-records4efbf625b6d4.
183.
Arsene, supra note 164.
184.
Reshma Kamath, Food Traceability on Blockchain: Walmart’s Pork and
Mango Pilots with IBM, J. BRIT. BLOCKCHAIN ASS’N, June 12, 2018, at 47, 48–49.
185.
Id. at 49.
186.
John Tilton, What’s in the Bottle? FDA Announces New Blockchain Pilot
Program for Tracking Drug Distribution, SHEPPARD MULLIN (Aug. 12, 2019),
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each year.187 A drug supply blockchain ledger would provide visibility and
transparency throughout the drug supply chain which could result in reduced
revenue losses by up to an estimated $43 billion annually.188 Likewise, drug
theft enabled by poor supply chain logistics or corrupt officials continues to
plague under-developed nations.189 A study by non-profit, Global Fund to
Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria revealed that between 2009 and 2011,
more than $2.5 million worth of drugs had been stolen or diverted from
African countries.190
Information Communication and Technology
consultant Rashid Kami, explained that “[w]e are therefore grappling with
issues of people dying of Malaria not because we do not have medicine, but
because of the fraud within the supply chain.”191
Medical records could “be stored on a distributed ledger or
blockchain” using Hyperledger Composer tools.192 The patient-centric
“blockchain is shared with the patient, health care provider, insurer, and the
[G]overnment.”193 The Government acts as a trusted party regulator holding
the EMR blockchain.194 “When information is required, the health care
provider or insurer” sends a request to the patient with “details of
information to be viewed” on the EMR blockchain.195 The patient authorizes
access using his or her private key permitting the health care provider or the
insurer access to the information.196

http://www.sheppardhealthlaw.com/2019/08/articles/healthcare/dscsa-tracking-drugdistribution-2/.
187.
Arsene, supra note 164.
188.
Id.
189.
See Tim K. Mackey et al., The Disease of Corruption: Views on How to
Fight Corruption to Advance 21st Century Global Health Goals, BMC MED., Sept. 29, 2016,
at 1, 1.
190.
AP Reports on Global Fund Malaria Drug Thefts, Issues Correction,
KAISER FAM. FOUND.: TOPICS (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.kff.org/news-summary/ap-reportson-global-fund-malaria-drug-thefts-issues-correction/.
191.
Bob Koigi, Tanzania’s First Blockchain Baby Rubberstamps Power of
Tech
in
Medical
Care,
FAIR
PLANET
(June
25,
2019),
http://www.fairplanet.org/story/tanzania’s-first-blockchain-baby-rubberstamps-power-of-techin-medical-care/;
What
Is
an
ICT
Consultant?,
E2E
CONSULTING,
http://www.e2econsulting.co.za/faq/what-is-an-ict-consultant/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
192.
Khurana, supra note 182.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
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A Blockchain Medical Information Commons

As previously addressed, patient records are often fragmented at
various health care providers.197 A patient may receive care at multiple
institutions, whether in a series of treatments for a unified purpose, or for a
variety of health care treatment provisions.198 By appending these records to
a unified blockchain ledger, health care providers can centralize and
aggregate these records into a single, uniform medical information
commons.199
Patients would no longer need to rely on their own memory nor
coordinate and gather records from various treatment providers, but rather
could give providers (and clinical data miners) an as needed, permissioned
access to relevant portions of their single unified medical record.200 A
unified system would also reduce or eliminate incentives for health care
providers to engage in anti-competitive information blockchain, as all would
have access to the same sets of patient health information.201
5.

Smart Contracts and Autonomous Data Collection

In 1994, Nick Szabo, a legal scholar and cryptographer, argued that
decentralized ledgers could be utilized for the performance of what he
termed smart contracts.202 The term smart contract is a bit of a misnomer, as
it is often used interchangeably to conceptualize the use of smart contracts as
binding legal contracts.203 A smart contract is any self-executing computer
code that can act as a digital manifestation of a transaction between two or
more parties.204
197.
See Angeles, supra note 96, at 50.
198.
See id.
199.
See id.
200.
See Khurana, supra note 182.
201.
See id.
202.
See Jake Frankenfield, Smart Contracts, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 8, 2019),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smart-contracts.asp; Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts:
Building Blocks for Digital Markets, EXTROPY, 1996, at 50; Stefan Stankovic, Who Is Nick
Szabo,
the
Mysterious
Blockchain
Titan,
UNBLOCK
(July
13,
2018),
http://www.unblock.net/nick-szabo. Szabo also proposed Bit gold around this time, the
conceptual predecessor to Bitcoin. Philip Moskov, What Is Bit Gold? The Brainchild of
Blockchain Pioneer Nick Szabo, COIN CENTRAL: GUIDES (May 22, 2018),
http://www.coincentral.com/what-is-bit-gold-the-brainchild-of-blockchain-pioneer-nickszabo/. Bit gold is credited as presenting the theory of the first disintermediated digital
currency. See id. Bit gold was never implemented. Id.
203.
See Szabo, supra note 202.
204.
Mauro Conti et al., A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues of Bitcoin, 20
IEEE COMM. SURVEYS & TUTORIALS 3416, 3447 (2018).
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Another way to conceptualize smart contracts is that of a digital
vending machine.205 A vending machine is a self-contained machine that
offers to enter into a certain contract with its users.206 A group of products
and prices are displayed, and, if a purchaser inserts money into the machine,
the machine will automatically vend the product to the purchaser.207
Vending machines are an existing form of an autonomous contract and have
existed in one form or another since Hero of Alexandria’s first century holy
water vending machine.208 In the 1980s, stock traders started utilizing
automated day trading programs for securities investing.209 By 2014, nearly
seventy-five percent of all securities traded on exchanges utilized some form
of automated trading system orders.210
By linking diagnostic technologies with a blockchain smart contract,
a diagnostic smart contract can automate the appending of diagnostic data to
a blockchain ledger.211 For example, instead of having to manually enter a
patient’s vitals for each visit, a primary care physician’s office equipped with
smart-contract-enabled diagnostic equipment can rely on that equipment to
automatically record a patient’s weight, temperature, blood pressure, and
other important but routine diagnostic information into the patient’s health
records.212 Lab diagnostic and testing machines can automatically record and
upload results onto the patient’s history, drastically reducing physician data
entry times, thereby increasing patient interaction, patient satisfaction, and
physician care time.213
C.

Addressing Objections to Blockchain EHR

A number of objections have been raised to utilizing a blockchain
ledger to store sensitive EHR.214 The five major ones identified or suggested
by the surveyed literature include: (1) the patient’s key creating a security
205.
Giulia Castellani, Smart Contracts, Legal-Tech Professions and Civil Law
Issues, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE DIGITAL ECON. 141, 142 (Valeria Fili & Federico Costantini
eds., 2019).
206.
See id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
JAMES W. CORTADA, THE DIGITAL HAND: VOLUME II: HOW COMPUTERS
CHANGED THE WORK OF AMERICAN FINANCIAL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MEDIA, AND
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 173 (2005).
210.
Jean Folger, Automated Trading Systems:
The Pros and Cons,
INVESTOPEDIA (May 12, 2019), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/11/automatedtrading-systems.asp.
211.
See Gerard, supra note 166; Miliard, supra note 10.
212.
See Miliard, supra note 10.
213.
See id.
214.
See id.; Gerard, supra note 166.
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point of failure; (2) exponential data growth in a blockchain ledger could
render it unusable; (3) HIPAA compliance is harder (and therefore, more
expensive) when records are not centralized in a single institutional
repository; (4) scalability and transactions speeds slow as more records are
added to the blockchain ledger; (5) brute force attacks and other data issues
pose a security threat to blockchain-based EHR.215
1.

The Patient’s Key

In an EHR blockchain system, each patient maintains their private
key to operate their data stored on the blockchain.216 There are a number of
risks in traditional computer controls over the patient’s key, as found in a
password log in system.217 A patient might forget his or her key.218 They
could inadvertently reset the key to an unknown key (necessitating customer
support to reset the private key, representing another security risk).219 They
could become incapacitated or unable to consent to their use of the key, and
the private key is forever lost, resulting in a complete loss of access to the
EHR.220 They could also unwittingly provide sensitive information to a third
party through social engineering.221 This objection is reductionist, as the
problem with these types of security weaknesses, focused on single points of
failure, is not caused by blockchain technology itself, but rather represents a
long-standing problem in computer system and database management.222
A pending United States patent application by Walmart offers a
solution to this problem in EHR systems.223 The Walmart patent application
utilizes a wearable device on the user, such as a bracelet, to capture a
biometric from an unresponsive or incapacitated patient to obtain access to
the patient’s private key.224 The patient’s medical record is then stored on a
limited access blockchain.225 The system receives an encrypted private key
and a public key associated with the patient stored on a wearable device.226
215.
See Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1211–17; Gerard, supra note 166.
216.
See Gerard, supra note 166.
217.
See id.
218.
William J. Gordon & Christian Catalini, Blockchain Technology for
Healthcare:
Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability, 16
COMPUTATIONAL & STRUCTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 224, 228 (2018).
219.
See id.
220.
Gerard, supra note 166.
221.
See id.
222.
See Gerard, supra note 166; Miliard, supra note 10.
223.
U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. 2018/0167200 to High et al.
224.
Id. at [0023], [0024].
225.
Id. at [0028].
226.
Id. at [0005].
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The wearable device is scanned, for example, at the scene of an emergency
to obtain the encrypted private key which is decrypted by a biometric
signature obtained from the patient (such as a retina scan, fingerprint or other
bodily feature of the patient).227 The biometric signature is used to decrypt
the encrypted private key.228 The patient’s health information is accessed
using the private key and the public key obtained from the wearable
device.229 The biometric data input overcomes the human single-point of
failure found in traditional computer security access systems.230
2.

Exponential Scaling and Data Growth Externalities

Other commentators have noted that there is an enormous amount of
aggregate patient data including genomic data, hospital records,
immunization records, and lab results.231 There has been an exponential
explosion in the amount of digital data in the health care industry since EHR
adoption began.232 Experts estimate that each patient will add about eighty
megabytes (“MB”) of text data and images to the blockchain each year.233 If
a physician has one hundred patients, over a ten year period, this will equate
to eighty gigabytes (“GB”) of data, not accounting for new patients during
the ten years.234 Given typical patients loads and data growth, doctor groups
will generate nearly a terabyte (“TB”) of data in a short time period.235 There
are transactional costs which must be accounted for when each block of data
is integrated into the patient-centric blockchain which include processing,
encryption, data transmission, and data storage over multiple databases
227.
Id. at [0006].
228.
High at [0006].
229.
Id.
230.
See id.
231.
See Nathan Brown, Healthcare Data Growth: An Exponential Problem,
NEXTECH: BLOG (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.nextech.com/blog/healthcare-data-growth-anexponential-problem; Miliard, supra note 10.
232.
See Brown, supra note 231. In economic terms:
As the unit cost of a good falls, demand for the good increases. Thus,
even as the unit cost of computer-related work has fallen (due to productivity
improvements), the demand for that work within the corporation has increased.
With a price elasticity of demand greater than one, the total amount of information
processing work after computerization, and its cost, can be greater than the volume
and cost of information work prior to computerization. Thus, even if the unit cost
of doing information work falls dramatically due to computerization, the total
demand for such work, and the total cost to the corporation may increase.

Stuart Macdonald et al., Measurement or Management?: Revisiting the Productivity Paradox
of Information Technology, 69 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 601, 609 (2000). This is true regardless
of the underlying database technology used to store data. See id.
233.
Brown, supra note 231.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.
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forming the backbone of the blockchain.236 Each copy of the blockchain
must be maintained in a secure storage at multiple database locations.237
There are also processing costs when various health care providers access
that patient-centric blockchain associated with password (a key control), data
transmission, and data storage.238
3.

Public vs. Private Blockchain EHR Systems

Others object to utilizing blockchain for EHR data storage,
suggesting that: (a) a blockchain is not designed for such large volumes of
data; (b) for medical clinical studies, each patient has a unique identifier, and
to access the data in each block a mechanism must be provided to redact or
mask the individual’s unique identifier; and (c) the anonymity of data on the
blockchain does not mean that the blockchain is private only to the patient.239
As noted by one commentator,
identity on blockchain tends to be anonymous but not private.
What this means is that while transactions are anonymous (real
identity is hidden), they are publicly recorded.
Once an
individual’s identity is linked to a blockchain identifier, their entire
history of transactions is available—which could be catastrophic
for clinical data. There are mechanisms to mitigate these issues—
for example, private blockchains that [are not] public, or storing
data off-chain—these issues need to be addressed more fully
before we see widespread EHR data sharing via blockchain.240

For this reason, HIPAA compliance is maintained by limiting
institutional control over a health care EHR blockchain system by granting
access to the underlying ledger to authorized health care providers.241 We
envision a decentralized blockchain EHR system in which each participating
hospital, physician, or other authorized entity, maintains a separate computer
node to maintain the blockchain ledger, but is required to gain patient
permission before accessing the patient’s records stored on the ledger.242
Linking the files to permissioned access by the patient would help ensure
236.
See Ryan Hales Hylock & Xiaoming Zeng, A Blockchain Framework for
Patient-Centered Health Records and Exchange (HealthChain): Evaluation and Proof-ofConcept Study, J. MED. INTERNET RES., Aug. 31, 2019 at 1, 2.
237.
See id.
238.
Id. at 1.
239.
Miliard, supra note 10.
240.
Id.
241.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.310 (2019); BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 3–4;
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 161.
242.
See EKBLAW ET AL., supra note 104, at 3–4.
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that only the permissioned authorized entities of the patient’s choosing could
access the data stored onto the blockchain ledger.243
4.

Maintaining Anonymity and HIPAA Compliance

HIPAA requires both physical and technological safeguards.244 A
health care facility must restrict physical access to its facilities while
permitting necessary authorized access.245 Its policies and procedures must
specify proper use of and physical access to workstations and electronic
media.246 HIPAA also imposes technical policies and procedures for control
of access, audit, and data integrity and data transmission security.247 For
HIPAA compliance, a blockchain-based EHR can impose immutable
technical policies and procedures to allow only authorized persons to access
EHR systems.248 The blockchain incorporates technologic audits monitoring
hardware, software, and procedures that record access and other activity in
the EHR system.249 Data integrity controls ensure that the data blocks in the
blockchain-based EHR are not improperly altered or destroyed by requiring
chronological supplementation to the chain.250 By design, the chain has
built-in electronic measures to confirm that the data has not been improperly
altered or destroyed.251 Data transmission security can be embedded in the
blockchain such that data passing through each router on the transmission
network generates a log record in the chain.252 All access points are similarly
logged onto the blockchain ledger to guard against unauthorized access to
transmitted EHR.253
Anonymity of unique patient data or personally identifiable
information is maintained by having varying levels of authorized health care

note 161.

243.
244.

Id. at 10.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.310; Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra

245.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.310.
246.
Id. Also, policies and procedures must specify proper use of and physical
access to workstations and electronic media. Id. These include policies regarding the transfer,
removal, disposal, and re-use of electronic media, to ensure appropriate protection of EHR.
Id.
247.
See id.; Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 161.
248.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2019); BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 3–4;
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 161.
249.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.312; BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133 at 11.
250.
EKBLAW ET AL., supra note 104, at 9.
251.
See BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 3.
252.
See EKBLAW ET AL., supra note 104, at 2 (referring to the log record as a
bread crumb trail).
253.
See BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133 at 6.
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user access.254 A token-based access control can be required in the
blockchain-based EHR, similar to systems used by credit card companies.255
The blockchain-based EHR only permits access to view, upload, or
download data based upon each person’s or entity’s key, and all chain
interactions are logged into the chain.256
As for the objection that the patient’s identity on the blockchain can
be ascertained by using the person’s social media data and/or generally
public data, the risk that the patient’s identity will be compromised by
comparing the patient’s public data with masked patient health information
on the EHR blockchain system is less than the risk of that person accessing
any financial portal on the internet to facilitate the transfer of funds, because
the blockchain-based EHR is end-to-end encrypted and all access is logged
into the chain.257 Hence, the use of a well-designed blockchain-based EHR
is relatively safer than other common financial transactions.258
5.

Transactional Scalability

Scalability is the ability of a blockchain system to integrate
continually increasing data and process that data through the blockchain
network within an acceptable time frame.259 As explained above, an EHR
blockchain system is a distributed and decentralized digital ledger or
database wherein blocks of data—individual EHR data blocks of texts,
images, videos, etc.—are shared between a private or a public network of
peer-to-peer computers communicating with each other to confirm the
authenticity of any proffered block of data.260 “At its core, there are three
key factors affecting the scalability of public blockchain networks”: (1) the
block size and block creation time; (2) the consensus protocol defining the
254.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.312.
255.
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC
HEALTH INFORMATION 91 (1997).
Token-based cryptographic authentication and
authorization systems for the Mastercard-Visa consortium and CyberCash Inc. can be
deployed by health care organizations in EHR systems. Id.
256.
See id. at 91–92.
257.
See id. at 96.
258.
See id. at 97.
259.
Vijay Raghunathan, The Scalability Conundrum of Blockchain Networks,
ENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 27, 2019), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/329084.

Id.

Block size and block creation time: The size of the bitcoin block is
fixed at [one] MB. Each [one] MB block can hold between 2000–4000
transactions. The bitcoin protocol is tuned to throttle the creation of blocks — one
block created approximately every [ten] minutes. This results in a horrid [three]–
[seven] TPS [thousand transactions per second].

260.

See BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133 at 3–4.
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rules and guidelines for participating in the blockchain distributed computer
network; and (3) the confirmation time which refers to the time needed to
reach a consensus on the computer nodes confirming the creation of a valid
block in a permanent place in the blockchain database.261
In a blockchain-based EHR, if a full copy of the ledger is presented
each time a new transaction is added, this accumulation of information may
degrade performance.262 One commentator has suggested that data sets
containing demographics, encounters, diagnosis, and medications be
included in the blockchain, but larger data (images, notes, etc.) can be
excluded, thereby keeping chain performance stable.263
If the blockchain-based EHR is maintained on a private, distributed
computer network, consensus protocol may be shortened, thereby increasing
confirmation times, while permitting larger data block sizes and increasing
access controls to the private network; however, interoperability between
different private networks may be degraded.264 Scalability issues can also be
solved by government-imposed data set guidelines; the use of several trusted
private networks; and a two-tiered blockchain ledger with one-tier
reasonably accessible with important more recent EHR data and a second tier
with larger data set blocks, potentially an archival data set.265 In general,
since access to and upload and download times for the EHR system are not
critical to its performance (unlike cryptocurrency transactions), the latency
and bandwidth of the network is less critical than the block size and
consensus protocol.266
6.

Brute Force Attacks and Other Data Issues

Some commentators raise concerns as to whether the EHR
blockchain system can be compromised by a brute force attack to ascertain
the patient’s private key or to decrypt an encrypted blockchain.267 In
261.
Raghunathan, supra note 259.
262.
Blockchain Performance, Throughput and Scalability, HEALTHCARE INFO.
MGMT. SYSTEMS SOC’Y, http://www.himss.org/blockchain-performance-throughput-andscalability (last visited May 1, 2020).
263.
Id.
264.
See id.; BIBLE ET AL., supra note 133, at 6.
265.
See Gerard, supra note 166; Raghunathan, supra note 259.
266.
See Blockchain Performance, Throughput and Scalability, supra note 262.
267.
Brute
Force
Attack,
TECHNOPEDIA:
DICTIONARY,
http://www.techopedia.com/definition/18091/brute-force-attack (last visited May 1, 2020); see
also Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification
Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. at 5565, 5639 (Jan. 25, 2013) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. §
164.524). “A brute force attack is a trial-and-error method used to obtain information such as
a user password . . . .” Brute Force Attack, supra. Typically, “automated software is used to
generate a large number of consecutive guesses as to the value of the desired data.” Id.
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connection with cryptocurrency, brute force attacks on electronic wallets
have sometimes been successful, but efforts to decrypt well-designed
currency have failed.268 Bitcoin currency uses a public blockchain and an
established consensus protocol, subjecting the coin to a fifty-one percent
consensus brute force attack.269 Given the data block size issue discussed
above, the EHR may only use trusted third party computer networks (a
private distributed network).270 The use of permission blockchain networks
permits the blockchain provider to limit access to the entire network, which
increases security and reduces the probability of a successful brute force
attack, but increases access time to the EHR.271 While brute force decryption
of a blockchain itself is impossible with modern computer technologies,
some argue that theoretical quantum computers will be able to decrypt the
encryption commonly used in current blockchain applications, but others
suggest that quantum-resistant public-key technologies and standards are
being evaluated.272
IV.

A ROADMAP TO UNIFIED BLOCKCHAIN EHR: CASE STUDIES

We have surveyed eleven use cases that demonstrate our points
raised in Part III, as follows:273
268.
E.O. Kiktenko et al., Detecting Brute-Force Attacks on Cryptocurrency
Wallets in BUSINESS INFORMATION SYSTEMS WORKSHOPS 232, 232 (Witold Abramowicz &
Rafael Corchvelo eds., 2019). Although attacks on e-wallets have occurred, “if the attack is
implemented successfully, a legitimate user is able to prove that fact of this attack with a high
probability.” Id.
269.
Conti et al., supra note 204, at 3428. To validate a Bitcoin transaction,
participant miners use a Proof of Work (“PoW”) as a consensus algorithm where the miners
require no authentication to join the public network, which makes the Bitcoin consensus
model extremely scalable, supporting thousands of network nodes. Id. at 3416, 3422. The
“PoW based consensus is vulnerable to 51% attacks, in which an adversary has control over
51% of the mining power (i.e. hashrate) in the network, hence it can write its own blocks or
fork the blockchain that at a later point converges with the main blockchain.” Id. at 3422.
270.
Miliard, supra note 10.
271.
See Berke, supra note 132. Private blockchain networks are proposed for
financial systems which give “their operators control over who can read the ledger of verified
transactions, who can submit transactions, and who can verify them.” Id.
272.
Jerry Chow & Michael Osborne, The Solution to Quantum Computers
Cracking
Cryptography
Is
Already
Here,
QUARTZ
(May
2,
2019),
http://www.qz.com/1605685/the-solution-to-quantum-computers-cracking-cryptography/.
Quantum computers may soon decrypt the 2048 bit RSA encryption used in blockchain
currency; however, one commentator has suggested that security experts have developed postquantum codes that even a quantum computer will not be able to crack. EMERGING TECH.
FROM THE ARXIV, supra note 163. “[T]he National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) is currently running a process to evaluate and standardize one or more quantumresistant public-key technologies.” Chow & Osborne, supra.
273.
See Miliard, supra note 10; discussion supra Part III.
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Massachusetts General Hospital and MediBloc

In 2017, Massachusetts General Hospital, a Harvard Medical School
associated hospital, partnered with MediBloc, a Korean blockchain
company.274 The pilot program was initially implemented to store and
exchange EMR rather than supplant the hospital systems’ existing electronic
records.275 The hospital aimed to “explore potentials of blockchain
technology to provide secure solutions for health information exchange,
integrate health care [Artificial Intelligence] applications into the day-to-day
clinical workflow, and support [a] data sharing and labeling platform for
machine learning model development.”276
B.

Vanderbilt and FHIRChain

As for increasing interoperability of existing EMR databases held by
different health care providers, Vanderbilt University Institute for Software
Integrated Systems, in a joint venture with Varian Medical Systems,
developed a method of sharing medical records between health care
organizations using blockchain configured as a smart contract.277 The
Vanderbilt team collaborated with radiation oncology treatment centers to
develop a Fast Healthcare Interoperability Resources (“FHIRChain”)
standards framework.278 The blockchain is configured to be a permanent
distributed ledger for online transactions or exchanges between several
health care providers having troves of EMR data and clinicians needing
patient-masked data to analyze treatment protocols and results.279 Unlike a
traditional database that is centrally located and maintained by one party, the
blockchain record is shared among a network of users.280 With the
FHIRChain blockchain program, patient data is obtained from the originating
hospital or clinic and, importantly, the original EMR remains with that health
care facility.281 When a patient wants to share his or her data with an outside
274.
Miliard, supra note 10.
275.
Id.
276.
Julie Spitzer, Massachusetts General Hospital Might Store Patient Data
on Blockchain Through New Partnership, BECKER’S HEALTHCARE (Dec. 6, 2018),
http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/ehrs/massachusetts-general-hospital-might-storepatient-data-on-blockchain-through-new-partnership.html.
277.
Peng Zhang et al., FHIRChain: Applying Blockchain to Securely and
Scalably Share Clinical Data, 16 COMPUTATIONAL & STRUCTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 267,
269, 271, 278 (2018).
278.
Id. at 267–68.
279.
See id. at 271–72.
280.
See id. at 268; Miliard, supra note 10.
281.
See Zhang et al., supra note 277, at 277.
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organization via the FHIRChain program, the hospital provides select
physicians or clinics with a public key, the patient provides his or her private
key, and access to the patient’s health information is permitted to the selected
physicians or clinics for a set period of time.282
The following Figure diagrammatically illustrates the FHIRChain
program.283
The blockchain (represented by papers in the ellipse)
chronologically logs access, chained data input and output.284 Original data
(marked with a key in the Figure), is uploaded to the blockchain with the
patient’s private key.285 The FHIRChain (the broken-line ellipse) normalizes
data obtained from hospital databases (see barrel-shaped elements) which
holds original EMR data.286 The normalized data is graphically shown as
siloed data on the FHIRChain (see small circles on the ellipse).287 The
FHIRChain program also controls patient privacy by masking patient
identity.288 The check-marked health care (“HC”) clinicians’ accesses,
processes, and then uploads resultant data to the blockchain with HC private
keys (confirmed as needed with the patient’s key).289
Chart IV – FHIR Chain290

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See id. at 271–72, 277.
Id. at 271; see also discussion Section IV.B.
See Zhang et al., supra note 277, at 271.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 271–72.
Zhang et al., supra note 277, at 271.
Id. at 271.
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FDA Drug Testing Compliance

Pharmaceutical companies seeking approval from the United States
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for new drugs must test the efficacy
of the drug with large patient studies.291 Getting accurate patient data for
these studies is difficult.292 If a patient-centric EMR is used, clinicians could
(a) find the right people for a medical trial faster; (b) manage and access drug
trial data for research purposes faster; and (c) provide better and more
accurate clinical trial bookkeeping, that is, better tracking of efficacy.293
Notwithstanding the serious concerns over implementing a patientcentric blockchain EHR, blockchain systems have been specifically
suggested in certain medical use cases such as: Sharing medical records
between health care organizations wherein the blockchain program converts
the data into a standardized format, permitting different health care providers
to provide access to siloed data and maintains an access log of clinical
studies to establish the efficacy of pharmaceutical drugs, maintaining patient
confidentiality and complete access to a database of masked patient EHR,
and employing blockchain to track the supply of designated drugs from their
origin, through all distribution points, and ultimately to the end-user.294
D.
Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. (“Boehringer”) and IBM
Canada Clinical Trials Program (“IBM”)
Boehringer is an international pharmaceutical company that employs
over 50,000 employees.295 The company focuses on human pharmaceuticals,
animal health, and biopharmaceuticals.296 In 2019, Boehringer announced a
partnership with IBM to utilize its blockchain technologies in its clinical
trials.297 Boehringer believes that a blockchain-based clinical trial EHR
system will improve trial quality, reduce errors, increase completeness,

291.
See Development & Approval Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct.
28, 2019), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs.
292.
Arsene, supra note 164; Development & Approval Process, supra note
291.
293.
Arsene, supra note 164.
294.
See id.
295.
Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. and IBM Canada Announce First of
Its Kind Collaboration to Integrate Blockchain Technology into Clinical Trials, supra note 10;
Our Company, BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM: ABOUT US, http://www.boehringeringelheim.ca/en/who-we-are/our-company (last visited May 1, 2020).
296.
Boehringer Ingelheim (Canada) Ltd. and IBM Canada Announce First of
Its Kind Collaboration to Integrate Blockchain Technology into Clinical Trials, supra note 10.
297.
Id.
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thereby increasing patient safety and scientific usefulness to clinical trial data
sets and reducing regulatory compliance costs.298
E.

National Cancer Institute and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

Medical imaging is seen as a “central part of diagnostics in today’s
health care, as a diagnostic imaging service is ‘paramount in confirming,
correctly assessing and documenting courses of many diseases as well as in
assessing responses to treatment.’”299 A joint venture between the National
Cancer Institute and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute is exploring a
“blockchain-based [EHR] system for medical image” sharing between
different entities.300 The project seeks to create a data library of medical
images for artificial intelligence/machine learning applications, with
technological goals of “improv[ing] image processing, analysis,
reconstruction, and enhancement” and socioeconomic goals to [1] improve
security and protection of privacy; [2] “maintai[n] flexibility; and [3]
enforc[e] data sovereignty.”301
Utilizing data from the NLST, the program hopes to de-fragmentize
data sets by unifying archival data to a single platform.302 Researchers with
the project noted that “[w]hile the explosion in the number and capability of
tools eases the process of data collection, data retrieval and information
analysis have been slow and complicated in the field of medicine, which has
become a global challenge faced by both the developed and developing
countries.”303 For these reasons, the project aims to develop a blockchainbased platform to: Integrate “data acquisition, storage, and transportation”
between providers; strengthen privacy-preserving safeguards for patient
298.
Id.
299.
Jianjing Lin, Blockchain-Based Information System for Medical Image
Transfer, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://biometry.nci.nih.gov/cdas/approved-projects/2180/ (last
visited May 1, 2020) (quoting Diagnostic Imaging, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/diagnostic_imaging/en/ (last visited May 1, 2020)).
300.
Donovan, supra note 175.
301.
Id.

Id.

The [National Lung Screening Trial] (“NLST”) was a randomized
controlled trial to determine whether screening for lung cancer with low-dose
helical computed tomography (CT) reduces mortality from lung cancer in highrisk individuals relative to screening with chest radiography. Around 54,000
participants were enrolled between August 2002 and April 2004. The NLST
datasets include data on participant characteristics, screening exam results,
diagnostic procedures, lung cancer, and mortality. Images from over 75,000 CT
screening exams are available, and more than 1,200 pathology images from a
subset of NLST lung cancer patients may be viewed.

302.
303.

See id.
Id.
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identities within the image data; develop algorithmic storage and retrieval of
image data; and conduct a cost-benefit analysis as it relates to costs, patient
outcomes, and provider workflow.304
F.

Care.Wallet

An Estonia-based company, Solve.Care, is launching a number of
partnerships with United States based health care companies to provide its
blockchain-based platform, Care.Wallet, for EHR management of
administrative functions, including the coordination and payment of health
care benefits.305 Solve.Care’s partnership with Uber Health seeks to increase
patient reliability in appointment attendance.306 Every year, an estimated 3.6
million Americans miss their medical appointments due to a lack of reliable
transportation, with the cost of missed primary care appointments estimated
at US $150 billion annually.307 Utilizing a HIPAA compliant platform, the
Care.Wallet provides patients a unified platform for accessing and sharing
appointment information, rescheduling options, arranging transportation, and
cost-sharing with trusted, concerned individuals and entities, such as the
patient’s family or employer.308 Arizona Care Network has partnered with
Solve.Care and Boehringer to launch its own network, with a goal of
providing concierge care management to its network of 25,000 type 2
diabetes patients.309
Citing recent changes to diabetes treatment
recommendations, Arizona Care Network believes Solve.Care provides a
needed system to meet these new guidelines, which prioritize managing
cardiovascular risk and general patient wellness as part of a successfullymanaged treatment protocol.310 The platform was expected to launch in the

304.
Donovan, supra note 175.
305.
Fred Donovan, ACN Is on Healthcare Blockchain Journey to Ease Admin
Burdens, HIT INFRASTRUCTURE (Aug. 1, 2019), http://www.hitinfrastructure.com/news/acn-ison-healthcare-blockchain-journey-to-ease-admin-burdens; On the Road to Better Care:
Solve.Care Partners with Uber Health to Deliver Medical Transport Service, SOLVE.CARE
(July 9, 2019), http://www.solve.care/on-the-road-to-better-care-solve-care-partners-withuber-health-to-deliver-medical-transport-service/.
306.
On the Road to Better Care: Solve.Care Partners with Uber Health to
Deliver Medical Transport Service, supra note 305.
307.
Id.; Laura Forman, Doctor Visits Could Provide Relief to Uber and Lyft,
WALL STREET. J. (July 10, 2019, 7:00 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/doctor-visits-couldprovide-relief-to-uber-and-lyft-11562756401.
308.
On the Road to Better Care: Solve.Care Partners with Uber Health to
Deliver Medical Transport Service, supra note 305.
309.
Donovan, supra note 305.
310.
Id.
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United States in late Q3 2019 and be available through the Apple Store and
Google Play.311
G.

The Payer Blockchain Initiative

A collaboration between Aetna, Anthem, Healthcare Service
Corporation, PNC Bank, IBM, Cigna, and Sentara Healthcare seeks universal
interoperability and transparency in health care.312 The members of the
collaboration believe that “blockchain [technologies] can transform the
industry by creating new ways to share and secure data across a business
network [a] byproduct of [which] is the ability to link organizations in realtime and in ways that can ultimately improve the patient experience.”313 The
main goal of the project is to accelerate new payment models and increase
interoperability between health care provider’s EHR systems.314
H.

The Pistoria Alliance

A global network of non-profit life science stakeholders is
investigating blockchain-based adoption among health care providers.315
Focusing on education and information, the Alliance is spearheading
quantitative ROI studies for blockchain-based EHR adoption, education, and
research, and development support.316
I.

Aid.Tech

A pilot program by Aid.Tech and PharmAccess Foundation seeks to
reduce waste and fraud in aid distribution to vulnerable and under privileged
pregnant women in Tanzania utilizing a blockchain-based EHR system.317
The platform collects and stores data on pre- and post-natal services to
mothers and, once born, automatically appends their child’s health data into
311.
312.

Id.
Jessica Kent, Cigna, Sentara Healthcare Join Payer Blockchain Initiative,
HEALTHPAYERINTELLIGENCE
(Feb.
20,
2019),
http://www.healthpayerintelligence.com/news/cigna-sentara-healthcare-join-payerblockchain-initiative.
313.
Id.
314.
Id.
315.
Jessica Kent, Pistoia Alliance to Use Blockchain for Life Sciences Data
Sharing,
HEALTHITANALYTICS:
NEWS
(Feb.
7,
2019),
http://healthitanalytics.com/news/pistoia-alliance-to-use-blockchain-for-life-sciences-datasharing.
316.
See id.
317.
Koigi, supra note 191.
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the platform.318 Each pregnant woman is assigned a digital identity key,
which allows them access to medications, assists them with administrative
functions, manages appointments, and provides a single point system to
review her medical history.319 The platform is designed to reduce fraud and
waste by only allowing the assigned woman and their children access to their
prescribed medications.320 A similar platform tracks the flow of drug aid
from government facilities to the patient down to the last tablet.321 As one
commentator notes:
The success of the blockchain project in maternal care in Tanzania
needs to be replicated to other African countries and to the entire
health sector . . . [t]his is a game-changer that will ensure that we
not only arrest fraud, but also save millions of lives and ensure
[that] everyone is able to access affordable medical care without a
hustle.322

J.

Sensyne Health

A novel 2019 project between EY, Sensyne Health, and Guardtime
will link medicine and treatment reimbursement to patient-based outcomes
hosted on a blockchain-based platform.323 Through the partnership, Sensyne
Health will add clinical artificial intelligence to enable the platform to “scale
faster, leading to fairer reimbursement, and access to novel treatments for
patients.”324 Ultimately, the project seeks to solve a monumental challenge
in health care, “accurate and fair patient reimbursement [measured] against
the actual health outcome provided by care providers and drug
manufacturers.”325
K.

Estonia and National Blockchain-Based EHR

In 2016, the Estonian E-Health Foundation launched a
developmental project aimed at archiving and safeguarding all 1.3 million of
318.
Id.
319.
Id.
320.
Id.
321.
Id.
322.
Koigi, supra note 191.
323.
Maya Vautier, EY, Sensyne Health and Guardtime to Use AI and
Blockchain to Link Health Care Reimbursement and Actual Patient Outcomes, EY (June 25,
2019), http://www.ey.com/en_gl/news/2019/06/ey-sensyne-health-and-guardtime-to-use-aiand-blockchain-to-link-health-care-reimbursement-and-actual-patient-outcomes.
324.
Id.
325.
Id.
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its residents’ EHR using a universal blockchain-based EHR system.326 In
lieu of digitizing all of a patient’s records on a single EHR platform, the
Estonian project is instead digitizing the meta-data logging the creation of,
maintenance of, access to, and transportation of underlying EHR stored
locally.327 By desegregating the meta-data from the underlying EHR record,
the system adds another layer of security and anonymity to patient records
while meeting many of the use case goals seen in other projects.328
V.

CONCLUSION

Recent federal laws and regulations imposed some standardization
for the disparate patchwork of existing EHR systems.329 The advent of
blockchain technology presents a viable opportunity to streamline the
collection and retrieval of patient data; automate audit processes through
autonomous algorithms; authorize health care provider access to EHR
records based on informed patient consent; reduce transaction costs in the
maintenance and creation of records; and archive less critical patient data,
not only for the individual’s benefit, but also for the community by
automatically anonymizing patient health information in the treatment and
clinical context.330

326.
Taavi Einaste, Blockchain and Healthcare: The Estonian Experience,
NORTAL: BLOG (Feb. 21, 2018), http://www.nortal.com/us/blog/blockchain-healthcareestonia/.
327.
See id.
328.
See id.
329.
42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2018); 42 C.F.R. § 495.22 (2019); 42 C.F.R. § 495.24.
330.
Kuo et al., supra note 3, at 1214.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, women’s bodies have served as a playground on
which politics, oppression, and control were practiced.1 From political
debates on abortion to notions that honor lies in a female’s virginity,
women’s bodies have been used as tools both for and against their own
autonomy.2 Simultaneously serving as a marker of change and a reminder of
delayed progress, the meaning of the female body has altered with time, but
the undercurrents of power, control, and stigmatization remain constant.3
*
Bethany Corbin is a regulatory compliance, transactional, and complex
litigation attorney in the health care, intellectual property, and privacy sectors. She earned a
Health Care LL.M. with a Certificate in Compliance Studies from Loyola University Chicago
School of Law, and a Juris Doctor from Wake Forest University School of Law. She is also a
Certified Information Privacy Professional through the International Association of Privacy
Professionals and is Certified in Healthcare Compliance and Healthcare Privacy Compliance
through the Compliance Certification Board. Bethany would like to thank the Executive and
Editorial Board members of the Nova Law Review, Volume 44, for their hard work and
dedication to both this Article and the 2019 Nova Law Review Symposium titled “First Do No
Harm: A Patient-Driven Approach to Navigating the Health Law, Intellectual Property, and
Technology Maze.”
1.
See Katrin Zimmermann, Female Health and Technology: Bridging the
Gap, MEDIUM (Jan. 14, 2019), http://www.medium.com/goingyellow/the-femtech-revolution989755cb4712.
2.
See id.; Thomas B. Edsall, Why the Fight over Abortion Is Unrelenting,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/opinion/abortionrestrictions-politics.html.
3.
See Edsall, supra note 2; Zimmermann, supra note 1.
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The woman is portrayed as an other, different and unequal to man, in a tale
as old as time.4
Recently, however, a new frontier has arrived that threatens to
oppress and quantify women under the guise of liberation.5 As the world
embraces the ongoing digital revolution, it welcomes new technological
developments that, while well-intended, can have the devastating
consequences of imposing societal perceptions of normalcy on women.6
Known as female technology, or femtech, this market addresses women’s
health, with a focus on period-tracking, fertility, pregnancy, sexual wellness,
and reproductive health.7 Founders of this technology claim that it not only
assists women with understanding their own bodies, but also enhances
scientific knowledge and research about the female population as a whole.8
Indeed, supporters argue that this technology “helps destigmatize women’s
reproductive and sexual health,” at a time when women’s specific health care
needs have historically been underserved.9
The problem, however, is that this technology—funded
predominantly by Caucasian males—is riddled with incorrect assumptions of
female needs and desires that not only stereotype women, but also serve to
define the default female body.10 Through the use of personas, forms,

4.
See CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE WOMEN: DATA BIAS IN A WORLD
DESIGNED FOR MEN 176–77 (2019); Neeki Tahmassebi, The Rise of Femtech, PLUG & PLAY:
HEALTH TECH., http://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/resources/rise-femtech/ (last visited
May 1, 2020).
5.
See Kimberly Krueger, Shaping the Future of FemTech, PLUG & PLAY:
HEALTH TECH., http://www.plugandplaytechcenter.com/resources/future-femtech-companies/
(last visited May 1, 2020).
6.
See SARA WACHTER-BOETTCHER, TECHNICALLY WRONG: SEXIST APPS,
BIASED ALGORITHMS, AND OTHER THREATS OF TOXIC TECH (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2017)
(describing how technology imposes normalcy requirements on women).
7.
Bérénice Magistretti, The Rise of Femtech: Women, Technology, and
Trump,
VENTUREBEAT
(Feb.
5,
2017,
10:03
AM),
http://www.venturebeat.com/2017/02/05/the-rise-of-femtech-women-technology-and-trump/;
see also Elise Mortensen, Femtech by the Numbers: The Rise of Innovation in Women’s
Health Technology, HITLAB, http://www.hitlab.org/blog/femtech-by-the-numbers (last
visited May 1, 2020).
8.
Suzannah Weiss, What Is FemTech? 5 Things to Know About the New
Industry, BUSTLE (Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.bustle.com/p/what-is-femtech-5-things-toknow-about-the-new-industry-8792289.
9.
Maria Simeone, Can Femtech Deliver Radically Personalized Care to
Women?, DATACONOMY (Jan. 30, 2020), http://www.dataconomy.com/2020/01/can-femtechdeliver-radically-personalized-care-to-women.
10.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 176; WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra
note 6, at 20; Kaitlyn Tiffany, Period-Tracking Apps Are Not for Women, VOX (Nov. 16,
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default settings, and design assumptions, femtech developers have created
products that categorize women and limit their data input to a range of
normal values, even if the woman’s unique, personal biology falls outside
the artificial normal range.11 This results not only in arbitrary restrictions on
who can use the app or digital device, but also perpetuates an environment in
which women who have abnormal results are deemed others that do not
conform to standard perceptions of women.12 In other words, digital
products are consistently telling women what their biology should be (e.g. a
thirty day period cycle), what their reproductive goals should be (e.g. a
smiley face on a period-tracking app when a woman misses her period, thus
signifying that her goal should be pregnancy), and what their sexual activity
and preferences should be (with imagery on apps highly focused on male
genitalia).13 These arbitrary standards reinforce notions of otherness for
women who do not—and oftentimes cannot—conform.14 In this manner,
numerous subsets of women, including transgendered women, are excluded,
stigmatized, and devalued during their most intimate experiences.15
Moreover, for women who are cautious about sharing their intimate
data with apps, a strong potential exists that the inputted data will not be
entirely accurate.16 For example, a woman who uses a period-tracking app as
a form of birth control, may accurately track her cycle in the app, but may
alter, conceal, or misrepresent data with respect to her body temperature,
2018, 12:35 PM), http://www.vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/13/18079458/menstrual-trackingsurveillance-glow-clue-apple-health.
11.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 37–40; Jenny McGrath, With
Period-Tracking Apps, the Fate of Your Fertility Is Far from Clear, DIGITAL TRENDS (Sept. 2,
2019, 1:00 AM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/the-problems-and-promises-of-periodtracking-apps/; Molly McHugh, Does Femtech Give Users Control of Their Health or Take It
Away?,
RINGER:
TECH
(Mar.
18,
2019,
6:30
AM),
http://www.theringer.com/tech/2019/3/18/18267094/femtech-female-health-appsmenstruation-fertility-trackers-clue-glow-ava (explaining that “many health apps try to shove
users and their bodies into strict categories.”).
12.
See McHugh, supra note 11.
13.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 31; McHugh, supra note 11.
14.
See Jonathan Todres, Law, Otherness, and Human Trafficking, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 605, 608–09 (2009); McHugh, supra note 11.
15.
See Olivia Goldhill, FemTech Is Not and Should Not Be a Thing, QUARTZ
(Apr. 3, 2019), http://www.qz.com/1586815/why-femtech-is-a-sexist-category/.
“[I]n
defining women by their biology, these products only focus on the needs of cis rather than
trans women.” Id.; see also Todres, supra note 14, at 614 (articulating the role of othering in
helping to devalue and dehumanize those who are deemed other or perceived as falling
outside the bounds of societal standards for normalcy).
16.
See McHugh, supra note 11 (stating that the efficacy of femtech devices
“depends on how much information a user is willing to feed it”).
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sexual positions, or mood swings.17 The complications from such data
alteration are twofold.18 First, the femtech app or device can no longer work
as intended because the data is not an authentic representation of that
individual’s body.19 Second, the data results that are then given or sold to
researchers and third parties are faulty and unreliable.20 Researchers, seeking
to use this data to study women’s health and better understand female
biology, will inadvertently develop skewed results.21 Further, with femtech
apps excluding or ostracizing subsets of the female population, the data will
continue to be biased toward the normal female, which creates a selfperpetuating stigmatization when researchers present their findings on what
is normal for this population.22 As a result, femtech products often fail to
align with the needs and desires of female consumers and can result in
women having diminished agency and control over their bodies and personal
data.23
How, then, can the tech industry fix the erroneous assumptions,
design flaws, and corporate practices that plague femtech to avoid
stereotyping and othering subsets of the female population?24 The remedy to
this ailment is complex and long-term solutions will require fundamental
shifts in the way society perceives and interacts with female consumers.25
That said, there are important steps that must be taken now to begin setting
the foundation for a seismic change and remedy the inadvertent
discrimination that femtech users face.26 First, consumers must use their
power and autonomy to demand better, unbiased products from developers.27
Only by recognizing and understanding the fundamental assumptions and
17.
See id.
18.
See id.
19.
See id.
20.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 75; McHugh supra note 11.
21.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 75.
22.
See id.; Laura Hudson, Technology Is Biased Too. How Do We Fix It?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 20, 2017), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/features/technology-isbiased-too-how-do-we-fix-it/. “Biased data can create feedback loops that function like a sort
of algorithmic confirmation bias, where the system finds what it expects to find rather than
what is objectively there.” Hudson, supra.
23.
See Lauren Sharkey, Is the Rise of Femtech a Good Thing for Women?
Here’s What the Experts Think, BUSTLE (July 6, 2019), http://www.bustle.com/p/is-the-riseof-femtech-a-good-thing-for-women-heres-what-the-experts-think-17993009.
24.
See Mick Champayne, How Femtech Is Capitalizing on Women,
PAPAYA.ROCKS (May 17, 2019), http://www.papaya.rocks/en/trendbook/w-jaki-sposobfemtech-zarabia-na-kobietach; Hudson, supra note 22.
25.
See Hudson, supra note 22.
26.
See id.
27.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 75.
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design flaws in these products can consumers incentivize manufacturers to
produce more inclusive apps and technology.28
Second, diverse
representation is needed within the companies that fund and develop these
devices to ensure all viewpoints are acknowledged and considered.29 Finally,
consumers must be consulted during the device design, development, and
deployment stages.30 Currently, there is a rush to market new devices
without adequate testing and vetting, and an overwhelming tendency for
male-dominated companies to know what women want.31 This assumed
knowledge—without specifically asking female consumers if the product
meets their needs—leads to erroneous and faulty design models that do not
satisfy women’s needs or that alienate and other certain portions of the
female community.32 By incorporating diverse female feedback at the
beginning, middle, and end stages of product development, femtech
companies can remedy design flaws up front before the product enters the
market and perpetuates perceptions of normalcy.33
To support this position, this Article is divided into four parts.34 Part
one presents an overview of the femtech industry, including a discussion of
devices that fall under the femtech umbrella.35 In addition, this section
explains how current femtech products have relied on flawed assumptions to
create unworkable and discriminatory products that alienate certain
categories of women.36 Part two then presents an analysis of othering in its
historical context and demonstrates how existing femtech products have
operated to other subsets of the female population.37 Part three then presents

28.
See Sharkey, supra note 23.
29.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII, 318; WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra
note 6, at 18–20, 26.
30.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 318; WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra
note 6, at 39–40.
31.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 28.
32.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 318; WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra
note 6, at 28, 39–40 (highlighting that even the use of the term fem has the potential to alienate
transgender and non-binary individuals).
33.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 318.
34.
See discussion infra Part I–IV.
35.
Tahmassebi, supra note 4; see also discussion infra Part I.
36.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, MED. FUTURIST (Feb. 21,
2019), http://www.medicalfuturist.com/femtech-womens-health/; see also discussion infra
Part I.
37.
John A. Powell & Stephen Menendian, The Problem of Othering:
Towards Inclusiveness and Belonging, OTHERING & BELONGING, Summer 2016, at 14, 22–23;
see also discussion infra Part II.
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solutions for helping to remedy the flaws associated with femtech devices.38
Finally, Part four succinctly concludes the Article.39
II.
A.

A WHOLE NEW WORLD: THE FEMTECH INDUSTRY

The Rise of Femtech

Throughout medical history, the male body has been perceived as the
default standard, with the female body recognized as an aberration or
deviation from the male norm.40 From the use of male rats in scientific
studies to the failure to include women in clinical trials, the medical field has
prioritized knowledge of the male body, with the subsequent application of
medical knowledge to women on a one-size-fits-all basis.41 This perception
has dominated the medical industry despite the fact that women’s symptoms
of diseases, tendency to develop certain diseases more frequently, and side
effect experiences can be substantially different from their male
counterparts.42 Indeed, “it wasn’t until 2001 that the Institute for Medicine”
determined that gender was a crucial consideration for clinical trials—and
even then, there has been a failure to include women in such trials due to
their frequent hormonal changes.43 Presently, it is estimated that the
“economic burden for women’s diseases [exceeds] $500 billion.”44
Given the tendency to de-emphasize women’s health in the medical
field, the development of a new industry focused on women’s reproductive
and hormonal wellness has garnered significant attention.45 Known as

Part III.

38.

WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 10–11; see also discussion infra

39.
See discussion infra Part IV.
40.
Tahmassebi, supra note 4; see also CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 1.
41.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 1, 220–24; Reenita Das, Femtech
Fights Gender Equality: How Do Social Determinants of Health Impact Women?, FORBES
(Mar. 7, 2019, 3:38 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reenitadas/2019/03/07/femtech-fightsgender-equality-how-do-social-determinants-of-health-impact-women. “Women have been
highly under-represented in clinical trials for chronic conditions.” Das, supra; see also
Simeone, supra note 9. “[U]ntil 1993, the FDA excluded women with childbearing potential
from participating in phase [one] and early phase [two] clinical studies to avoid controlling for
complications like women’s menstrual cycles.” Simeone, supra note 9; Zimmermann, supra
note 1.
42.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 220–24.
43.
Sam Forsdick, What is Femtech? Promoting Female Healthcare in a
Male-Dominated
Industry,
NS
BUS.
(Nov.
30,
2018),
http://www.nsbusinesshub.com/science/what-is-femtech/.
44.
Tahmassebi, supra note 4.
45.
See Mortensen, supra note 7.
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femtech (short for female technology), this industry encompasses “any
software, diagnostics, products, and services that leverage technology to
improve women’s health.”46 This includes digital and standard health care
products that are created, designed, and directed at women, including
wearables, mobile applications, and hygiene products.47 Designed in
response to a market “flooded with products tailored to the needs of men,”
including Viagra, penis enlargement pills, and fitness apps, femtech seeks to
cater to the remaining 50% of the population by focusing on health care
solutions unique to women.48 According to the Global Wellness Summit, the
overarching mission of the femtech industry is to not only identify the
balance between health and wellness for women, but also to “disrupt
pharma-based contraception and fertility strategies.”49 Thus, while women’s
health is much broader than merely the reproductive organs, a large segment
of the femtech industry focuses on this aspect of women’s wellness.50
Indeed, the term femtech was initially coined in 2016 by Ida Tin, an
entrepreneur who founded the femtech application called Clue.51 Focused on
46.
Kate Clark, Femtech’s Billion-Dollar Year, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 3, 2019,
5:46 PM), http://www.techcrunch.com/2019/04/03/femtechs-billion-dollar-year/; Magistretti,
supra note 7; see also Marija Butkovic, Top 100 Women in Fem Tech and Health Tech,
MEDIUM (Apr. 13, 2019), http://medium.com/women-of-wearables/top-100-women-in-femtech-and-health-tech-34eccf021053. “As an industry, [femtech] largely encompasses any
digital or standard health tools aimed at women’s health, including wearables, internetconnected medical devices, mobile apps, hygiene products, and others.” Butkovic, supra;
Mortensen, supra note 7; Celia Rosas, Note, The Future Is Femtech: Privacy and Data
Security Issues Surrounding FemTech Applications, 15 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 319, 320 (2019).
47.
Butkovic, supra note 46.
48.
Magistretti, supra note 7.
49.
Annie Xu, Femtech: Can Female Fertility Apps Replace Birth Control?,
MISCELLANY
NEWS:
OPINIONS
(Apr.
18,
2019),
http://www.miscellanynews.org/2019/04/18/opinions/femtech-can-female-fertility-appsreplace-birth-control/.
50.
Magistretti, supra note 7. While the “best known categories of femtech
are menstruation care, sexual health, fertility tracking and solutions, and pregnancy care,”
women’s health care “is about much more than just reproductive organs.” Mortensen, supra
note 7; see also Simeone, supra note 9. “Women’s health goes beyond family planning and
fertility” and includes illnesses “like autoimmune diseases [that] have a [three times] higher
prevalence in women than men.” Simeone, supra note 9; Does Digital Health Technology
Know Women?, supra note 36. “[W]omen’s health does not only mean period tracking and
pregnancy,” yet “[a] lot less consideration is given to other female health problems such as
menopause, cancer detection, breastfeeding troubles, troubles around bladder control, and a lot
more.” Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36. “There continues to
be very little discussion on women’s health, beyond pregnancy and menstruation, indicating
that a large unmet need and, in effect, an untapped opportunity exists.” Das, supra note 41.
51.
Butkovic, supra note 46; Jessie Gabriel & Tara Ravi, Women Investing in
Women’s Health: The Rise of Femtech Companies and Investors in Celebration of Women’s
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period-tracking, ovulation, and fertility, Clue allows its users to monitor the
length of their cycles, predict upcoming cycles, determine fertile windows,
track mood swings, basal body temperature and energy levels, and read
literature about these bodily functions.52 Period-tracking apps are currently a
hot commodity, ranking as the fourth most popular application for adults in
health care and the second most popular among adolescent women.53 More
than one hundred million women today monitor their cycles using mobile
applications.54 Beyond Clue, popular femtech products include Glow, Flo,
and Eve (period, fertility and ovulation trackers), Thinx (absorbent period
underwear), Nurx and Natural Cycles (birth control), and Yarlap (pelvic
floor exerciser), among others.55 Presently, the femtech industry consists of
over two hundred startups worldwide, most of which have the overarching
goal of helping women understand their hormones, enhancing female agency
over their bodies, and contributing to scientific research on the historically
underrepresented female population.56 These products are advertised as
being designed “with a ladies first approach” to help “ditch[] the taboos
around female health and sexuality” and help women who may suffer from
medical conditions.57 Accordingly, femtech products have been applauded
History Month, BAKERHOSTETLER (Mar. 19, 2019), http://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/womeninvesting-in-womens-health-the-rise-of-femtech-companies-and-investors-in-celebration-ofwomens-history-month; see also Mortensen, supra note 7.
52.
See CLUE, http://www.helloclue.com (last visited May 1, 2020).
53.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36; Tiffany,
supra note 10.
54.
Champayne, supra note 24. “Women have long tracked personal data
(including menstrual cycle, basal body temperature, and other indicators) in order to facilitate
or prevent pregnancy.” Karen E.C. Levy, Intimate Surveillance, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 679, 684
(2015).
55.
See Marina Khidekel, The Race to Hack Your Period Is on, ELLE (June 25,
2018), http://www.elle.com/beauty/health-fitness/a21272099/clue-period-app/; Magistretti,
supra note 7; Mortensen, supra note 7; Weiss, supra note 8. Other familiar femtech products
on the market include Bellabeat, OvuSense, Tempdrop, and Ava, which aim to give “the
modern person a chic, tech-savvy solution for monitoring their body.” McHugh, supra note
11.
56.
Anna Altman, Mommy and Data, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 14, 2019),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/152693/femtech-companies-alleviate-exploit-femaleanxiety. Femtech companies advertise their products as “helping women along the path to
self-determination and healthy, sustainable lifestyles” and as an opportunity to enhance female
agency. Id. “[T]echnology can help people gain more agency over their own health — and
not only as it applies to reproduction.” McHugh, supra note 11. “The goal of FemTech is to
give women more control over their health, their happiness, and their futures.” Weiss, supra
note 8.
57.
Femtech Companies Innovating Traditional Women’s Healthcare, ALLEY,
http://www.alley.com/post/meet-the-femtech-companies-innovating-traditional-womenshealth (last visited May 1, 2020).
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for increasing the accessibility of health care services to women, and for
shifting the male-dominated medical dialogue to the health care needs of
women.58
The numbers support the observation that the femtech industry is
experiencing rapid and sustainable growth under the guise of female
autonomy.59 Since 2014, femtech startups have raised over $1.1 billion in
funding.60 As of April 2019, femtech had attracted over $240 million in
venture capital funding, with the sector on pace to secure nearly $1 billion in
investments by the end of 2019.61 Estimates suggest that approximately
$200 billion is being spent on femtech products every year, with Frost &
Sullivan predicting that the femtech market will be valued at $50 billion by
2025.62 Thus, the femtech market represents a lucrative opportunity for
investors and startups to aid women in understanding their bodies.63
But, there is a darker side to the femtech industry that lurks in the
shadows, calling into question the altruistic nature of these devices.64
Casting them instead as tools of consumerism and surveillance, this
alternative viewpoint highlights that the investment backers of femtech
devices remain largely men, with limited expertise as to the female body and
female desires.65 During the initial development of this industry, femtech
was considered a niche market, with very few Silicon Valley investors
willing to listen to pitches for female products, let alone invest in them.66
Male investors perceived discussions of female biology as disgusting and
58.
See Reenita Das, Women’s Healthcare Comes Out of the Shadows:
Femtech Shows the Way to Billion-Dollar Opportunities, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2018, 11:01 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/reenitadas/2018/04/12/womens-healthcare-comes-out-of-theshadows-femtech-shows-the-way-to-billion-dollar-opportunities/#48e6c1636159. “Femtech
is part of a growing trend in medical tech that aims to make female healthcare easier to
manage.” Forsdick, supra note 43.
59.
See Das, supra note 58.
60.
Butkovic, supra note 46; Magistretti, supra note 7; see also Cotton
Codinha, What Is Femtech, and Is It the New Pink Tax?, ALLURE: WELLNESS (Apr. 22, 2019),
http://www.allure.com/story/what-is-femtech.
61.
Clark, supra note 46; Mortensen, supra note 7.
62.
Altman, supra note 56; Butkovic, supra note 46; Codinha, supra note 60;
McHugh, supra note 11; Mortensen, supra note 7.
63.
See Das, supra note 58.
64.
See id.; Codinha, supra note 60.
65.
See Champayne, supra note 24; Codinha, supra note 60; Magistretti,
supra note 7.
66.
Gabriel & Ravi, supra note 51. “[Silicon] Valley is dominated by men,
and pitching a period-tracking app to a testosterone-filled room can be intimidating.”
Magistretti, supra note 7; see also CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 174–75; Mortensen, supra
note 7.
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irrelevant, refusing to fund products that did not also cater to male needs.67
While women do participate in the investment space, they “hold only 11% of
executive positions at Silicon Valley companies, and only 5%” of executive
positions at startups.68 Venture capitalist firms with female investors,
however, are three times more likely to invest in companies with female
CEOs, including femtech companies.69 Further, in 2017, all-women
investment teams received only “$1.9 billion of the $85 billion total invested
by venture capitalists,” whereas all-male teams received approximately $66.9
billion.70 As a result, the femtech market grew incredibly slowly, with just
2% of venture capital dollars going to fund female-led startups and projects,
and only 4% of health care research and development funding invested in
women’s health worldwide.71
By 2020, however, it is anticipated that the female economy will be
bigger than the entire economy of China, with women influencing $20
trillion in spending (or 70% of all consumer spending).72 Accordingly,
increased focus has been paid to women as consumers, and the products that
they need and desire.73 The growth of femtech has occurred against this
backdrop—male dominated investment firms seeking to serve the female
population as consumers with a lucrative source of revenue, not as patients.74
Representing about 50% of the population, women are perceived as valuable
consumers in an untapped market that exudes potential, with the femtech
market now “tickling the curiosity of hungry venture capitalists who are
beginning to sniff an opportunity like bloodhounds.”75
67.
See Zoe Kleinman, Femtech: Right Time, Wrong Term?, BBC NEWS:
TECH. (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49880017; Magistretti, supra
note 7; Tahmassebi, supra note 4.
68.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36; see also
Champayne, supra note 24.
69.
Butkovic, supra note 46.
70.
Id. “Of the remaining 19%, 12% of funds were raised by mixed-gender
teams, while 7% was raised by teams whose gender makeup” was unknown. Id.
71.
Id.; Rose Acton, Femtech Has the Potential to Improve the Lives of
Millions of Women, CAPX (Oct. 10, 2018), http://capx.co/femtech-has-the-potential-toimprove-the-lives-of-millions-of-women/; Altman, supra note 56; Das, supra note 58;
Mortensen, supra note 7; Zimmermann, supra note 1.
72.
Das, supra note 41.
73.
See id.
74.
Altman, supra note 56; see also Mortensen, supra note 7.
75.
Butkovic, supra note 46; Magistretti, supra note 7; Simeone, supra note 9.
Half of the global population, women “make up a market of 3.73 billion prospective
customers worldwide.” Mortensen, supra note 7. “With more or less half the population on
this planet being female, there’s clearly a demand for health-related products and services that
meet their specific needs.” Butkovic, supra note 46.
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This is not the first time that product developers, investors, and even
the Government have capitalized on women’s unique biology.76 For
example, tampons and sanitary napkins—both essential products for
menstruating women—have routinely been sold and taxed in the United
States as a luxury good, not a medical necessity (which would be exempt
from sales tax and purchasable through assistance programs).77 This
perspective, which is supported today by at least thirty-five states,
encourages product developers to view women as a captive, vulnerable
audience with limited care options.78 In fact, the tampon/sanitary napkin
industry has experienced almost no innovation in the last thirty-five years,
despite women’s unceasing need for these products.79 As such, a high
probability exists that the tech industry views women as consumers, not
patients, and that it “[tugs] at the fears and anxieties women have about their
bodies and life choices” to market these products.80 Women’s bodies are
thus seen as a way to make profit, rather than a vehicle to improving longterm health care objectives for unique female health issues.81
B.

Misaligned Assumptions & Design Flaws

The desire and ability to profit off women’s bodies are further
complicated by the misaligned assumptions and design flaws that plague
femtech products today.82 As an industry funded predominantly by males,
digital health makes assumptions about women’s needs and desires that do
not necessarily align with reality.83 This skewed underlying knowledge
influences product creation and design, and results in femtech applications
that are not only impractical, offensive, and unreliable, but that also
76.
See Codinha, supra note 60.
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Eleanor Lawrie, People Find Anything About the Vagina Hard to Talk
About, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-46345591. “The
feminine hygiene market alone is worth an estimated $30 [billion], but has seen barely any
innovation since the tampon was invented in the 1930s.” Id. Similarly, “there’s been little
innovation in birth control since the Pill’s invention in the 50s.” Weiss, supra note 8.
80.
Altman, supra note 56; see also Tiffany, supra note 10 (mentioning that
anxiety, fear, and desire are profitable).
81.
Codinha, supra note 60. “Women represent a huge market, and in some
ways, because of a lack of care options, a vulnerable one.” Id.
82.
See Champayne, supra note 24.
83.
Champayne, supra note 24; Jasmine Shirey, Everything You Need to
Know About Femtech Because You Probably Use It Everyday, FAIRYGODBOSS,
http://www.fairygodboss.com/career-topics/femtech (last visited May 1, 2020); see Forsdick,
supra note 43.
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contribute to the othering of certain female populations.84 These design
flaws arise from the male-dominated landscape of the femtech industry, and
the inability of product designers to comprehend and account for unique
female physiology among all members of the female population.85
At a product development level, femtech apps and devices have
historically been funded and/or designed for women by men and marketers
who do not use the products and do not have a foundational understanding of
the female body.86 Flo, an ovulation calendar, period tracker, and pregnancy
app, was created by two brothers, Dmitry and Yuri Gurski from Belarus.87
Similarly, Glow, one of the most popular period and ovulation tracking apps,
was founded in 2013 by PayPal’s Max Levchin and four other men.88 As
part of its design during the first two years of operation, Glow reminded
women who were entering a fertile window “to wear nice underwear that
day” and encouraged the woman’s partner “to bring home some flowers.”89
These messages, which women may find offensive and derogatory, make
clear that these applications were not created by women for women, and help
to reinforce stereotypes about women and sex.90 While Glow has since
updated its products and how it communicates about women’s health, its
micro-aggressions against women could have been avoided altogether by
asking women up front about their preferences and intended uses.91
Similarly, at Apple where women hold only twenty-nine percent of
leadership positions and twenty-three percent of tech positions, the company
debuted its comprehensive health-monitoring system in 2014, complete with

note 83.

84.

See Champayne, supra note 24; Forsdick, supra note 43; Shirey, supra

85.
86.

See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 167, 174, 180, 234.
Tiffany, supra note 10.

[The] app wasn’t designed for me. It wasn’t designed for anyone who wants to
track their period or general reproductive health. The same is true of almost every
menstruation-tracking app:
They’re designed for marketers, for men, for
hypothetical unborn children, and perhaps weirdest of all, a kind of voluntary
surveillance stance.

Id.; Krueger, supra note 5; see also Acton, supra note 71; Das, supra note 58; Does Digital
Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36 (recognizing that femtech devices “were
most probably designed and developed by men, and most likely not consulted by future
users”). This model has been changing in recent years, as more female entrepreneurs enter the
femtech space. Lawrie, supra note 79 (describing that female entrepreneurs are now
beginning to drive these products); Xu, supra note 49.
87.
Champayne, supra note 24.
88.
Id.; Magistretti, supra note 7; Tiffany, supra note 10.
89.
Tiffany, supra note 10; Levy, supra note 54, at 685.
90.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 28; McHugh, supra note 11
(stating that, “[i]n many ways, [femtech devices] are not . . . made for women”).
91.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 31.
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monitoring for blood pressure, blood alcohol level, steps, copper intake, and
molybdenum.92 The health monitoring system did not, however, include a
basic period tracker for women.93 This basic error “surely would have been
caught by a team with enough women on it.”94 A comparable mishap
occurred at Fitbit which, despite having millions of female users, did not add
female health tracking until May 2018, even though it was one of the
company’s most requested features.95 Thus, even when products are
designed to be gender neutral, they are nonetheless biased towards men and
male health needs.96
In addition, rather than use straightforward medical terminology and
design characteristics that are typical of male or gender-neutral health care
applications, femtech devices routinely include superfluous or insulting
design elements that downplay the importance of female health.97 Floating
clouds, color palettes that emphasize pink and red, irrelevant flowers, and
faux-empowering language are common in femtech applications today.98
These designs emphasize fundamental (and often incorrect) assumptions
about women and their desires.99 For example, a period tracking app may
have a cloud drift across the screen of a woman’s smart phone, informing her
in welcoming letters and a positive tone that she is seven days late for her
period.100 The woman may have to continue watching the cloud for several
weeks as she prepares for an abortion—a circumstance in which the app’s
designers have clearly misunderstood that pregnancy is not always a
welcome occurrence.101 Further, when an abortion or miscarriage happens,
some apps prevent women from logging this data, which adds insult to injury
by telling women that their experience falls outside normal data calculations
and skews the data and predictions for their next cycles.102 Similarly, some
femtech applications use incorrect terminology, referring to its users as girls
or to sex as hookups, and describes sex in a way that is exclusively focused
92.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 176; Tiffany, supra note 10.
93.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 176.
94.
Id.
95.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36; McHugh,
supra note 11.
96.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at 176–77.
97.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 28; McGrath, supra note 11;
Tiffany, supra note 10.
98.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 28; McGrath, supra note 11;
Tiffany, supra note 10.
99.
See Tiffany, supra note 10.
100.
See id.
101.
See id.
102.
See McHugh, supra note 11.
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on male genitalia and excludes the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and
queer (“LGBTQ”) population (for example, a banana with or without a
condom).103 The pattern that emerges from these designs is “an industry that
is willing to invest plenty of resources in chasing delight and disruption, but
[has not] stopped to think about [who is] being served by its products, and
[who is] being left behind, alienated, or insulted.”104
Indeed, a University of Washington research team found that these
design characteristics formed the basis of common complaints about femtech
products.105 Yet, these design schemes are conspicuously absent in health
care products that are not aimed specifically at women.106 By including
these design elements in femtech products, the overarching message
conveyed to women is that their reproductive health is not a serious health
concern or medically important, but instead represents an opportunity for
marketers to exploit women as consumers.107 In fact, only 5% of apps
studied even cited medical literature to help women understand their bodies
and health.108 As such, it has become clear that these femtech applications
are intentionally designed to emphasize underlying marketing goals and not
necessarily women’s health.109 This perpetuates the longstanding stereotype
that women’s health concerns should be taken less seriously than men’s,
which can have devastating and sometimes fatal consequences.110
Further, femtech products have consistently failed to live up to the
promises they provide women.111 Consumers who download, purchase, or
use these applications expect minimum levels of usability, reliability, and
accuracy, yet these metrics are questionable for existing products.112 First,
femtech products typically operate over a range of normal or average values
103.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 31; see also McHugh, supra note
11; Tiffany, supra note 10.
104.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 8; see also Tiffany, supra note 10.
The ways in which period-tracking or fertility-tracking apps are different
reveal the ways most designers think of them: As products that provide information
that’s not actually very serious or important medically, and that should exist mostly
to convince a woman to spend as much time as possible looking at ads, while
supplying the owner with as robust a data set as possible, so they can better target
more ads.

Tiffany, supra note 10.
105.
McGrath, supra note 11.
106.
Tiffany, supra note 10.
107.
Champayne, supra note 24; see also Tiffany, supra note 10.
108.
McGrath, supra note 11.
109.
See Tiffany, supra note 10.
110.
Zimmermann, supra note 1.
111.
See Xu, supra note 49.
112.
Id.
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that define the spectrum of data a woman may input into the application.113
For instance, a regular period cycle may span between twenty-one and
thirty-five days (the average length is twenty-eight days), with an application
requiring inputted cycle data to match those timeframes.114 An individual
who experiences a cycle of forty-five or fifty days, or has bleeding for more
than fourteen days may be unable to accurately log her data in the app if she
is confined to those time limits.115 For example, when Fitbit finally added
period and ovulation tracking to its devices in 2018, many women were upset
that they couldn’t record more than ten days for a period.116
Second, femtech devices possess questionable reliability records
with high levels of inaccuracy.117 A 2016 study published in the Journal of
the American Board of Family Medicine reported that popular period
tracking apps failed to accurately predict when women will be the most
fertile.118 This data was reconfirmed in 2018 by gynecologist Alexander
Freis in a study involving calendar-based and calculothermal apps.119
Published in Frontiers in Public Health, this study found that calendar-based
and calculothermal apps predict fertile cycle days and ovulation by averaging
data from prior cycles.120 This retrospective methodology, Dr. Freis
explains, “is viewed as inadequately reliable as a result of the known
variability of the cycle length and ovulation day from month to month, a fact
that has been known to science since the 1930s.”121 The utility of this
technique employed by hundreds of femtech apps is limited, and most fertile
days will often be missed as a result of natural variation in cycle length.122
Indeed, none of the apps examined considered the full variation of cycle
characteristics, and most were inaccurate by more than a couple of days.123
This data underscores a study from 2000, which found that only 30% of
women had a fertile window even falling within the tenth to seventeenth day
113.
Id.
114.
McGrath, supra note 11.
115.
See id. “Some apps won’t allow you to chart periods that are longer or
shorter than the average two to seven days.” Id.
116.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36.
117.
See Xu, supra note 49. “A recent study . . . found that most of these apps
provided sub-optimal predictive results and were off by more than a couple of days.” Id.
118.
Marguerite Duane et al., The Performance of Fertility Awareness-Based
Method Apps Marketed to Avoid Pregnancy, 29 J. AM. BOARD. FAM. MED. 508, 509–11
(2016); Altman, supra note 56.
119.
Alexander Freis et al., Plausibility of Menstrual Cycle Apps Claiming to
Support Conception, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH, Apr. 2018, at 1, 6, 8; Xu, supra note 49.
120.
Freis et al., supra note 119, at 6.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.; Xu, supra note 49.
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average, thus making ovulation prediction based on tracking and algorithms
unreliable.124
Similarly, a 2018 study from Current Research and Opinion
reviewed seventy-three menstrual cycle apps and found that none could
correctly predict ovulation.125 In fact, the best app scored only a 21%
accuracy rate.126 Researchers at Columbia University Medical Center arrived
at a similar conclusion after studying 108 femtech apps, in which they found
that 95% of free smartphone menstrual cycle apps were inaccurate.127 Very
few of these apps had involvement or oversight from health professionals or
cited medical literature.128 However, even those femtech products that have
scientific backing and approval by the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”) are not foolproof.129 Natural Cycles, the first hormone-free, FDAapproved digital contraceptive, relies on data inputted by the user and
collected from a thermometer to determine when a woman will most likely
be fertile.130 Although Natural Cycles warns users that no form of
contraception is 100% effective, the use of the app led to thirty-seven
Swedish women reporting unwanted pregnancies.131
Given these flawed assumptions, design features, and data
inaccuracies, it is easy to understand how femtech can be perceived as failing
women and not acknowledging the full scope of women’s needs.132 By
neglecting to account not only for women’s design preferences but also for
their hormonal and body differences, these products cannot operate in a
reliable and effective manner that furthers the underlying goals of enhancing
female agency and improving women’s health.133 While femtech may be
perceived as a lucrative market for investors, it is a nuanced and complex
field that requires both product designers and technology that can understand
important distinctions about the female body in order to add value.134 Until
124.
McGrath, supra note 11.
125.
Zoë LaRock, Femtech Companies Are Likely Poised for Speedy Growth –
Despite Failing to Prove That Their Tools Live Up to the Hype, BUS. INSIDER (July 22, 2019
1:16 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/femtech-space-booms-despite-tepid-efficacy2019-7.
126.
Id.
127.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36.
128.
Id.
129.
See McGrath, supra note 11.
130.
See Ryan Ayers, Femtech: Startups Changing Women’s Health Tech,
READWRITE: HEALTH (Oct. 11, 2019), http://www.readwrite.com/2019/10/11/femtech-startups-changing-womens-health-tech/; Das, supra note 58.
131.
McGrath, supra note 11; see also LaRock, supra note 125.
132.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36.
133.
See Altman, supra note 56.
134.
Simeone, supra note 9.
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this occurs on a widespread scale, femtech products have the potential to
perpetuate stereotypes and discrimination that harm women and diminish
their agency.135
III.

FEMTECH AND THE OTHERING OF WOMEN

The undeniable connection between femtech, society, and politics
can lead to the socially undesirable consequence of othering subsets of
women.136 Scholars and experts have long identified a “tendency within
human societies to organize and collectively define themselves along
dimensions of difference and sameness” in order to “impart social meaning[]
[and] help navigate [the] social world”—even on an unconscious level.137
This tendency manifests itself in the underlying assumptions that pervade
femtech products—from their conception to design to sale—which can lead
to the unintended marginalization of groups of women who fail to conform
to socially constructed perceptions of normalcy.138 The result is devaluation
and othering of certain classes of women based on the structure and
assumptions of femtech devices, and the data they collect and normalize.139
A.

Defining Othering

The term othering refers to “a set of dynamics, processes, and
structures that engender marginality and persistent inequality across any of
the full range of human differences based on group identities.”140 In this
manner, othering results in the construction of an identity in reference to
others, and is a manner of “propagating group-based inequality and
marginality”.141 Through this process, a virtuous self and a lesser other are
created.142 Othering thus operates to define and secure one’s identity by
135.
See Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36.
136.
Powell & Menendian, supra note 37, at 17; see also Champayne, supra
note 24; McHugh, supra note 11.
137.
Powell & Menendian, supra note 37, at 23–24.
138.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 51; McHugh, supra note 11.
139.
Powell & Menendian, supra note 37, at 25–26; Todres, supra note 14, at
609; see also McHugh, supra note 11.
140.
Powell & Menendian, supra note 37, at 17.
141.
Id.; Natalie J. Grove & Anthony B. Zwi, Our Health and Theirs: Forced
Migration, Othering, and Public Health, 62 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1931, 1933–34 (2006); Joy L.
Johnson et al., Othering and Being Othered in the Context of Health Care Services, 16
HEALTH COMM. 253, 254 (2004); Susan J. Stabile, Othering and the Law, 12 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 381, 382–83 (2016).
142.
Stabile, supra note 141, at 382; Todres, supra note 14, at 607.
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stigmatizing and distancing those who are different.143 This results in the
exclusion, devaluation, and dehumanization of others from the self’s locus of
concern.144
A key feature of othering is that group-based identities can become
so fundamental that they are seen as natural and inform everyday behavior
and decisions.145 Even at an unconscious level, this continual process of
othering—or us versus them—can lead to individual acts of discrimination
based on stereotypes that are perpetuated and approved by general society.146
“When replicated across society and over time, individual acts of
discrimination have a cumulative and magnifying effect that may help
explain many group-based inequalities.”147
Accordingly, even if
unintentional, othering practices can “reinforce and reproduce positions of
dominance and subordination.”148
By enforcing projections of difference on those who fall outside the
self and societally-proclaimed norms, othering contributes to alienation,
marginalization, and internalized oppression.149 The other becomes trapped
in her uniqueness and is reduced to an object that can be analyzed,
categorized, and discriminated against.150 Although this discrimination may,
at times, be overt, it can also take the form of microaggressions.151 A
microaggression occurs if there is indirect, subtle, or unintentional
discrimination against members of a marginalized or other group.152 This
behavior can extend to commonplace verbal and environmental indignities
that reinforce stereotypes without intending to do so.153 When such
microaggressions occur, they create distance between the self and the other,
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with the other often “internaliz[ing] the devalued sense of self portrayed in
the dominant discourse.”154
While there are multiple dimensions across which othering may
occur, sex and gender are two common forms of othering that are deeply
engrained in human existence.155 As early as 1949, French philosopher
Simone de Beauvoir provided a framework for understanding the
construction of gender, asserting that man is considered default while woman
is characterized as the Other.156 As part of this framework, humanity is
perceived as being male, with man defining woman not [as] herself but as
relative to him.157 Stated differently, men are represented as the norm in
Western society, while “women [are] viewed as deficient.”158 This
perception of male as dominant and normal persists today, even in
technological apps like Apple’s comprehensive health tracker that are
gender-neutral but fail to include basic tracking applications for women.159
As technology propels society into an age of endless screens and code, it also
serves to fragment and divide society.160 Thus, seventy years after Simone
de Beauvoir’s publication of The Second Sex, some of the most privileged
men in Silicon Valley—able-bodied, cisgender, heterosexual, and
Caucasian—are restricting meaningful innovation in the health care
technology space for their non-male counterparts due to ingrained gender
bias.161
B.

Femtech: Using Digital Technology to Other Women

Beyond the traditional male-female bias, a new dimension of
othering has arisen with respect to femtech products: The construction of
female identities along artificial lines of what society and males perceive as
154.
Todres, supra note 14, at 618.
155.
See Canales, supra note 149, at 19; Todres, supra note 14, at 619; Powell
& Menendian, supra note 37, at 18.
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SEX 19, 26 (Constance Borde & Sheila Malovany-Chevallier trans., Vintage Books 2011)
(1949) (ebook); Goldhill, supra note 15.
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in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 693 (2002).
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See Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36
(noting that Apple Health appeared on the market without a period tracker and did not add one
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See id. (acknowledging that while “[t]he terminology and industries have
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normal.162 The design features and assumptions built into femtech products
reveal the dissonance between what many women are and want, and what
society expects them to be and desire.163 In particular, the act of
measurement itself is never neutral, yet, femtech decidedly measures the
most intimate and subjective experiences by simplifying them to analytical
and comparable data points.164 Once the data is collected and averaged, it
operates to create socially acceptable versions of normal, against which
women compare their own health and experiences.165 By charting, graphing,
and comparing one woman’s experience or performance with another’s, app
developers can simplify highly personal interactions and “normatively
construct[] the quality of intimate behaviors along a very limited set of
axes.”166 Such simplification and normative constructions can introduce
algorithmic subjectivity into society’s understanding of intimate and
reproductive behavior.167
While marketing for femtech devices promotes themes of agency
and self-determination, the messaging can sound like a veneer of feminism
for a product that is more concerned with manipulating women’s fears and
insecurities about their bodies for the sake of profit.168 Because self-tracking
tools are designed for consumers who are assumed to be young and fit, they
present a restricted image of wellbeing, often assuming a certain type of user
who is unburdened by poverty or mental or physical illness.169 This is
evidenced on the homepages of many femtech websites, where a presumably
able-bodied, cis-presenting woman holds or wears a product related to sex or
reproduction.170 These images reinforce the message that these devices and
products help the user achieve normative femininity.171 This not only leaves
behind women who do not menstruate or cannot get pregnant, but it also
neglects women whose sexual experiences are not heterosexual in nature.172
Specifically, every time a woman’s data or experience fails to
conform to the artificial standard, she faces repeated microaggressions and
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othering that highlight her failure to adhere to societal expectations.173 In
this manner, femtech “legitimates certain forms of knowledge and
experience, while rendering others invisible.”174 For instance, apps that limit
data entry for the length of a woman’s cycle implicitly tell women with
longer-than-average cycles that they are abnormal and that their data is not
even worth recording.175 Similarly, the app that congratulates women on
missing their period marginalizes the experiences of individuals who may
have been raped, sexually abused, or are uninterested in parenting a child.176
These women are implicitly told that their experiences are unnatural and
atypical for normal women, thus working to other and distance this subpopulation.177 In that same vein, the app that monitors sexual activity using
male genitalia conveys to all LGBTQ individuals that they deviate from the
arbitrary norm of the heterosexual female—a societally created and imposed
standard.178 Stated differently, femtech products “tell[] queer, unpartnered,
infertile, and/or women uninterested in procreating that they aren’t even
women.”179 As such, each assumption that is built into a femtech device—
without careful vetting and understanding of the entire consumer
population—can serve to ostracize and other subsets of women.180 These
women are made to feel unequal, as if they have inherently less value than
their normal counterparts, despite the fact that each individual body is
unique.181 This has the artificial effect of placing women into hierarchical
categories based on their ability to conform to arbitrary criteria.182 In this
manner, femtech not only creates and defines what is normal for female
173.
Levy, supra note 54, at 687–88; see also McHugh, supra note 11;
Microaggression, supra note 152.
174.
Levy, supra note 54, at 687; Tiffany, supra note 10.
175.
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“strong assumptions built into [femtech] design[s] . . . can marginalize a lot of women’s
sexual health experiences”). “The assumption from the outset is that pregnancy drives period
tracking — an assumption that may immediately exclude a broad swath of the female
population.” Krueger, supra note 5.
177.
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178.
Miranda Hall, The Strange Sexism of Period Apps, VICE (July 25, 2017,
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179.
Tiffany, supra note 10 (quoting Maggie Delano, I Tried Tracking My
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reproductive health and sexual wellness, but it does so with little thought to
the consequences that befall the othered population groups.183 This leads to
exclusion and disempowerment for subsets of the female population that may
already be marginalized.184
In particular, the Lambda Legal survey on discrimination aptly notes
that queer Americans regularly encounter “disrespectful attitudes,
discriminatory treatment, inflexible or prejudicial policies, and even refusals
of essential care.”185 But, “in defining women primarily by their biology,
many femtech companies focus singularly on the needs of cis [and not] trans
women.”186 This not only others trans women, but it also categorically
excludes trans men who often have similar physiologies to cis women.187
This double exclusion peels back any illusion that most femtech companies
are first and foremost concerned with assisting the most vulnerable and
underserved populations.188 Rather, although an opportunity exists for
scientific innovation to address the unique health needs of intersex and nonbinary (including trans) individuals, this population is further ignored and
marginalized through the product assumptions that are built into femtech
devices.189
Moreover, this othering by femtech devices results in a selfperpetuating cycle that first imposes constructs of normalcy on the female
population and then uses the collected data to further define societal
standards of normalcy.190 By limiting the data that users can input into these
devices, the femtech industry has defined the normal data range from the
start.191 Given that some femtech devices then use or sell the inputted data to
third parties and researchers, this data is subsequently analyzed to average
and normalize the female experience across populations.192 Defining
183.
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184.
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normalcy and then using data that is inputted in accordance with those
standards to construct normalcy excludes the experiences of large portions of
the female population.193
Further, given the sensitive nature of data collection for femtech
devices (i.e., menstrual and sexual data input), women are often
uncomfortable providing data on every intimate aspect of their lives.194
Some femtech apps, for example, request data such as sexual position, cycle
length and flow, weight, mood, medications, intensity of cramps, acne, time
of sexual activity, color and thickness of cervical fluid, and basal body
temperature.195 Women who are uncomfortable providing the full data
requested will either avoid data input in certain categories or, when data
avoidance is not possible to continue using the app, they will enter incorrect
or false data to avoid full surveillance into their private lives.196 These
actions not only decrease the effectiveness of the femtech devices, but they
also skew the underlying data that is then used to normalize female
experience.197 This skewed data not only biases the algorithms that function
within these femtech devices to normalize data and predict fertility windows,
cycle lengths, etc., but it also negatively impacts scientific research studies
that are being performed on this data to understand and improve women’s
health conditions.198
Thus, design technologies in the femtech space frequently fail to
acknowledge the scope of women’s medical needs and instead rely on
gendered assumptions that can marginalize women’s health experiences.199
It is increasingly evident that the distance in social locations between
investors and designers in Silicon Valley and patient-consumers exacerbates
existing inequalities in terms of access to medical care and full
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personhood.200 In this manner, femtech devices can reproduce social
inequalities that maintain systems of gendered dominance.201
IV.

FIXING FEMTECH TO AVOID DIGITAL MICRO-AGGRESSIONS AND
DISCRIMINATION

Given the current status of femtech and the perpetuation of gendered
stereotypes and dominance, it is crucial that future products be designed to
create an inclusive environment for all users without the imposition of biased
standards of normalcy.202 “[T]he more technology becomes embedded in all
aspects of life, the more it matters whether that technology is biased,
alienating, or harmful.”203 The assumptions that designers and technologists
weave into their products should be reflective of the collective user
experience, rather than seeking to impose normalcy on a diverse
population.204 As technology becomes more pervasive, users must begin
demanding inclusive platforms and interfaces that promote health and
wellbeing, rather than reinforcing biases.205
To do this requires first and foremost that consumers acknowledge
their power and autonomy in the digital marketplace, and their control over
spending on biased products.206 Because heterosexual Caucasian female
normalcy has long been recognized and paraded as the golden standard, it is
easy to ignore—even unintentionally—the subtle discriminatory messaging
that some femtech products convey.207 Further, these digital microaggressions are merely another snub in a long chain of discriminatory events
towards diverse consumers, making them a daily part of life that can go
unnoticed at a conscious level.208 While tech is not overtly or purposely
discriminatory in most circumstances, the assumptions that underlie these
products must be challenged and reformed.209
200.
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The problem, however, is not the lack of a solution but rather the
lack of an incentive.210 Femtech designers have experienced success with
their current marketing strategies and products; yet, success does not equal
inclusion.211 Femtech consumers also enthusiastically embrace the notion
that women’s health is finally stepping into the forefront of issues that
developers and society recognize, and they see the future potential of these
products.212 When each consumer focuses on how the femtech app helps her
in her own daily life and how these products might contribute to the
improvement of women’s health worldwide, it becomes easy to forget the
biased assumptions that form the basis of these products.213
Thus, until consumers begin demanding more inclusive products that
avoid gender dominance and normalcy, tech companies have little incentive
to change.214 With a primary focus on the bottom line, femtech developers
are more interested in attracting a large user base and monetizing data
collection than they are with correcting social injustices or ensuring full
representation.215 It is up to consumers to request product changes and
inclusion through expression of dissatisfaction and conscious spending on
products that promote diversity and inclusion.216 Until consumer priorities
shift, tech companies lack the incentive to increase spending on their devices
to ensure inclusion.217 However, as more daily interactions take place in the
digital world, these technologies hold increasing power over the
development of cultural norms.218 As such, technology does not exist merely
to be marveled at by consumers; instead, it exists as part of the collective

210.
Id. at 21; Sharkey, supra note 23.
211.
Clark, supra note 46; Champayne, supra note 24.
212.
See Champayne, supra note 24; Codinha, supra note 60; Femtech
Companies Innovating Traditional Women’s Healthcare, supra note 57; McHugh, supra note
11 (describing the current status of women’s health as a global crisis and noting the historic
“lack of concern from the medical industry” regarding this issue). “Caring for the female
body is still being regarded as a luxury and sold at that price.” Codinha, supra note 60.
213.
See Codinha, supra note 60; Femtech Companies Innovating Traditional
Women’s Healthcare, supra note 57; McHugh, supra note 11.
214.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 40, 75 (calling on consumers
to demand that designers create more inclusive products); Hudson, supra note 22. “The first
step is to start demanding that the institutions using these tools make deliberate choices about
the moral decisions embedded in their systems.” Hudson, supra note 22.
215.
See Champayne, supra note 24; Codinha, supra note 60.
216.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 40, 75; Hudson, supra note
22.
217.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 40, 75; Hudson, supra note
22.
218.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 197.
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consumer experience.219 Product developers must be held accountable for
the biased and exclusionary assumptions that pervade their products.220 Only
by demanding better can consumers alter the landscape of female technology
to ensure comprehensive representation and inclusion.221
In addition, broader societal shifts are needed in the perception of
female normalcy.222 The existing femtech devices reflect commonly
accepted societal perceptions of the female body, which implies widespread
societal discrimination.223 While activism has greatly contributed to
increased inclusion of the LGBTQ population, more must be done to ensure
that micro-aggressions and discrimination are the exception, not the norm.224
This general societal shift will inevitably take time, but the seeds of change
must be planted now.225 First, consumers must move beyond the instant
gratification that accompanies technology and try to understand the
assumptions and inputs that are woven into the devices they use, and the
impact of each assumption on other population groups.226 By examining
technology with an eye towards understanding rather than blind acceptance,
flaws can be more readily identified and remedied.227
Second, representation in technology companies and Silicon Valley
must become increasingly diverse to ensure all viewpoints are heard,
acknowledged, and considered.228 Although gender diversity has increased
in femtech companies, the Silicon Valley investment firms that approve and
back these products have seen little change from the historically male-

219.
See Champayne, supra note 24; Sharkey, supra note 23.
220.
Hudson, supra note 22.
221.
Id.
222.
See Codinha, supra note 60.
223.
Hall, supra note 178.
224.
See WATCHER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 11; Faroat Andasheva, Aren’t
I a Woman? Deconstructing Sex Discrimination and Freeing Transgender Women from
Solitary Confinement, 12 FIU L. REV. 117, 140 (2016).
To avoid othering transgender and non-gender conforming individuals,
while simultaneously challenging the binary sex system, a solution should consist
of trans inclusivity to the level where trans individuals fit perfectly within the
understanding of sex and gender; not occupy a small, capricious class where their
existence is divided between two sides.

Andasheva, supra, at 140.
225.
See Andasheva, supra note 224, at 150.
226.
See Hudson, supra note 22.
227.
Id.
228.
See CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII; WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra
note 6, at 26. “[W]hen we are designing a world that is meant to work for everyone we need
women in the room.” CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII.
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dominated environment.229 The product creation teams and funding groups
that design and financially support these devices must be reflective of the
broader population groups they serve.230 Unfortunately, the lack of diversity
in this area is a key contributor to the development of products that does not
match consumer expectations and that inadvertently discriminate against
sub-populations.231
Finally, femtech products should be heavily vetted by diverse
consumer groups before launch.232 While a number of femtech companies
currently do this, some companies nonetheless feel pressure to rush to
market, and do not ensure adequate testing among representative
consumers.233 The perspective among these organizations is that the rush to
market will enable the company to capture available market share while
fixing bugs or product complaints at a later date.234 Extensive testing,
however, can help to identify implicit biases in products before they hit the
market, and can ensure that companies better understand what the consumer
population is seeking in the product.235
Thus, consumers, product
developers, and investors all play a fundamental role in altering the femtech
landscape to promote inclusion and diversity.236
V.

CONCLUSION

The femtech industry is rapidly developing, growing, and changing
with women perceived as a lucrative consumer base upon which fears,
desires, and anxieties can be exploited.237 While these products are,
theoretically, designed with good intentions to bring greater insight and
attention to women’s health concerns, their development and design can
inadvertently marginalize subsets of the population.238 At the current stage
229.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36. “In spite
of the slogan of diversity pinned on the flag of many tech companies, the field is highly
dominated by men.” Id.
230.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII; see also Tahmassebi, supra note 4.
231.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII. “[F]ailing to include the perspective
of women is a huge driver of an unintended male bias that attempts (often in good faith) to
pass itself off as gender neutral.” Id.
232.
See Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36.
233.
Id. (stating that future users were most likely not consulted by femtech
designers before the products were released into the market).
234.
See id.; Tiffany, supra note 10.
235.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 28, 71.
236.
See Tahmassebi, supra note 4; Does Digital Health Technology Know
Women?, supra note 36.
237.
See Tiffany, supra note 10.
238.
See WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 37–38, 51.
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of development, numerous femtech products contain incorrect assumptions
about consumers’ needs and desires, and instead seek to impose arbitrary
standards of normalcy upon all members of the female population.239
Individuals whose data, desires, or lifestyles do not conform with these
assumptions experience micro-aggressions and discrimination that serve to
distance or other them from the normal standard.240 Fundamental societal
shifts are necessary to ensure full representation and inclusion of all
consumers for femtech products, and consumers must be empowered to
demand better products from the companies that develop this technology.241
Digital tools must be viewed “not as a wonder, or even as a villain, but rather
as a series of choices that designers and technologists have made.”242
Presently, there is a collective abdication of responsibility that must be
remedied to ensure women’s health concerns are addressed not only among
all subsets of the population, but also among all dimensions—including, but
not limited to, reproductive and sexual wellness.243

239.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36; McHugh,
supra note 11.
240.
Does Digital Health Technology Know Women?, supra note 36; McHugh,
supra note 11; Tiffany, supra note 10.
241.
CRIADO PEREZ, supra note 4, at XIII–XV; Hudson, supra note 22.
242.
WACHTER-BOETTCHER, supra note 6, at 200.
243.
See McHugh, supra note 11; Tiffany, supra note 10.
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INTRODUCTION

Ideally, health care, science-technology, and law should go hand in
hand to protect weak and vulnerable patients.1 Bearing in mind the concerns
over public health amidst the frenzy of proprietary patent claiming,
escalating prices of medicines, and the letter and spirit of the Bayh-Dole Act,
this Article critically analyzes the impact of the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the United States case in Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford
Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. (“Stanford v. Roche”)2
on the interests of ordinary patients.3 The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act is
termed as a landmark legislative development to enhance university
*
Kishor Dere is a research scholar at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Delhi. He has academic training in computer science, political science, international relations,
philosophy, and law. He has earned doctorates in international relations, philosophy, and law.
Mr. Dere would like to thank the Executive and Editorial Board members of the Nova Law
Review, Volume 44, for their hard work and dedication to this Article.
1.
See Stephen Ezell, The Bayh-Dole Act’s Vital Importance to the U.S. LifeSciences Innovation System, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2019),
http://www.itif.org/publications/2019/03/04/bayh-dole-acts-vital-importance-us-life-sciencesinnovation-system.
2.
563 U.S. 776 (2011).
3.
See id. at 783; Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018); Ezell, supra
note 1; discussion infra section III.B.
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competitiveness by increasing incentives for universities to exploit
intellectual property. 4 Before the Bayh-Dole Act was passed, universities
did not have effective systems for technology transfer, making ownership
rights unclear.5 As a result, companies were less likely to collaborate with
universities because they did not want to invest in technologies the university
may not actually own or that the inventor may assign to another entity.6 The
United States Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to clarify ownership rights
to promote collaboration between industry and nonprofits, including
universities. 7 The primary purpose was to encourage future research and
discovery.8
The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Stanford
v. Roche offers a new interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act that differs from
the pre-FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc.9 era.10 It does not seem to accord
with the spirit in which Congress had adopted this law. 11 There was
widespread criticism of this judicial verdict fearing that uncertainty over
patent ownership might dampen enthusiasm of entrepreneurs keen to invest
in new inventions. 12 The United States District Court of the Northern
District of California had ruled in favor of Stanford as a lawful title bearer
following the federal government. 13 Popular understanding was that the
opinion of the United States District Court of the Northern District of
California in favor of Stanford was correct, which had held that the inventor
was not at all interested in assigning it to Cetus Corporation (“Cetus”).14
The adjudication done by the United States District Court of the
Northern District of California was considered to be appropriate owing to the
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act itself.15 By assigning the rights in future
inventions to Cetus, the inventor had created a discontinuity in the title

4.
Ezell, supra note 1; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
5.
Ezell, supra note 1; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
6.
See Ezell, supra note 1.
7.
35 U.S.C. § 200.
8.
Id.
9.
939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
10.
Ashlie Depinet, The Public Is Paying Twice: How Stanford v. Roche
Undermines the Congressional Intent of the Bayh-Dole Act, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 729, 738
(2013); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776, 776; FilmTec Corp.,
939 F.2d at 1573–74.
11.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 738; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200; Stanford, 563
U.S. at 776; FilmTec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1573–74.
12.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 750.
13.
Id. at 738; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford, 563 U.S. at 783.
14.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 738; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
15.
Stanford v. Roche, 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Depinet,
supra note 10, at 738, 749; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
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contrary to the stipulations of the Bayh-Dole Act. 16 The United States
District Court of the Northern District of California’s judgment echoed the
Congressional logic behind passing the Bayh-Dole Act, vested patent
ownership in the university operating under the said law, incentivized the
university to undertake research along with its commercialization, and
encouraged the industry to contribute to the commercialization of the
invention made by the university. 17 Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit
adopted a different approach, and it was also endorsed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.18
The inventor, while joining the university, had signed an agreement
to assign his rights and title to prospective inventions to his employer, i.e.
Stanford.19 While serving Stanford, the inventor got an opportunity to deal
with Cetus.20 It was in 1991 that Roche acquired polymerase chain reaction
(PCR)-related assets of Cetus.21 As soon as he began to pay visits to Cetus,
he signed a Visitor’s Confidentiality Agreement expressly stating that he
transferred his rights to future invention to Cetus. 22 The Federal Circuit
construed that the Visitor’s Agreement with Cetus alluded to assignment of
present rights while the employment contract with Stanford talked about
assignment of future rights. 23 As a result of this peculiar interpretation,
Cetus got the rights to the invention at hand. 24 Thus, by the time the
invention was made and Stanford submitted its invention disclosure
statements, Cetus had already procured and/or secured rights from the
inventor through the confidentiality agreement it had him sign at the outset.25

16.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 780; Depinet, supra note 10, at 749; see also 35
U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
17.
Stanford, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1124; Depinet, supra note 10, at 738–39; see
also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
18.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 793; Stanford v. Roche, 583 F.3d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Depinet, supra note 10, at 739; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
19.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 783; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 845.
20.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 781; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 837.
21.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 781; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 837.
22.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 781; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 837.
23.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 841.
24.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
25.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
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This was the majority judgment.26 The dissenting judge did not agree with
this kind of hairsplitting done by the majority because, in his view, it
defeated the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act, i.e. to oversee relationships of
small businesses and voluntary sector grantees with the government.27 The
majority judgment had rather focused on regulating the relationship between
the recipients of grants and their employee-inventors.28 Net result of such an
approach would be the government funded universities, nonprofit research
organizations, and small businesses would not have inventions nor would
they have patent rights, held the minority judgment.29
In this judgment, the Supreme Court of the United States asserted
that the Bayh-Dole Act did not supplant the patent law standards and did not
proprio motu vest rights and title to federally funded inventions in federal
contractors. 30 The Court held that its opinion was grounded in the
benchmarks of patent law, which were substituted by the Bayh-Dole Act.31
The Supreme Court of the United States relied on common law to rule in
favor of Roche, while the Bayh-Dole Act was precisely passed to do away
with the patent ownership uncertainty caused by the common law.32
The judicial unpredictability, as demonstrated in Stanford v. Roche,
would embitter relationships between the universities making inventions, and
private organizations seeking to commercialize such inventions under the
Bayh-Dole Act. 33 It will compel universities to downgrade their research
priorities, in spite of receiving federal funds for this purpose. 34 Private
companies will also hesitate to license such university patents thanks to their
ambiguous ownership status. 35 Researchers may be frightened of penal

26.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
27.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 797–98 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Stanford, 583 F.3d at 845.
28.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
29.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212;
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784; Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
30.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 780; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
31.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 749; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 780.
32.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 749; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 780.
33.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 740; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford,
563 U.S. at 776.
34.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 739–40; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
35.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 747; see also Stanford, 563 U.S. at 781; Liza
Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1966–67
(2012).
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consequences of commercializing their inventions. 36 It has far-reaching
consequences.37
In the wake of the unexpected judicial verdict in Stanford v. Roche,
university and other public employees could be apprehensive about the legal
status of their inventions.38 A careful look at the federal conflict of interest
rules shows that these rules treat royalties emanating from a source other
than the employer of the inventor as a financial conflict of interest.39 This
would inevitably force the researchers from playing any role that gives rise
to a conflict of interest and attracts a criminal penalty.40 It would end up in
an anti-climax of the Bayh-Dole Act because inventors from government-run
institutions and their prospective industry supporters would be afraid of
working together.41
The most devastating impact of such judicial confusion and
uncertainty is on the hundreds of millions of patients suffering from a wide
variety of existing and emerging diseases.42 Small businesses, universities,
inventors, and public employers would hesitate from undertaking new
research and experiments in the health care sector meant to provide relief to
patients.43
II.

HISTORY OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT OF 1980

Since this Article deals with one of the United States patent laws and
its interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United States in a 2011 case,
as well as the impact of that particular judicial pronouncement on public
health, it becomes pertinent to familiarize oneself with the historical
background of the relevant issues.44

36.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 747; see also Stanford, 563 U.S. at 781;
Vertinsky, supra note 35, at 1966–67.
37.
See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 798 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
38.
See id. at 786; Vertinsky, supra note 35, at 2003.
39.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 756; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200; Stanford, 563
U.S. at 798; Robert M. Patino, Moving Research to Patient Applications Through
Commercialization: Understanding and Evaluating the Role of Intellectual Property, 49 J.
AM. ASSOC. FOR LABORATORY ANIMAL SCI. 147, 148 (2010).
40.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 756; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200; Stanford, 563
U.S. at 798; Patino, supra note 39, at 148.
41.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 756; see also 35 U.S.C. § 200; Stanford, 563
U.S. at 798; Patino, supra note 39, at 148.
42.
See Patino, supra note 39, at 147.
43.
See id.
44.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Stanford, 563 U.S. at 793; Patino, supra note
39, at 147, 150.
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Government Funds Research but Companies Own Patents

The early 1900s were an eyewitness to the launch of a host of
modern medicines.45 The new era of medicines began with the discovery of
insulin and the introduction of sulfa drugs, barbiturates, amphetamine, and
heparin.46 At the far end of the 1940s, there were applications for penicillin
drugs, morphine, phenobarbital, epinephrine, niacin, codeine, testosterone,
progesterone, conjugated estrogens, digitalis, benzocaine, and theophylline,
which are considered to be indispensable even in the second decade of the
twenty-first century. 47 The major development took place when scholars
teamed up with the forerunners of contemporary research-based companies.48
The pharmaceutical companies inaugurated on average forty-three new
chemical entities annually in the decade of the 1950s.49 The Federal Drug
Administration (“FDA”) received applications for acetaminophen and new
antibiotics, for example, as well as drugs to treat hypertension,
anticoagulants, early cancer drugs, and the first oral contraceptive.50 The era
of the 1950s is also known as the period of the wonder drugs.51
It is interesting to recall the paradox that while the nineteenthcentury pioneering inventors of these medicines sought patent protection, the
medical and scientific establishments objected to the patenting of
pharmaceutical products. 52 The grounds of resistance to pharmaceutical
patenting were preventing crass commercialism and avoiding secrecy created
by patenting which was a domain of quack medicines. 53 Moreover, the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) had made it illegal to hold patents
45.
See Suzanne White Junod, FDA and Clinical Drug Trials: A Short
History, in A QUICK GUIDE TO CLINICAL TRIALS 25, 28 (Madhu Davies & Faiz Kermani eds.,
2008).
46.
See id.
47.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., WHO MODEL LIST OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES
1–7 (2017).
48.
See DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 118–22 (2010) (ebook); Joseph M.
Gabriel, Pharmaceutical Patenting and the Transformation of American Medical Ethics, 49
BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 577, 587 (2016); Nicolas Rasmussen, The Drug Industry and Clinical
Research in Interwar America: Three Types of Physician Collaborator, 79 BULL. HIST. MED.
50, 55 (2005).
49.
SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE
1962 AMENDMENTS 13 (1974).
50.
See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 47, at 1–7.
51.
HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND
THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1990 149 (1997).
52.
See Gabriel, supra note 48, at 578–582, 585, 587; White Junod, supra
note 45, at 27; Patino, supra note 39, at 147, 150.
53.
Gabriel, supra note 48, at 578–79, 585, 587.
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and had forbidden prescribing patented goods. 54 The contemporary
generation obsessed with intellectual property rights (“IPRs”) may be
shocked to learn that the leading United States corporations, like Parke-Davis
(today’s Pfizer) and E.R. Squibb (now Bristol-Myers Squibb), in their early
phases had deliberately avoided seeking patents and trade secrets.55 There
was, however, a gradual yet perceptible attitudinal change towards the issue
of pharmaceutical patents in the first quarter of the twentieth century.56
Members of the academic community began to patent their
inventions either by assigning patents to their host institutions or institutions
of their affiliation. 57 For instance, the patent on insulin was held by the
University of Toronto in 1923. 58 Research-oriented pharmaceutical
companies in the United States also started patenting their inventions.59 For
example, Parke-Davis (predecessor of Pfizer) possessed eight patents granted
in the 1920s on chemicals for medicinal use or various methods used in
medical treatment. 60 The scientific and public health establishments
continued to remain uncertain about the need to patent medicines for many
more decades. 61 The path-breaking collaboration between the universitybased medical researchers and research-driven pharmaceutical industry in the
1950s and 1960s generated, according to Gabriel, impressive therapeutic
dividends. 62 In the wake of this paradigm shift, the patenting of
pharmaceutical products began to be seen as an “ethically legitimate and
even necessary” incentive mechanism encouraging researchers to develop
effective drugs.63
The federal administrative machinery that curtails the life span or
term of a patent also became visible around the same time. 64 While a
premarket review of biological medicines was introduced in 1902 and of new
54.
Id. at 580.
55.
Id. at 581; Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/topic/bristol-myers-squibb-company (last visited May 1, 2020);
2000:
Pfizer
Joins
Forces
with
Warner-Lambert,
PFIZER,
http://www.pfizer.com/about/history/pfizer_warner_lambert (last visited May 1, 2020).
56.
Gabriel, supra note 48, at 584–85.
57.
Id. at 588.
58.
Id.; U.S. Patent No. 1,469,994 (filed Oct. 9, 1923); Erika Lietzan, The
History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV.
53, 67 n.70 (2018).
59.
Gabriel, supra note 48, at 588.
60.
See U.S. Patent No. 1,717,198 (filed June 11, 1929); Lietzan, supra note
58, at 66–67.
61.
Gabriel, supra note 48, at 589.
62.
Id. at 592.
63.
Id. at 592–93.
64.
See Erika Lietzan, The Drug Innovation Paradox, 83 MO. L. REV. 39, 49
(2018).
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medicines in 1938, its previous applications were founded on safety data.65
Those were quite modest in size as well as in scope.66 In the 1940s, the
patent office regulators and university researchers evolved “the randomized,
controlled, blinded clinical trial [to prove] therapeutic claims.” 67 In the
1950s, it was commonplace for the FDA to demand the data on outcomes.68
It was in the year 1962 that the United States Congress legislated a premarket
approval requirement and prescribed that companies should provide
substantial evidence of the effectiveness of drugs.69 As expected, there was
new rigor in expectations of the FDA about the content and scope of
applications in the subsequent decades.70 The period between 1950 and 1965
witnessed a dramatic rise in the standard time required from the maiden
clinical trial to an approval by the FDA, approximately seven years.71 This
was also the period that saw preclinical testing trials become more rigorous
and lengthy.72 As a result of these developments, in the second half of the
1960s, average patent life for new drugs was 13.9 years, and in the early
1970s, it was 12.4 years.73 It was further reduced to 9.5 years by 1979.74 A
research study recorded that twenty-five percent of the reduction in the
original patent term was caused by “an increase in the time between patent
filings and the start of clinical trials.”75 Fifty percent of the loss in the legally
stipulated term of the patent was caused by “an increase in the time between
the start of clinical trials and [obtaining] regulatory approval.”76

65.
Id.; Biologics Control Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57–244, § 1, 32 Stat. 728,
728–29 (1902); Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, § 505, 52 Stat.
1040, 1052 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301).
66.
Lietzan, supra note 64, at 49.
67.
Lietzan, supra note 58, at 67; see also Geoffrey Marshall et al.,
Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary Tuberculosis: A Medical Research Council
Investigation, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 4582, 4582 (1948) (reporting of first such trial).
68.
Lietzan, supra note 58, at 67; see also Regulations for the Enforcement of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 Fed. Reg. 5576, 5578 (July 25, 1956) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. § 130.4).
69.
Lietzan, supra note 64, at 51–52.
70.
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87–781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780
(1962) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301); see also Lietzan, supra note 64, at 52–54.
71.
Lietzan, supra note 58, at 67.
72.
Id. at 68.
73.
Peter Barton Hutt, The Importance of Patent Term Restoration to
Pharmaceutical Innovation, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1982, at 6, 16–17.
74.
Id.; see also Leonard G. Schifrin, Lessons from the Drug Lag: A
Retrospective Analysis of the 1962 Drug Regulations, 5 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 91
(1982).
75.
Lietzan, supra note 58, at 68.
76.
Id. The remaining twenty-five percent of the patent term could be saved
only because the patent office mercifully issued patents relatively faster. Id.
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The advent of the rigorous patent administration in the United States
meant that the cradle to grave welfare state was doing its best to award
patents only to the deserving inventions and thereby protecting larger public
interest as well.77 The welfare state was also, and still is, a generous sponsor
of the research on patentable inventions in university laboratories and nonprofit sector institutions. 78 It is a fact of life that in liberal, progressive,
democratic, and welfare states like the United States, the federal government
is a major sponsor of academic research.79 This claim can be bolstered by
empirical evidence produced through academic research done by the
National Science Foundation (“NSF”).80 The NSF website states that a team
of researchers reckoned relationships between grants made by the
government and innumerable United States patents along with scientific
research papers between 1926 and 2017.81 The said research shows that at
least one-third of patents in the United States solely rely on the federallyfinanced research.82 It is noteworthy that this number has risen constantly
during the last nine decades.83 This report makes a stunning revelation that
industrial corporations increasingly rely on research supported by the federal
government.84 Moreover, this effect is across the board, not confined to any
particular discipline. 85 For example, the report mentions that about twothirds of the United States patents in chemistry and metallurgy emanate from
federally subsidized research. 86 Hillary Greene from the University of
77.
See RONDA BRITT, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., UNIVERSITIES REPORT $55 BILLION
SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING R&D SPENDING FOR FY 2009; REDESIGNED SURVEY TO LAUNCH
2010 2 (2010); L. Fleming et al., Government-Funded Research Increasingly Fuels
Innovation, 364 SCI. 1139, 1139–40 (2019).
78.
See BRITT, supra note 77, at 1; Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139–40.
79.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139–40. For example, in 2009, United
States’ universities and colleges spent $54.9 billion on science and engineering research and
development (“R&D”). See BRITT, supra note 77, at 3. Of that amount, about sixty percent,
or $32.6 billion, came from the federal government. See id.
80.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139; Government-Funded Research
Increasingly
Fuels
Innovation,
NAT’L
SCI.
FOUND.
(June
26,
2019),
http://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=298793&org=NSF&from=news.
81.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1140; Government-Funded Research
Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
82.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1140; see also Government-Funded
Research Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
83.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1140; see also Government-Funded
Research Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
84.
See Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1140; Government-Funded Research
Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
85.
See Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1141; Government-Funded Research
Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
86.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139; see also Government-Funded
Research Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80. “A new study finds that almost oneIN
IN
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Connecticut School of Law and a co-author of the report writes,
“[t]echnological progress is seen as a process through which inventions build
on one another.”87 She adds, “[i]n this study we examine the importance of
government-supported research as contributing to subsequent inventions.”88
These findings were published in the journal Science.89 The report critically
notes that the ratio of overall foreign patenting in the United States system
that relies on federal research still lags behind that of the United States
inventors.90 For instance, in 2017, 28.2% of the United States patents by
American inventors, and 12.4% of the United States patents by foreign
inventors relied on federally funded research.91 As per the report, foreign
inventors include those from Japan, Germany, Korea, England, France,
China, Taiwan, and India. 92 It is popularly argued that, by default,
ownership of federally funded inventions should go to the tax payers or
general public, whose hard-earned money replenishes the federal treasury.93
It may be noted that, in addition to public ownership, the ownership of
patentable inventions emanating from the federal funding could also go to a
few other parties such as: (a) the government; (b) the contractor-universities;
(c) the inventors; and (d) the private entrepreneurs keen on exploiting such
inventions. 94 Our experience of day-to-day life shows that contractoruniversities are owners of several inventions stemming out of federal
research grants and salaries.95 Thus, there is empirical evidence to prove that

third of [United States] patents rely on federal research.” Government-Funded Research
Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note 80.
87.
Id.; UCONN Communications, Government-Funded Research
Increasingly
Fuels
Innovation,
UCONN:
RES.
(June
21,
2019),
http://www.today.uconn.edu/2019/06/government-funded-research-increasingly-fuelsinnovation/; see also Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139.
88.
Government-Funded Research Increasingly Fuels Innovation, supra note
80; UCONN Communications, supra note 87; see also Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139.
89.
Fleming et al., supra note 77, at 1139.
90.
Id. at 1140.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research & Private Development:
Patents & Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663,
1690–91 (1996).
94.
Id. at 1725–26.
95.
UC Patent Acknowledgment, UCNET: COMPENSATION & BENEFITS,
http://ucnet.universityofcalifornia.edu/compensation-and-benefits/patent-acknowledgment/
(last visited May 1, 2020) (illustrating the University of California’s mandatory employee
invention assignment agreement); STANFORD UNIV., RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK 38 (2019).
Stanford University’s Employee Research Policy Handbook, requiring that “inventions shall
be assigned to the University, regardless of the source of funding.” STANFORD UNIV., supra,
at 38.
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the United States Government has a lion’s share in supporting health related
research and development.96
Besides overseeing and financing research, the government’s support
to academic institutions and training of young scientists have enabled and
nurtured the world’s leading biomedical infrastructure. 97 Government
funded fundamental research has facilitated the rise of biotechnology
companies.98 The government’s money does not remain confined to primary
research alone.99 Had that not been the case, there would not have been a
great deal of patentable inventions, because no patent is granted for
conducting basic research, but exclusively for those implementations of
fundamental research that have tangible and proven usefulness. 100
Nonetheless, the industry naturally and regularly lays claim to success in its
eventual profit-orientation.101 In spite of such self-serving assertions by the
industry, the allocation of resources by the government for health-related
research and development by the government is too high. 102 Government
spending on health-related research and development is not the only aspect
of public funding.103 In addition to this, there are also staggering tax credits
and whopping deductions that amount to public investment in these private
enterprises.104 The recent stress on managed care has mounted pressures to
enhance government funding and thereby counterbalances even more toward
public investment without clear cut regulatory provisions.105 Since ordinary
96.
BRITT, supra note 77, at 1, 3; see also UC Patent Acknowledgment, supra
note 95; STANFORD UNIV., supra note 95, at 38.
97.
Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Drug
Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements
Imposed Upon Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75
TUL. L. REV. 631, 636 (2001); see also Lynne G. Zucker et al., Intellectual Capital and the
Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises 7–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 4653, 1994).
98.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 636.
99.
See Jeff Gerth & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Companies Profit from
Research Supported by Taxpayers, N.Y. TIMES: SCI. (Apr. 23, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/042300hth-drugs.html
[http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/national/science/health/042300hthdrugs.html].
100.
See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). An invention can be patented only if it first
satisfies, among other elements, the demonstrable utility requirement of the Patent Act. Id.
101.
Gerth & Stolberg, supra note 99; Peter G. Gosselin & Paul Jacobs, DNA
Device’s Heredity Scrutinized by U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2000, at Al.
102.
See Gosselin & Jacobs, supra note 101.
103.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 639.
104.
Id. at 637.
105.
See Alan M. Garber & Paul M. Romer, Evaluating the Federal Role in
Financing Health-Related Research, 93 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12,717, 12,724 (1996).
A move toward managed care in the delivery of health care services is desirable only to the
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people also contribute to public exchequer by paying taxes, the members of
the general public also have moral as well as legal rights to inventions
resulting from government-funding.106 Public funding done via the National
Institutes of Health (“NIH”) is the most obvious source of taxpayer support
for health-related research and development.107 One must not forget that tax
credits and tax deductions availed by the pharmaceutical industry are another
main indirect source of taxpayer support for health-related research and
development.108
B.

Bayh-Dole Act Heralds New Era of Patents

The Bayh-Dole Act tackles the thorny issue of patenting and
commercialization of scientific and technological research sponsored by the
federal government.109 This innovative law has multidimensional effects.110
First and foremost, this unique law harmonizes research funding policies of
federal agencies.111 Unlike in the past, it does not leave it to those agencies
to individually decide whether inventions originating from federally funded
research may be patented and if so, who would be the owner of such patent
rights.112 Secondly, the new law permits the federal government to continue
to have a non-exclusive, paid-up license to practice the patented invention
and to march-in and take necessary steps if the recipient of the grant failed in
making reasonable efforts to use the patented invention for the larger good of
the public. 113 There are hardly any instances of federal agencies ever
asserting and exercising their march-in rights under the Act in question.114
Thirdly, the Bayh-Dole Act does not let non-U.S. institutions exploit the U.S.
extent that it reduces the utilization of some medical technologies. Id. It will have a side
effect of diminishing private sector incentives to conduct research leading to innovations in
health care. See id. This change requires higher public support for biomedical research. Id.
The suitable policy, therefore, should dovetail greater government support for research in
some areas with stronger property rights and a move toward increasing dependence on the
private sector in other areas. Id.
106.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 637.
107.
Id. The NIH happens to be a major public agency funding health-related
research and development; it finances over 80% of all federal government expenditure in this
field. Id. at 638, no.26.
108.
Id. at 638.
109.
Id. at 646; see also Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018).
110.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 646–48; see also Emily Michiko Morris,
The Many Faces of Bayh-Dole, 54 DUQ. L. REV. 81, 86 (2016).
111.
Morris, supra note 110, at 86.
112.
Eisenberg, supra note 93 at 1671; Morris, supra note 110, at 86 (citing
Brett Frischmann, Innovation & Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. Science and
Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. REV. 347, 398 (2000)).
113.
35 U.S.C. §§ 202(c)(2)–203; Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1679.
114.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 642; Frischmann, supra note 112, at 403.
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funded research by requiring that manufacturing under subject patents occurs
“substantially in the United States.”115 Yet another feature is that the BayhDole Act also supports small businesses by expressly according a preference
for patent licensing to small businesses wherever possible.116
Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act deals with the issue of ownership of
intellectual property rights emanating from research financed by the
government. 117
It allows United States’ non-profit organizations,
universities, and small businesses to possess title of their respective
inventions.118 The government retains a right to use the technology.119 The
Bayh-Dole Act’s principal aim is to foster the transfer of technology
originating from federal government supported upstream research for
development into downstream applications.120 The prevalent feeling before
the advent of this law on the legislative horizon was that most of this
pioneering research could have been of critical value and use to the general
public.121 There was a great deal of hesitation in the private industry to put
money into developing and commercializing such unutilized or underutilized
government funded research.122 Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, the government
used to enjoy the IPRs to the inventions funded by it. 123 There was a
viewpoint that the frontier research was not being exploited, either because it
was not patented or the government was the owner of patent rights and that
the patent rights were coveted by recipients of grants or the following
licensees. 124 In order to address these concerns, the United States
Government allowed fund-receiving contractors to cling to the patent rights
on their research with a hope that this step would offer incentives for

115.
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, A Technology Policy Perspective on the NIH Gene
Patenting Controversy, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 633, 650 (1994); see also 35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
116.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 643; see also 35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
117.
35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1665, 1667, 1693, 1705.
118.
35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1665, 1667, 1691–93,
1705.
119.
35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1689, 1718.
120.
35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1664; Peter Lee,
Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in
Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1508 (2012); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 77, 97–98 (1999).
121.
Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1678.
122.
See id. at 1680, 1701.
123.
See 35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Federal Technology Transfer Act and Related
Legislation, EPA (Oct. 7, 2019), http://www.epa.gov/ftta/federal-technology-transfer-act-andrelated-legislation.
124.
See Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1702; F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707 (2001).
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harnessing the inventions.125 With the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, there
was a mind-boggling rise in patents secured by the universities, as well as the
resources invested by the universities in the lengthy and cumbersome process
of patenting.126 Ever since its enforcement in 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act has
triggered a wave of inventions and innovations in the United States.127 It did
so by promising proprietorship of technologies funded by the federal
government to universities and small businesses that develop such
technologies.128 Parker Tresemer opines that the judgment of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Stanford v. Roche, unfortunately, weakens the
framework of the Bayh-Dole Act, and worries that the Court’s judgment may
bring to a standstill the ongoing advantageous implementation of the said
law.129
After the end of the Second World War and the consequent surge in
the American industrial output, the United States’ leaders expected domestic
industry and universities to lead the world in production and innovation.130
125.
See Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1680–81; Lee, supra note 120, at 1512–
13; Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries: Added
Pressure for a Broad Research Exemption in the United States?, 59 ME. L. REV. 259, 260
(2007). It is remarkable that the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980
instructs federal agencies to transfer federally owned technology to both state and local
governments and to the private sector. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311, 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
3701); Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 644. Arno and Davis point out that the revised
version of the said law allows government-financed and run laboratories to sign research and
development collaboration agreements with private contractors and to license, or to assign title
to, any patents being granted. Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 644; see also StevensonWydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 § 2318; Wei-Lin Wang, A Critical Study on the
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements of U.S. Federal Laboratories:
Technology Commercialization and the Public Interest, 9 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS., 50,
53–55 (2012).
126.
David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985, 989 (2005); Mireles, supra note 125, at 264; Kristen Osenga,
Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson from Big Business
to Increase Innovation, 59 ME L. REV. 407, 419 (2007) (revealing that between 1991 and
2004, universities spent six times more on patenting); see also Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No.
96-517, § 301, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212).
127.
Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1708–09; Mireles, supra note 125, at 264; see
also Bayh-Dole Act § 301.
128.
Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018); see also Eisenberg, supra
note 93, at 1708–09.
129.
Parker Tresemer, Renewing the Bayh-Dole Act as a Default Rule in the
Wake of Stanford v. Roche, 6 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 173, 173 (2012); see also 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200–212; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011).
130.
Steve L. Bertha, Intellectual Property Activities in U.S. Research
Universities, 36 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 513, 514 (1996); Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of
Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 93 (2004); Tresemer, supra note 129, at 173.
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The harsh reality, however, was that in the 1970s, the United States had
emerged as an international laggard, primarily due to the federal policy of
holding on to the patents created by technologies funded by federal
authorities.131 In the pre-1980 period, it was unthinkable for the government
to relinquish patent rights to the private industry, especially when inventions
were funded by the federal institutions. 132 The paradox was that the
government did not have adequate resources to satisfactorily exploit those
inventions. 133
Private companies were reluctant to invest in the
commercialization of nascent technologies in the absence of sole patent
rights to technologies funded by the government. 134 Unlike many other
members of the United States Congress, Senators Bob Dole (R., KS) and
Birch Bayh (D., IN) were of the view that by hanging on to exclusive rights
to inventions funded by federal sources, the government was consciously or
unconsciously tearing down any incentive for the private industry and
researchers to harness such beneficial technologies.135
The Bayh-Dole Act has stimulated American innovation
by guaranteeing ownership of federally funded technologies to the
small businesses and universities best suited to develop them. The
Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Stanford v. Roche,
however, undermines the Bayh-Dole Act’s framework and
threatens to stall its continued beneficial application. In the wake
of World War II and the resulting spike in American production,
United States policymakers looked to universities and domestic
industries to be international leaders in innovation and
production.136

The legislative backdrop of the Bayh-Dole Act reveals that the
United States Congress envisaged a law that involved allocation of
inventions developed under government contracts; the resulting patent rights
would go to the small business or nonprofit contractors firstly, and a
conditional mechanism for assignment to the employee-inventor if the
contractor decided not to maintain title, secondly.137
131.
Stevens, supra note 130, at 94.
132.
See Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1663, 1672, 1708–09.
133.
Tresemer, supra note 129, at 173–74.
134.
Id. at 174.
135.
Id. at 174–75; see also Stevens, supra note 130, at 94, 96.
136.
Tresemer, supra note 129, at 173; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212;
Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776, 780 (2011).
137.
James G. McEwen et al., The Impact of Stanford v. Roche on Technology
Licensing Under Bayh-Dole, PROCUREMENT LAW., Winter 2012, at 5, 12; see also Bayh-Dole
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 202, 94 Stat. 3015, 3020 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200-212).
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[T]he legislative history for both the Senate and House
indicates the legislat[ors] contemplated a statutory scheme that
involved assignment of inventions developed under government
contracts and resulting patent rights to the small business or
nonprofit contractors in the first instance, and a contingent
mechanism for assignment to the employee-inventor in the event
the contractor did not elect to retain title.138

Universities have invariably been in the forefront of the research and
development of many new scientific and technological inventions. 139
Throughout the United States, billions of dollars are earmarked annually to
promote research in a number of disciplines and the development of
innumerable inventions to transform the market.140 Regrettably, not even a
tiny portion of that sum is spent on commercialization of all such pathbreaking inventions. 141 This approach forbids the introduction of novel
technology into society.142 University technology transfer programs attempt
to reduce the effects of that barrier by collaborating with the industry to take
a new technology through the commercialization process with the ultimate
goal of market entry. 143 These programs educate students as well as
customers as they work jointly to analyze and prepare all aspects of the
invention for penetration into market.144
Irrespective of its scintillating success, the Bayh-Dole Act has been
criticized from time to time.145 The fulcrum of the criticism has been that the
common people should not be forced to pay twice for goods manufactured
out of inventions for which taxpayers have already paid. 146 It has been
138.
McEwen et al., supra note 137, at 12.
139.
Bertha, supra note 130, at 514; Stevens, supra note 130, at 95.
140.
Stevens, supra note 130, at 95.
141.
Id.
142.
See id. at 96.
143.
See Margaret G. Mastrodonato, Comment, Stanford v. Roche: Another
Hurdle for Technology Transfer Programs?, 20 DIG.: NAT’L ITALIAN AM. B. ASS’N L.J., 79,
79 (2012).
144.
Id.
145.
John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable Pricing — a New
Twist for March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 149, 150 (2005); see also Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018). The
Economist reported that “since 1980, American universities witnessed . . . a ten-fold increase
in their patents and created [over] 2,200 companies to exploit their technology, which in turn
has produced 260,000 new jobs; they now contribute $40 billion annually to the American
economy.” Raubitschek & Latker, supra, at 150; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
146.
See The Univ. & Small Bus. Patent Procedures Act: Hearings Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 96th Cong. 153, 157 (1979) (statement of Adm. Hyman G.
Rickover, Dir. of the Div. of Naval Reactors, Dep’t of Energy). Admiral Hyman Rickover
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repeatedly argued by critics that the Bayh-Dole Act was not meant to provide
innovators an absolute right to determine market prices for their inventions,
which has escalated the prices of medicines, mainly for patented drugs.147
The most basic question haunting the minds of experts and lay
people alike has been: “Do American taxpayers, who finance a majority of
research and development (“R&D”) projects related to public health, ever
receive a fair return on their investment?”148 In a market-driven economy
like the United States, it is interesting that—to talk about public taxpayer
returns on health-related R&D—one ought to confine the discussion to
returns in kind or non-monetary returns because the taxpayers hardly ever
see a monetary benefit.149
The professed claim of promoting public-private partnerships has
been to serve the public interest by researching and commercially utilizing
inventions that emerge out of federal funding through the transfer of new
technology, material resources, staff, and know-how among industry,
academic community, and federal government agencies.150 There is also a
view that the public interest can be better served by competitively
encouraging private companies to market products developed by university
researchers or scientists working in government institutions.151 They alluded
to the gains of novel treatments, the employment generation, and the growth
of individual businesses. 152 The antagonists of this opinion hold that the
corporate world has an accountability deficit despite its heavy utilization of
public resources and return on investment of the taxpayer is far from
sufficient.153 In favor of this contention, these detractors refer to expensive
frankly stated “[i]n my opinion, Government contractors — including small businesses and
universities — should not be given title to inventions developed at Government expense . . .
These inventions are paid for by the public and therefore should be available for any citizen to
use or not as he sees fit.” Id.
147.
Raubitschek & Latker, supra note 145, at 151; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–
212.
148.
See Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 634.
149.
See id. at 634 n.10 (mentioning that the Federal Government receives less
than a one percent return in royalties on government inventions).
150.
Id. at 634.
151.
Id. Stating the alleged rationale behind the Bayh-Dole Act: “At least
insofar as it adopted a title, as opposed to a licensing, approach to government-developed
patents—and the legislative history is replete with claims that granting title, as opposed to a
mere license, to federal contractors would expedite technological progress.” Id. at 634 n.11
(citing Gov’t Patent Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research & Tech. of the
Comm. on Sci. & Tech. U.S. H. of Rep., 96th Cong. 4–5 (1979)).
152.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 634–35.
153.
Id. at 635. It may be pertinent to recall Sanders’ Amendment to the House
appropriations bill, which prescribed that federally funded inventions must be subject to
reasonable pricing requirements. 146 CONG. REC. H4224, H4291 (2000) (statement of Rep.
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products even though they are an outcome of research done by the
government funds in the form of grants, licenses, tax credits for businesses,
and fund allocations.154 Such critics also contend that official subsidies for
research and development twist incentives for investment and consumption
besides bringing in interest group pressures that can conceal market cues.155
III.
A.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE 1980 ACT

Stanford v. Roche and Judicial Uncertainty
1.

District Court Favors Stanford

In Stanford v. Roche, the question before the court was the
ownership of patents to test efficacy of anti-HIV treatments. 156 The
procedure involved in this activity calculated the quantity of HIV in the
blood of a patient.157 It was developed by Dr. Mark Holodniy, a researcher
from Stanford University.158 Interestingly, he also used to serve at Cetus, a
research company located in California. 159 Initially, an employment
agreement was signed by Dr. Holodniy with Stanford which required him to
allot to Stanford patent rights to any invention originating from his
employment at Stanford. 160 Subsequently, in order to acquire entrance to
Cetus, Dr. Holodniy signed another contract with Cetus which prescribed
that Dr. Holodniy “would allocate and does hereby allocate to Cetus” all
rights to inventions made as a result of his ingress into the Cetus
laboratories. 161 Following his return to Stanford, Dr. Holodniy and his
fellow researchers in Stanford converted that technique into practice or

Sanders). In other words, it stressed that march-in rights provided for by the Bayh-Dole Act
ought to be enforced to ensure affordable pricing of such crucial drugs. See id.
154.
Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 635; see also James Love, The Other
Drug War, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 20, 2001), http://www.prospect.org/health/drug-war/; Health
Care Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Comm. on Ways & Means
H.R., 103d Cong. 444–48 (1993) (testimony of Abbey S. Meyers, Exec. Dir. Nat’l Org. for
Rare Disorders).
155.
U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, MULTINATIONALS AND THE
U.S. TECHNOLOGY BASE 12 (1994).
156.
Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776, 780–81 (2011).
157.
Id. at 781.
158.
Id.
159.
See id.
160.
Id. at 799. Dr. Holodniy agree(d) to assign to Stanford patent rights to
any invention resulting from his employment at Stanford. Stanford, 563 U.S. at 799.
161.
Id. at 781. Dr. Holodniy “will assign and do[es] hereby assign” to Cetus
all rights to inventions made “as a consequence of [his] access to Cetus.” Id.
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introduced commercial utility to the said invention. 162 On the basis of
written allocation of rights secured from its researchers including Dr.
Holodniy, Stanford applied for and obtained patents to the HIV measurement
process. 163 In the intervening period, Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.
(“Roche”), a pharmaceutical entity known for its expertise in screening of
diagnostic blood, took over assets of Cetus meant for and related to the
testing technology.164 Undoubtedly, this transaction also included all rights
acquired by Cetus under the aegis of its agreement signed with Dr.
Holodniy.165 In the wake of completion of clinical trials, Roche went ahead
and commercialized the procedure as well as profitably packaged and sold
the HIV test kits. 166 In the aftermath of this development, Stanford sued
Roche for violation of its patent rights.167 Roche claimed that it was a coowner of the HIV computation procedure.168 This claim of Roche was based
on the agreement it had signed with Dr. Holodniy under which he had
undertaken to transfer his rights in that invention to Cetus. 169 Stanford
contended that such an agreement went against the letter and spirit of the
Bayh-Dole Act, which explicitly stated that research institutions in receipt of
federal grants may choose to retain title to any subject invention that was a
result of such government sponsored research.170 One, to quote exact words
of the Bayh-Dole Act, “may . . . elect to retain title to any subject
invention.”171 Stanford asserted that since its HIV quantification research
was based on federal grants, the Bayh-Dole Act conferred the exclusive
rights in the patented technology upon Stanford by virtue of being the
beneficiary of the federal grant.172 This fact and law naturally ejected Dr.
Holodniy’s transfer of his IPRs to the Cetus.173 The court of first instance, or
District Court, admitted Stanford’s contentions.174

162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 781.
165.
Id.
166.
Id. at 781–82.
167.
Id. at 783.
168.
Id.
169.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 783.
170.
Id. at 782–83; see also Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018).
171.
35 U.S.C. § 202(a); Stanford, 563 U.S. at 782.
172.
Stanford v. Roche, 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2007); see also
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
173.
See Stanford, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
174.
Id. at 1124.
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Appellate Courts Help Employee and Third Party
a.

CAFC Negates District Court Ruling

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”) turned it upside down.175 Since the dispute revolved around the
question as to which of the two separate assignments signed at different
times by Dr. Holodniy with two institutions would prevail over another, the
CAFC relied upon its precedent in FilmTec and adjudicated that Dr.
Holodniy’s first agreement signed with Stanford was nothing more, nor
better than, a promise to assign IPRs at an unspecified time in the future,
while Dr. Holodniy’s later pact signed with Cetus as a matter of fact then and
there, allocated his rights to Cetus in his future inventions. 176 Thus, the
CAFC attached significance to different wording of the two different
agreements, not chronologically to determine which one would repudiate
another.177 The CAFC dismissed Stanford’s recourse to the Bayh-Dole Act,
arguing that the said Act did not automatically rescind a right of an inventor
in an invention born out of the government financed research.178 In other
words, Dr. Holodniy’s subsequent agreement with Cetus, and thereby his
decision to allot his IPRs to Cetus, remained flawless.179 To be precise, the
CAFC adjudged that Bayh-Dole Act could not frustrate the arrangement
between Cetus and Dr. Holodniy.180
b.

Supreme Court Disregards Act

On June 6, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States delivered a
crucial judgment to clarify the ownership rights in inventions financed by
grants from the federal government.181 The judgment in Stanford v. Roche
was the maiden encounter of the Supreme Court of the United States with the
Bayh-Dole Act.182 The highest Court was dealing with a three-decade old
federal law that governs the allocation of these rights among individual
inventors, research institutions receiving government grants, and the federal
government.183 The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Bayh175.
176.
Cir. 1991).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Stanford v. Roche, 583 F.3d 832, 849 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Id. at 842; FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572 (Fed.
Stanford, 583 F.3d at 842.
See id. at 844; Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018).
See Stanford, 583 F.3d at 844.
See id. at 845; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
See Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776, 793 (2011).
See id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 793; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
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Dole Act does not change the long-standing philosophy of the United States
patent legislation that a third party may acquire a right to an invention only
through an assignment by the inventor.184 By reiterating this principle, the
Supreme Court of the United States chose the course of action that hardly
impacts the prevalent law. 185 In spite of this, the research institutions in
general and universities in particular, which are recipients of federal grants,
are required to critically analyze the employment agreements signed with
their researchers to guarantee that these agreements succeed in tout de suite
assignment of all upcoming patent ownership rights to the institution.186 The
majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, ordered that even
though an inventor could assign his or her rights emanating from an
invention to a third party, including an employer who facilitated this
research, an employer does not suo moto get rights in an invention made by
its employee.187
The Supreme Court of the United States in its majority judgment
upheld the opinion of the CAFC.188 The Chief Justice, John Grover Roberts
Junior, wrote the judgment. 189 Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, joined Justice Roberts; Justice Sotomayor authored a
concurring opinion. 190 The Chief Justice observed that the most basic
premise of the United States Patent Act is that an inventor enjoys the rights
in an invention. 191 “[R]ights in an invention belong to the inventor.” 192
Despite the fact that an inventor can assign his or her rights to the third party,
including an employer whose facility ushered in the invention and patent,
even such a proprietor does not proprio motu earn such rights in an invention
made by its employee.193 According to the majority opinion, the employee
researcher ought to categorically assign his rights to the employer so that the
latter gets those rights.194 The employee “must expressly grant his [or her]
rights in an invention to his [or her] employer if the employer is to obtain
those rights.”195 One wonders how on earth the highest Court overlooked the
District Court’s appropriate interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act, vis a vis Dr.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
187 (1933)).

See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 792; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 792–93.
See id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 789.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id. at 780.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 780.
Id. at 789.
Id. at 786.
See id. (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
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Holodniy’s initial assignment agreement with Stanford that predated his
subsequent assignment agreement with Cetus, and affirmed the CFAC’s
unbelievable construction of the said Act privileging the latter contract.196
The Supreme Court of the United States seems to have supposed that Cetus
acquired patent rights in the HIV reckoning technique, developed by Dr.
Holodniy through such allocation of rights.197
The majority opinion did not construe the Bayh-Dole Act as
changing this time-honored practice that could rearrange the usual hierarchy
of rights in an invention right, when the invention is thought of, or first
abridged, to practice with the contribution of federal grants. 198 The apex
Court could not discover the intention of the lawmakers in the United States
Congress, who had voted in favor of this bill to replace one of the elementary
norms of the patent legislation, and deny inventors rights in their own
inventions.199 Merely because the wording of assignment of Dr. Holodniy’s
rights to Cetus was correct, the Supreme Court of the United States ordered
that the contract could not be adversely affected by the Bayh-Dole Act.200
According to the Supreme Court, its interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act
merely echoed the widely prevalent practice among a large number of
signatories to pacts invoking the said Act. 201 The Supreme Court of the
United States stressed that universities generally sign agreements with their
research staff stipulating the allocation of rights in inventions to the
universities.202 This is a legal necessity under the Bayh-Dole Act for the
research institutions that receive federal money.203
The honorable Supreme Court in its majority opinion took it for
granted that most of the research bodies getting the federal grants under the
provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act thus far needed lawful assignment of rights
from their employees. 204 It teaches a bitter lesson to all government
contractors receiving the Bayh-Dole funds that they ought to draft and sign
only those accords with researchers that perfectly guarantee enforceable
assignments of rights to the institutions.205 Another lesson to be drawn from
the refusal of the Supreme Court of the United States to interfere with the
ruling of the CAFC on the basis of the precedent in FilmTec, is that the
196.
See id. at 784; Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018).
197.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 784.
198.
Id. at 786; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
199.
See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 782.
200.
Id. at 781, 787; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
201.
See Stanford, 563 U.S. at 792–93; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
202.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 793.
203.
Id.; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
204.
Igor Timofeyev, Stanford v. Roche Decision Requires Greater Diligence,
INTELL. PROP. MAG., Sept. 2011, at 63, 63.
205.
Id. at 64.
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agreement signing bodies should not undermine the existing assignment
arrangements even for future inventions and patents.206 Yet another painful
lesson to be drawn from the majority opinion is that research institutions
receiving federal funds should incorporate non-disclosure clauses in their
employment contracts or necessitate the prior consent of the employer for
signing agreements with outside institutions.207 Last, but not the least, the
official contractors must keep track of the appeals before the CAFC on this
specific query. 208 If at all, the Supreme Court of the United States is
persuaded to look at the CAFC’s determination in FilmTec as it could bring
in desirable changes in the patent law and ownership of inventions-cumpatents. 209 The Supreme Court of the United States’ 2011 judgment in
Stanford v. Roche endowed IPRs in the inventor or researcher. 210 The
judicial verdict prevented an independently contracting party or a university
from monitoring developments made by students or faculty without radically
different agreements.211 In the wake of this change, technology programs
meant for commercialization of technologies at universities will undoubtedly
become much more difficult to steer for various stakeholders due to the
augmented thrust in licensing agreements necessary to secure IPRs under the
newly devised use of the Bayh-Dole Act.212 In the wake of the Supreme
Court of the United States’ decision, public organizations may lose the rights
to intellectual property that is generated under various contracts signed
before the rendering of the Court’s judgment.213 The holding could deter the
useful research partnerships between private industries and universities that
Congress sought to support while adopting the University and Small
Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980.214 The Court’s judgment will also
prevent inventors “from developing useful intellectual property, due to
potential problems arising from state ethics laws and federal conflict of

1991).

206.

Id.; FilmTec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1568 (Fed. Cir.

207.
Timofeyev, supra note 204, at 64.
208.
Id.
209.
FilmTec Corp., 939 F.2d at 1568; Timofeyev, supra note 204, at 64.
210.
563 U.S. 776 (2011); see also Timofeyev, supra note 204.
211.
Mastrodonato, supra note 143, at 86; Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Affirms
CAFC in Stanford v. Roche on Bayh-Dole, IPWATCHDOG (June 6, 2011),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2011/06/06/supreme-court-affirms-cafc-instanford-v-roche-onbayh-dole/.
212.
Mastrodonato, supra note 143, at 86; see also Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200–212 (2018).
213.
Depinet, supra note 10, at 729; Mastrodonato, supra note 143, at 87.
214.
Stanford, 563 U.S. at 793; The Univ. & Small Bus. Patent Procedures Act:
Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. S., 96th Cong. 1 (1979) (statement of Adm.
Hyman G. Rickover, Dir. of the Div. of Naval Reactors, Dep’t of Energy).
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interest regulations.” 215 “Private investment in these activities will be
actively discouraged because of uncertainties about ownership of the
inventions.”216 The decision raises a big question mark on the ownership of
inventions and may dismay the society that always keenly awaits news from
universities for frontier research and inventions that promote welfare of
ordinary people.217 “The decision ultimately puts a cloud on the ownership
of inventions and will have a negative impact on a society that looks to
universities for research and inventions.”218
James G. McEwen, Sean M. O’Connor, John E. McCarthy, Jr., and
Susan Warshaw Ebner opine that, as a result of this case, it will be essential
for universities or other research institutions to introspect and proceed by
being extra cautious to decide whether the employment agreements have
foolproof assignments to their prior assigned inventions, to inventions
licensed from outside parties, and to inventions that would be assigned to
them under impending federal sponsorships.219
As a result of this case, it will be critical for Stanford—and
universities or other entities similarly situated—to look backward and move
forward by exercising due diligence to determine whether it has clear and
valid assignments to its prior assigned inventions, to inventions it has
licensed from third parties, and to those inventions that will be assigned to it
under future federal funding agreements.220
c.

Minority View Echoes District Court

The dissenting opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States,
written by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice Ginsburg, decreed that the
Court’s majority ruling ignored the contextual or surrounding norm that
declines individual researchers or inventor IPRs for which people have
already paid through taxes to the government.221 Justice Breyer disagreed
with the rule adopted by the CAFC in FilmTec, which states that an
inventor’s current awarding of rights in a forthcoming invention, like Dr.
Holodniy’s issuing of rights to Cetus, would spontaneously cede a legal title
to such inventions.222 Justice Breyer opined that such an assignment, like the
initial one secured by Stanford from Dr. Holodniy, conveyed only an
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Depinet, supra note 10, at 730.
Id.
See id.
Id.
McEwen et al., supra note 137, at 11.
Id.
Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776, 794 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 799–802.
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equitable title to the invention.223 He added that Stanford’s assignment being
first in time took precedence.224
B.

Supreme Court’s Order and Public Health

It may be timely to analyze the verdict of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Stanford v. Roche with reference to the ongoing public
health debate in the United States.225 The Heritage Foundation Report points
out that the United States Heritage policymakers are discussing “whether
Congress should [implement] a single-payer [health care] system or set up a
system based on personal choice and market competition.” 226 The basic
issue, however, is whether government officials or individuals and their
families will decide on critical health care issues.227 If a single-payer system
is to be adopted, it necessitates a major bargain. 228 It may include long
waiting lists, care delays and denials, a loss of personal and economic
freedom, the loss of existing health coverage, the levying of new federal
taxes, and significant reductions in payment for doctors and medical
professionals.229 Authors of the report argue that there is no clear cut public
opinion on this contentious issue.230 The report suggests that conservatives
in Congress have to come out with reasonable and effective policy choices or
be ready to lose the game and pave the way for victory of proponents of a
single-payer program.231
The Brookings Institution Report notes that the central theme of
policy discussions of the 2020 presidential election will be health care.232
Democratic challengers and Republican incumbent President Donald Trump
have their pre-decided, but diametrically opposite views on a host of issues
associated with the access of individuals to the health care system. 233
223.
Id.
224.
Id. at 799–801.
225.
Id.
226.
ROBERT MOFFIT ET AL., THE NATIONAL DEBATE OVER GOVERNMENTCONTROLLED HEALTH CARE 1 (2019).
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
Id.
231.
MOFFIT ET AL., supra note 226, at 1.
232.
Tamari Dzotsenidze, Behind the Scenes of Policy 2020, a New Brookings
Resource to Inform Americans About Issues in the Presidential Election, BROOKINGS (Dec.
19, 2019), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2019/12/19/behind-the-scenes-ofpolicy-2020-a-new-brookings-resource-to-inform-americans-about-issues-in-the-presidentialelection/.
233.
John Hudak, Health Care Is an Opportunity and Liability for Both Parties
in
2020,
BROOKINGS
(July
12,
2019),
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Regardless of political parties having the golden opportunity to use the issue
to their electoral advantage, both parties are evading popular stance on issues
that Americans think are vital to the future.234 Gallup in its November 2018
poll had asked participants: “How important will [health care] be to your
vote in Congress this year?”235
Interestingly, eighty percent of the respondents replied that it would
be an extremely important issue for them.236 This finding would not at all
astonish an astute observer of United States health care politics because
irrespective of what one hears from the vote-seeking politicians or newshungry cable news shows, it is the ordinary Americans who deal with the
health care system and its problems on a day-to-day basis.237 They do so
through sojourns in hospitals, visits to doctors, caring for old parents,
noticing the insurance premium deducted from their paycheck, or paying a
co-pay for an x-ray.238 Since health care constitutes “one-sixth of the [United
States] economy,” it has become a ubiquitous issue across the United
States.239 Therefore, their views are of primary importance.240 In a scenario
where a particular policy issue is dear to voters and those voters think that it
determines their electoral choices, the political party or candidate in the
election fray having similar ideas that resonate with those of the voters, can
emerge successful.241
Both the rival parties Democrats and Republicans, however, have
serious problems of answerability on this divisive issue.242 One may briefly
look at the challenges (besides opportunities) of Democrats on a perennially
polarizing topic of health care.243 There are certain dimensions of health care
that help Democrats because their views find favor with majorities of the
public opinion. 244 For example, as per a 2018 Gallup poll, 57% of
Americans want the government to ensure that “all Americans have health”

http://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2019/07/12/health-care-is-an-opportunity-and-liabilityfor-both-parties-in-2020/.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.; Frank Newport, Top Issues for Voters: Healthcare, Economy,
Immigration, GALLUP: POL. (Nov. 2, 2018), http://news.gallup.com/poll/244367/top-issuesvoters-healthcare-economy-immigration.aspx.
236.
Hudak, supra note 233; see also Newport, supra note 235.
237.
See Hudak, supra note 233.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
See id.
241.
Id.
242.
Hudak, supra note 233.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
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care coverage.245 Likewise, a 2019 poll conducted by CNN showed that 56%
of Americans opine that the “government should provide a national health
insurance program for all Americans,” even though it could lead to higher
taxes.246 Besides this, the Kaiser Family Foundation’s (“KFF”) 2018 polling
results showed that over 75% of Americans supported shutting the down of
the Medicare prescription, expansion of Medicaid, eliminating out-of-pocket
expenses for availing preventive care, subsidies for poor Americans to
procure health care, and retaining children on parents’ insurance until they
attain the age of 26. 247 These are part and parcel of the Democraticsupported Affordable Care Act (“ACA”). 248 It is a hard fact that despite
enjoying some of these advantages on health care, quite a few Democratic
presidential candidates have supported policies contradicting popular
opinion.249 For instance, the same CNN opinion poll revealed that only 38%
of Americans favored health insurance coverage for undocumented
individuals, while the majority 59% resisted it. 250 Moreover, 56% of the
participants were in favor of a national health insurance program, but 57% of
those supporters stated that any such plan should not jeopardize private
health insurance.251
The aforesaid opinion poll findings by CNN merely confirm a KFF
study held in June 2019 which indicated that although 63% of the Americans
hailed Medicare for All, most of them did not know how that policy would
be executed.252 It is noteworthy that how the questions were framed also
mattered.253 It was reported that while 63% percent supported Medicare for
all, only 49% percent endorsed “a single payer health care system.”254 In
reality, the KFF study discovered that 55% percent of Americans were of the
view that under a Medicare for all plan, they could retain their private health

245.
Id.; see also Frank Newport, Government Favored to Ensure Healthcare,
but
Not
Deliver
It,
GALLUP:
WELLBEING
(Dec.
3,
2018),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/245105/government-favored-ensure-healthcare-not-deliver.aspx.
246.
Hudak, supra note 233; see also SSRS, POLL 8 (2019).
247.
Hudak, supra note 233; Ashley Kirzinger et al., Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll – March 2018: Views on Prescription Drug Pricing and Medicare-for-all Proposals,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2018), http://www.kff.org/health-costs/poll-finding/kaiserhealth-tracking-poll-march-2018-prescription-drug-pricing-medicare-for-all-proposals/.
248.
Hudak, supra note 233; KAISER FAM. FOUND., Summary of the Affordable
Care Act, (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-theaffordable-care-act/.
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Kirzinger et al., supra note 247.
250.
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Hudak, supra note 233.
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Id.
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insurance. 255 A 2019 poll by Hill-HarrisX indicated that only a handful
(13%) of Americans welcomed a system calling for dismantling the extant
private health insurance.256
This fluidity in public opinion, and paradoxical views of voters about
the Democratic health care plans precipitate a situation in which voters look
for nitty-gritty details rather than catchy words and phrases.257 Even if many
presidential candidates support the popular Medicare for All, there are
several candidates who support much less popular positions including the
closure of private health insurance and coverage for individuals who are not
documented.258 In most of the cases, the candidates are adopting a principled
position when they contend that health care is an inalienable human right and
therefore, everybody must be covered regardless of one’s social, economic,
or any other status in society.259 It seems that health care being a household
concern for all Americans, the Democratic Party candidates would be
required to persuade people who doubt parts of their health care plans.260 It
is also time to look at the handicaps of Republicans on health care.261 In
2010 and 2014, the Republican Party succeeded in midterm congressional
polls by attacking the ACA or Obamacare.262 It promised to abrogate the
widely condemned piece of legislation.263 In the 2016 presidential campaign,
the Republican candidate who promised to revoke the law and substitute it
with a better one won, but a Democrat who assured to retain and reform the
law lost the election.264 In spite of emerging victorious in the race to occupy
the White House, down the road, Republicans encountered a serious political
problem that emerged in the early phases of President Trump’s
administration.265 The American people made a volte-face on health care.266
During the former President Obama administration, appeal of ACA had
declined to thirty-three percent, recorded the KFF poll.267 However, as the
law began to face an existential threat from the Republican White House and
Republican Congress, Republicans willy-nilly popularized Obamacare. 268
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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268.
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By early 2018, the ACA commanded majority support and continues to do
so. 269 The American people realized that, while the brand name ACA or
Obamacare was unpopular, there was a lot in the law they wanted. 270
Thanks to the about turn in the public opinion, the Republicans, even after
controlling the executive and legislative branches of the government, could
not scrap the law.271 Therefore, President Trump has attempted to get the
law repealed through judicial decisions.272 In a case recently decided by a
federal appeals court—Texas v. United States273—which the Supreme Court
of the United States has granted certiorari, the validity of the ACA or
Obamacare law is in question.274 While President Trump’s administration,
among its varied stances on the law, has promised to throw this law, lock,
stock and barrel, the annulment of the ACA could be strategically used by
Democrats against President Trump in the next presidential election.275
It should be realized that even if the nullification of the ACA may
appeal to the President’s fans, it would in fact discard some of the essential
ingredients of the law that are popular among several Americans, including
Republican voters. 276 A yardstick of the growing unpopularity of the
President’s ACA repeal position can be estimated from the November 2018
levels of support for following nine cardinal provisions of the ACA.277
[1] Coverage for pre-existing [c]onditions (65%); [2]
Medicaid expansion (77%); [3] Closing the Medicare drug
doughnut hole (81%); [4] Subsidies for [poor] Americans’
coverage (81%); [5] Payroll tax increases for the rich (65%); [6]
Children staying on parents insurance until 26 (82%); [7]
269.
Id.
270.
Id.
271.
Hudak, supra note 233.
272.
Id.
273.
945 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2019).
274.
Id. at 368–69, 402; see also California v. Texas, No. 19-840, 2020 WL
981804, at *1 (S. Ct. Mar. 3, 2020); Hudak, supra note 233; MaryBeth Musumeci, Explaining
Texas v. U.S.: A Guide to the Case Challenging the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 10,
2020),
http://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/explaining-texas-v-u-s-a-guide-to-thecase-challenging-the-aca/. “In striking down the entire Affordable Care Act, the district court
[in Texas v. United States] disregarded the clearly expressed intent of the democratically
elected representatives of the people.” Texas v. United States, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR:
HEALTH CARE, http://www.theusconstitution.org/litigation/texas-v-united-states/ (last visited
May 1, 2020); see also Texas, 945 F.3d at 368–69, 402. That ruling is insupportable. Texas
v. United States, supra; see also Texas, 945 F.3d at 368–69, 402. “Congress’s intent here
could not be clearer: [T]he rest of the law should stand in the absence of an enforceable
mandate.” Texas v. United States, supra; see also Texas, 945 F.3d at 368–69, 402.
275.
Hudak, supra note 233.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.
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Eliminating out-of-pocket costs for preventive care (79%); [8]
ACA exchanges (82%), [and] [9] The employer mandate (69%).278

This opinion survey should serve as a warning to those who seek
rescission of the ACA. 279 The President’s crazily unpopular position has
become less popular with the passage of time.280 The President’s claims on
socialism, socialized medicine, and a philosophical argument about the
proper role of government would go unheard if the administration abolishes
ACA provisions that voters rely upon.281 As the health care debate in the
United States moves ahead, both the major parties can objectively assess
their own as well as their rival’s positions on health care. 282 Even if an
ideological commitment of candidates may prevail upon them, the only thing
that matters at the ballot box is public opinion, particularly on a sensitive
issue like health care. 283 However, President Trump faces a unique
challenge. 284 The federal courts could dramatically transform the United
States health care system. 285 Democrats obviously cannot one-sidedly
enforce Medicare for All, or ban private health insurance without having
sufficient votes in the House of Representatives and Senate.286 Eventually, if
the ACA is revoked or drastically changed against the popular will,
Republicans cannot go scot-free from the electoral radar screen.287
It is common knowledge that health care systems of various nations
have evolved along different routes. 288 In some countries there is a
prevalence of private insurance, while in others there is universal health care,
and in few others there is a hybrid form of the two.289 It is observed that in
most of the industrialized nations, health care is regarded as a human right
and is therefore “provided universally, [usually] free at the point-of-care.”290
The United States has developed a deeply divided profit-oriented system that
is much “more expensive than those of its counterparts [in Europe] and
delivers poorer outcomes than the health care systems in other high-income
countries, while leaving a substantial proportion of Americans without health
278.
Id. (listing public support for elements of the ACA).
279.
See id.
280.
Hudak, supra note 233.
281.
Id.
282.
See id.
283.
Id.
284.
Id.
285.
Hudak, supra note 233.
286.
Id.
287.
Id.
288.
Greg Jones & Hagop Kantarjian, The Many Roads to Universal Health
Care in the USA, 20 LANCET ONCOLOGY e601, e601 (2019).
289.
Id.
290.
Id.
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coverage.”291 It is pertinent to analyze the health care system in the United
States and suggest measures for accomplishing universal health care across
the United States.292 Three principal ingredients of such a blueprint are: “[1]
support and improve the Affordable Care Act; [2] maintain the existing
private insurance system; [and] [3] offer in parallel a government-sponsored
health care insurance, [or slowly and steadily] expand Medicare to more
people [so that eventually] all Americans not covered under existing health
care insurances” are also fully insured.293
It is essential to study health care policy and practice in the United
States. 294 A critical analysis shows that there have been “impassioned
debates about the best solutions to health care in America” among political
leaders, public policy analysts, members of the medical profession, and the
people at large.295 The divide over the Health Care Reform Act of 2010
highlighted a “multitude of fears, challenges, obstacles, and passions” that
often complicated rather than clarified the debate. 296 The discourse has
forever been heated.297 The complexity of issues animating the health care
debate has compelled the United States public to grapple with the exigencies
of the present system in respect of economic, fiscal, and monetary policy,
especially as they relate to philosophical, often ideologically driven
approaches to the problem. 298 Americans have also examined their ideas
about the relationship of the individual to and interaction with the state and
the varied social and cultural beliefs about what a United States solution to
the problem of health care appears to be. 299 Prominent and perennially
important debates provide readers with views on multiple sides of the
complex issue.300 The United States public health discourse is overshadowed

291.
Id.
292.
Id.
293.
Jones & Kantarjian, supra note 288, at e601.
294.
Jennie Jacobs Kronenfeld et al., Description to DEBATES ON U.S.
HEALTHCARE (2012).
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
297.
Id.
298.
Id.
299.
Kronenfeld et al., supra note 294.
300.
See id.; Joshua Cohen, 2020 Election’s Healthcare Debate: Truths, HalfTruths,
and
Falsehoods,
FORBES
(July
8,
2019,
9:06
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuacohen/2019/07/08/2020-elections-healthcare-debatetruths-half-truths-and-falsehoods/; Matthew Fiedler & Christen Linke Young, Current
Debates in Health Care Policy: A Brief Overview, BROOKINGS: POL’Y 2020 (Oct. 15, 2019),
http://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/current-debates-in-health-care-policy-a-briefoverview/.
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by four major questions.301 First, what should be done to lower health care
costs for consumers? 302 Second, what is to be done to curb hospital
prices?303 Third, how to control drug prices?304 Fourth, what is to be done
about long-term care? 305 These questions are in addition to the ongoing
debate on Medicare.306
In order to gauge the scale, magnitude, and gravity of the everdeepening public health care crisis in the United States, it may be worthwhile
to look at some of the stunning research findings. 307 Data from the
Commonwealth Fund suggests that the number of underinsured Americans
has doubled in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.308 It simply
means although these people have an insurance card, their coverage fails to
provide adequate financial protection if there is a health crisis. 309 The
grievance against Obamacare is that even most of the lawfully sold plans
require subscribers to pay thousands of dollars from their own pockets.310
Moreover, the ratio of those who have an employer-sponsored insurance and
are still being rendered underinsured has tripled since the turn of the present
century. 311 As a consequence of this, as found by Gallup in a survey, a
quarter of Americans said they had avoided seeking health care in the
previous year because of concerns over cost. 312 Adam Gaffney of the
Harvard Medical School, who favors single payer asks, “[h]ow would you
reduce or eliminate the deductibles faced by people who are covered by their
employer?”313 In response to the uproar over surprise medical bills—often
incurred at hospitals—and the instances of hospitals suing patients to recover
unpaid bills, it has become imperative for the United States public health
policy makers to look at this crucial part of the health care machinery.314 For
instance:

301.
See Dylan Scott, 4 Health Care Questions, Besides Medicare-For-All,
Every 2020 Democratic Candidate Should Answer, VOX (Sept. 12, 2019, 9:55 AM),
http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/9/12/20859515/september-democratic-debate2020-presidential-candidates-health-care.
302.
Id.
303.
Id.
304.
Id.
305.
Id.
306.
Scott, supra note 301.
307.
See id.
308.
Id.
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Scott, supra note 301.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
Id.
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For inpatient care, hospital prices grew 42% from 2007 to
2014 while physician prices rose 18% according to researchers
who studied the Health Care Cost Institute’s claims data for people
with employer-sponsored insurance from Aetna, Humana, and
UnitedHealthcare Group. Similarly, for hospital-based outpatient
care, hospital prices increased 25% while physician prices grew
6%, the new Health Affairs study found.315

This is how hospitals consume a lot of patients’ resources when it
comes to health care expenditure. 316 Despite this, the hard fact is that
popular discourse on health care mainly blames pharmaceutical companies
and health insurers. 317 Larry Levitt, Senior Vice President at the Kaiser
Family Foundation, said, “[t]here is a lot of discussion about drug prices.
How about hospital prices? . . . What would you do to bring them down?”318
It is indeed a tough question.319
The reason behind the frequent uproar over drug prices is because, in
addition to visiting the doctor, patients have to buy prescription drugs at the
pharmacy at high costs.320 Almost fifty percent of Americans purchase a
prescription drug every month. 321 Twenty five percent of Americans say
their medication is not affordable. 322 Reflecting upon these common
concerns, Rachel Sachs, who teaches at Washington University in St. Louis
and is an expert in drug prices, posed questions to the leading 2020
Democratic presidential candidates on the critical topic of rising prices of
drugs.323 Her penetrating questions on the monster of ever-rising drug prices
could be summarized as follows:
1] For Joe Biden: Why didn’t his work on the cancer
Moonshot Initiative focus more on reducing the price of costly
new cancer drugs?
2] For Kamala Harris: Are there medications she would
consider good candidates for march-in rights or compulsory
licensing (when the government effectively revokes a drug
315.
Id. (quoting Alex Kacik, Hospital Price Growth Driving Healthcare
Spending,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(Feb.
4,
2019,
12:00
AM),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20190204/NEWS/190209984/hospital-pricegrowth-driving-healthcare-spending).
316.
Scott, supra note 301.
317.
Id.
318.
Id.
319.
See id.
320.
Id.
321.
Scott, supra note 301.
322.
Id.
323.
Id.
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maker’s patent on a treatment and ends their monopoly on
producing it) and why?
3] For Bernie Sanders: Why should the United States try
to match the prices paid for drugs in other developed countries,
rather than focus on fixing the [United States] market on its own
terms?
4] For Elizabeth Warren: Does she think the government
actually has the capacity to manufacture (or contract with private
companies to manufacture) generic drugs, as she has proposed in
Senate legislation?
5] For Pete Buttigieg: What is your plan to lower drug
prices?324

Similarly, long-term care for senior citizens or the chronically ill is
too costly.325 The official data of the average costs is as follows: “$225 a
day or $6,844 per month for a semi-private room in a nursing home. Two
hundred and fifty-three dollars ($253) a day or $7,698 per month for a
private room in a nursing home. One hundred and nineteen dollars ($119) a
day or $3,628 per month for care in an assisted living facility (for a onebedroom unit).”326
A recent study indicates that the “average lifetime cost for long-term
care is $172,000.” 327 The analysis shows that these problems will be
aggravated as the baby boomers become senior citizens who desperately
need long-term services as well as support.328 This very report estimates that
the overall expenditure on long-term care—including informal care and lost
productivity for people who have to look after their near and dear ones—is
expected to “double from $2.8 trillion to $5.6 trillion by 2047.”329 Those
who are prosperous can afford to pay for it on their own.330 Those who are
not wealthy spend so much money that they become eligible for Medicaid,
which, however, is meant for poor Americans.331 Long-term care has been a
neglected issue in the United States health care discourse.332 It may not be
an exaggeration to say that with or without single-payer, the long-term care
crisis is going to deepen unless the decision-makers have an innovative plan
to rectify the situation.333
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Id.
Scott, supra note 301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Scott, supra note 301.
Id.
Id.
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There are few more worrisome statistics to reveal the much deeper
malaise of the public health care system in the United States.334 “The United
States spent $10,209 per person on health care in 2017,” and sadly this figure
is more than “2.5 times the average spent by [other] member countries of the
OECD ($3,992 per person).”335 It shows the escalating prices of health care
in the United States.336 Likewise, the United States five-year survival rate
for all types of cancers is 67%, over 10% higher than the five-year cancer
survival rate in the United Kingdom at 54%, and 7% higher than Canada.337
It is also shocking that “medical debt is the [top] reason for people to file
bankruptcy in the United States.”338 It is alarming that 28.5 million people in
the United States (8.8% of the United States population) lack health
insurance. 339 Among those who do have health insurance, “67.2% have
private insurance while 37.7% have government-provided coverage.”340 The
latter comes through programs such as Medicaid or Medicare.341
The most common type of coverage is employer-based health
insurance that includes 56% of the United States population.342 The research
shows that the United States is the only nation among the thirty-six
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
member states that does not have universal health care in practice as well as
by constitutional right.343 Supporters of the right to health care, on one hand,
argue that nobody in the United States should be excluded from the coverage
of health care. 344 They believe that a right to health care would prevent
bankruptcies in medical domain, significantly improve public health, slash
general health care spending, assist small businesses, and that health care
should be offered by the government as an essential service.345 Critics, on
the other hand, contend that a right to health care leads to communism and
that it should be the responsibility of every individual to secure health care
334.
Id.
335.
Should All Americans Have the Right (Be Entitled) to Health Care?,
PROCON.ORG (Feb. 14, 2019), http://healthcare.procon.org.
336.
Id.
337.
Id.
338.
Id.
339.
Id.; History of the Right to Health Care, PROCON.ORG (Oct. 22, 2018),
http://healthcare.procon.org/history-of-the-right-to-health-care/.
340.
History of the Right to Health Care, supra note 339; Should All Americans
Have the Right (Be Entitled) to Health Care?, supra note 335.
341.
History of the Right to Health Care, supra note 339; Should All Americans
Have the Right (Be Entitled) to Health Care?, supra note 335.
342.
History of the Right to Health Care, supra note 339.
343.
Id.
344.
Id.
345.
Id.
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for him or herself.346 They apprehend that provision of health care by the
government would adversely affect, not only the quality, but also the
availability of health care, and would cause whopping government debt and
deficits.347
Amidst efforts by President Trump’s administration to impose
Medicaid work requirements and reduce abortion and LGBTQ protections,
aggrieved people hope that a Democratic president could move in the
opposite direction having a new executive agenda on health care.348 Walid
Gellad, an expert in drug prices and other health issues at the University of
Pittsburgh, wonders: “If [Medicare for All] is a no-go in Congress, then
what changes would they make to the current system?”349 Dylan Scott writes
that if a radical reform of the United States health care system is not in the
agenda in January 2021, then skyrocketing drug prices, the ballooning opioid
crisis, the ever growing hospital spending, and long-term care are all critical
problems that a new Democratic president would have to deal with.350 It
must be noted that the executive branch of the United States has an
extraordinary power to handle health care.351 It is in charge of Medicare and
Medicaid, the two largest insurance programs in the United States, and it
directs a vast public health apparatus and the regulations that keep it in
check.352 One can say that, ideally, even a Republican president would have
to tackle these problems because health care is an issue that concerns all.353
After having looked at the Bayh-Dole Act, the Supreme Court
opinion on Stanford v. Roche, and the public health situation in the United
States, one is compelled to say that the top Court’s verdict has unfortunately
done injustice to the law itself and the sacrosanct cause of public health.354
Supporters of the Bayh-Dole Act assert that said legislation permits
universities and other recipients of federal research funds to retain the patent
rights of their research to stimulate further development and
commercialization of the scientific and technological inventions and

346.
Id.
347.
History of the Right to Health Care, supra note 339.
348.
Scott, supra note 301.
349.
Id.
350.
Id.
351.
Id.
352.
Id.
353.
See Scott, supra note 301.
354.
See Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2018); Stanford v. Roche, 563
U.S. 776, 780 (2011); Alex Philippidis, Supreme Court Decision in Stanford v. Roche Does
Not Change Bayh-Dole, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS: INSIGHTS (June 9,
2011),
http://www.genengnews.com/insights/supreme-court-decision-in-stanford-v-rochedoes-not-change-bayh-dole/.
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innovations that would otherwise remain underutilized or not even known.355
Emily Michiko Morris, however, points out that critics have vehemently
questioned this proposition by arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act is, at best,
redundant, and at worst a nuisance to the process of innovation.356 In other
words, the Bayh-Dole Act has become a bit contentious, especially with
respect to patents granted to federally financed research pursued in the
universities. 357 An answer to the controversial question on university
patenting under the Bayh-Dole Act—whether it is right or wrong—is that it
is highly subjective and relative.358 In some instances, university patenting is
useful; while in other instances, it is harmful, and often, it is simply
immaterial.359
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article suggests that those United States research institutions
availing of federal grants ought to come up with rigorously drafted foolproof
employment agreements. 360 The contracts must include clauses on nondisclosure, prior permission to be sought by employees, while signing
agreements with third parties, and third parties not subverting already
existing agreements between employees and their employers. 361 The
government bodies ought to get their patent rights, including the
pharmaceutical ones, by entering into infallible contracts with employees.362
The general population should not be made to pay more than once for the
inventions that they have already paid for through taxes.363 While protecting
the legitimate interests of inventors and private companies, public interest,
especially public health, should not be compromised. 364 Moreover, the
United States policymakers and regulators need to regulate skyrocketing
drug prices.365 The honorable justices are humbly requested to accord top
355.
Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1663–64; Frischmann, supra note 112, at
399–400; Rai, supra note 120, at 97–98; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
356.
Morris, supra note 110, at 82; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212; Dovid A.
Kanarfogel, Rectifying the Missing Costs of University Patent Practices: Addressing BayhDole Criticisms Through Faculty Involvement, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 533, 533
(2009).
357.
Morris, supra note 110, at 82; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
358.
Morris, supra note 110, at 82; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
359.
Morris, supra note 110, at 82; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
360.
See Timofeyev, supra note 204, at 64.
361.
Id.
362.
Id.
363.
See Eisenberg, supra note 93, at 1167–68.
364.
See Arno & Davis, supra note 97, at 635.
365.
See Scott, supra note 301.
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priority to public health. 366 This may happen more frequently if the
legislative intent behind the passage of the law in question is looked into by
all the courts of law in the judicial hierarchy.367

366.
See Rachel A. Nugent & Gerald T. Keusch, Global Health: Lessons from
Bayh-Dole, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL
INNOVATION 153, 156 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 2007).
367.
Id.
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H. G. Wells may have given us The Invisible Man,1 but head trauma
has given many of us fractured minds.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Many medical professionals now consider crime to be a disease
brought on by mental deficiencies.2 This does not mean that the deficiency
need be present since birth, but can be brought about through head trauma
such as concussions, sub-concussive impacts, or explosions, which may lead
to a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), chronic traumatic encephalopathy
(“CTE”), frontal lobe issue(s), etc.3 These injuries can cause an individual to
lose the ability “to regulate emotion and behavior.”4 The individual becomes
prone to act violently and even criminally—sometimes going from being
cool, calm, and collected to exploding in an uncontrollable fit of rage with no
apparent trigger.5
It is a common assumption that everyone makes their own choices
and these choices are the determining factor in what they do.6 “However,
neuroscience indicates that our choices sometimes are based upon electrical
impulses and neuron activity that are not a part of conscious behavior. This
includes not only criminal activity, but also decisions made by police,
prosecutors, and jurors to arrest, prosecute, or convict.”7 When looking at
1.
H. G. WELLS, THE INVISIBLE MAN (Macdonald Daly ed., Everyman 1995).
2.
Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 56 (2006).
3.
What Is CTE?, CONCUSSION LEGACY FOUND.: CTE RESOURCES,
http://www.concussionfoundation.org/CTE-resources/what-is-CTE (last visited May 1, 2020);
see also Gillian Mohney, Could a CTE Diagnosis Have Changed the Aaron Hernandez
Verdict?, HEALTHLINE: HEALTH NEWS (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.healthline.com/healthnews/aaron-hernandez-cte-diagnosis.
4.
John McDermott, The Connection Between Concussions, CTE and Acts of
Violence, MEL (July 12, 2017), http://www.melmagazine.com/the-connection-betweenconcussions-cte-and-acts-of-violence-65330058f80.
5.
See id.
6.
KEVIN DAVIS, THE BRAIN DEFENSE: MURDER IN MANHATTAN AND THE
DAWN OF NEUROSCIENCE IN AMERICA’S COURTROOMS 28 (2017).
7.
Id.
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crime, it is necessary to understand what the prosecution must prove.8 For a
verdict of guilty, the prosecution must prove the elements of a crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.9 Typically, this includes the element of intent to commit
the crime.10 The question then is whether the element of intent can be
proven in individuals with severe neurological disorders caused by
neurological trauma.11 Serious rationality impairments may undermine or
even diminish criminal responsibility.12 One study has shown that TBIs are
roughly seven times higher in prisoners than the general population.13 There
is evidence that over one million inmates suffer from some form of mental
illness.14 If mental impairment due to brain trauma was taken into account at
trial, how many people would be in institutions receiving help, instead of
rotting away in prison as the environment furthers their criminal nature?15
The groups most known for cranial impacts in the United States are
the players of the National Football League (“NFL”).16 These men may
experience thousands of bodily impacts throughout their careers.17 Most of
these will be of the sub-concussive variety which do not normally lead to
immediate cognitive or other neurological issues.18 Instead, problems tend to
arise years later, often during retirement.19 However, football players have
been shown to be charged with violent crimes at a far higher rate than the
general population.20 This is likely a result of the repeated head trauma over

8.
See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 198, 209.
11.
See id. at 199–201; Mohney, supra note 3.
12.
Paul Litton, Traumatic Brain Injury and a Divergence Between Moral and
Criminal Responsibility, DUQ. L. REV., Winter 2018, at 35, 38.
13.
Chandra Bozelko, Traumatic Brain Injury Should Be a Factor When
Judging Individuals Accused of Crimes, STAT: OPINION (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://www.statnews.com/2017/12/07/traumatic-brain-injury-crime/.
14.
Jillian Peterson & Kevin Heinz, Understanding Offenders with Serious
Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 537, 538
(2016).
15.
See Etienne Benson, Rehabilitate or Punish?, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL.,
July/Aug. 2003, at 46, 46.
16.
J. Amy Dillard & Lisa A. Tucker, Is C.T.E. a Defense for Murder?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2017, at A21(L); Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) as a Criminal
Defense, BAEZ LAW FIRM (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.baezlawfirm.com/chronic-traumaticencephalopathy-cte-as-a-criminal-defense/.
17.
See Dillard & Tucker, supra note 16; Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
(CTE) as a Criminal Defense, supra note 16.
18.
See Mohney, supra note 3.
19.
See id.
20.
Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) as a Criminal Defense, supra
note 16.
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time.21 This trauma can potentially lead to CTE.22 As explained in Part IV
below, this disease slowly destroys the brain, thus causing permanent,
debilitative, and potentially serious behavioral changes to many people once
looked up to as heroes.23
Unlike TBIs where diagnosis can be found through the use of
Computed Tomography Scans (“CTs”) and Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(“MRI”), there is no definitive test for CTE that can be used on a living
person.24 However, a recent study at Boston University showed that out of
111 brains of deceased NFL players, 110 suffered from CTE.25 Like our
football heroes, our American heroes, those who serve our country and
maintain the freedom we are all accustomed to, seem to be suffering much of
the same fate.26 As a result of the various combat injuries experienced by
veterans, out of the 125 brains examined of deceased soldiers, 74 were
positive for CTE.27 In situations of violence, such as the 2015 murder of
Odin Lloyd by former New England Patriots star Aaron Hernandez, how
might the outcome of Hernandez’s trial been different if it was then known
that he suffered from not only CTE, but what turned out to be an extreme
case?28
Luckily, there is a relatively new set of courts that seek to help those
with mental health issues.29 Instead of helping society by shuttering mentally
ill defendants behind bars, the mental health courts seek to help the
individuals themselves so that they can return to being productive members
of the society that would so willingly turn a blind eye to the help these
individuals need.30
21.
See Julia Jacobo, Former NFL Player Confirmed as 1st Diagnosis of CTE
in
Living
Patient,
ABC
NEWS
(Nov.
15,
2017,
10:23
PM),
http://www.abcnews.go.com/US/nfl-player-confirmed-1st-diagnosis-cte-livingpatient/story?id=51181721; Mohney, supra note 3.
22.
What Is CTE?, supra note 3.
23.
See id.; discussion infra Part IV.
24.
See Mohney, supra note 3; Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) and Concussion,
AM. SOC’Y NEURORADIOLOGY, http://www.asnr.org/patientinfo/conditions/tbi.shtml (last
visited May 1, 2020).
25.
Dillard & Tucker, supra note 16.
26.
See Sharyn Alfonsi, Combat Veterans Coming Home with CTE, CBS
NEWS: 60 MINUTES (Sept. 16, 2018), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/60-minutes-combatveterans-coming-home-with-cte-brain-injury/.
27.
Id.
28.
See id.; Mohney, supra note 3.
29.
See Ursula Castellano, The Politics of Benchcraft: The Role of Judges in
Mental Health Courts, 42 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 398, 398 (2017); Laura Snodgrass & Brad
Justice, Death Is Different: Limits on the Imposition of the Death Penalty to Traumatic Brain
Injuries, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81, 83–85 (2007).
30.
See Castellano, supra note 29, at 398–99.
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This Article seeks to highlight the sad plight of individuals who
commit criminal acts due to having suffered neurological trauma.31 Part II of
this Article presents a series of case studies that show the disheartening
changes that befell a model employee; a happy father; an American hero; and
a football legend.32 Parts III and IV explain different forms of brain injuries
and what they each entail.33 Part V provides an overview of the four most
prominent tests for insanity in American jurisprudence.34 Part VI looks at
brain damage, criminal sentencing, and the remarkable volume of persons
with TBIs in the American prison population.35 Parts VII and VIII examine a
series of three Supreme Court of the United States opinions and analogizes
individuals with brain damage to persons with intellectual disabilities or
persons who were juveniles at the time they committed a capital crime.36
Part IX considers whether an individual with brain damage—who was
competent at the time of committing a crime—can later be deemed
incompetent to stand trial as a result of their brain deteriorating between the
time of the crime and their day in court.37 Part X is a brief overview of the
American mental health court system and the Author’s proposal for an
expansion of this system to broaden the scope of the type of individuals
permitted before the bench.38

I.

31.

See Bozelko, supra note 13; Mohney, supra note 3; discussion supra Part

32.
See Aaron Hernandez Biography, BIOGRAPHY (Jan. 16, 2020),
http://www.biography.com/people/aaron-hernandez; discussion infra Part II.
33.
See 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, DOLMAN L. GROUP:
BLOG (Oct. 7, 2019), http://www.dolmanlaw.com/4-types-brain-injuries-3-levels-severity/;
discussion infra Part III–IV.
34.
See Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 402, 98
Stat. 1837, 2057 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 17); State v. Felter, 25 Iowa 67,
82–83 (1868); M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 718; Model Penal Code § 4.01
(AM. LAW INST. 1962); M’Naghten Rule, FREE DICTIONARY: LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/M%27Naghten+Rule (last visited May 1, 2020); discussion
infra Part V.
35.
See Lydia D. Johnson, Guilty or Innocent? . . . Just Take a Look at My
Brain — Analyzing the Nexus Between Traumatic Brain Injury and Criminal Responsibility,
37 S.U. L. REV. 25, 25–26 (2009); Stacey Wood & Bhushan S. Agharkar, Traumatic Brain
Injury in Criminal Litigation, 84 UMKC L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2015); discussion infra Part
VI.
36.
See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1989 (2014); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 556 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 305 (2002); Snodgrass & Justice,
supra note 29, at 82; discussion infra Part VII–VIII.
37.
See Wood & Agharkar, supra note 35, at 416; discussion infra Part IX.
38.
See Michael L. Perlin, “Who Will Judge the Many When the Game Is
Through?”: Considering the Profound Differences Between Mental Health Courts and
Traditional Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 937, 957–58
(2018); discussion infra Part X.
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CASE STUDIES: BROKEN MINDS AND WHAT CHANGES MAY COME

There is an unfortunate reality in life in that bad things happen to
good people.39 Granted, bad things also happen to bad people.40 Anyone
may be subjected to a brain injury.41 Generally speaking, brain injuries are
equal opportunity aggressors that leave the recipient in a worse condition
than where they began.42 Sadly, many injuries have a tendency to go
unnoticed due to the lingering harm hiding in the shadow of apparent
recovery.43 The following stories are about real people who suffered
neurological trauma and were never fully themselves again.44
A.

Phineas Gage

The case of Phineas Gage is one of the most famous cases of all time
of an individual with a neurological disorder.45 On September 13, 1848,
twenty-five-year-old Phineas Gage was working as the foreman of a blasting
crew for the Rutland & Burlington Railroad of Vermont.46 On this particular
day, an explosion occurred that caused an iron rod to shoot through his
cheek, behind his eye, and up through the top of his skull.47 Miraculously,
not only was he alive, but he was awake and able to speak.48 After several
months of being tended by a physician, he returned to work.49
Prior to the accident, he was kept in high regard; having a good mind
and good temper.50 After the accident, “he became ‘fitful, irreverent, and
grossly profane.’”51 He became very antisocial and could not maintain a
job.52 He passed away in 1861.53 In 1868, Gage’s treating physician
39.
Robert Puff, Bad Things Happen to Everyone, PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 4,
2017), http://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/meditation-modern-life/201706/bad-thingshappen-everyone.
40.
See id.
41.
See Lauren Reed-Guy, Head Injury, HEALTHLINE (Apr. 9, 2018),
http://www.healthline.com/health/head-injury.
42.
See id.
43.
See id.
44.
See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 3–4.
45.
Id. at 17.
46.
Id.
47.
Id. at 17–18.
48.
Id. at 18.
49.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 18.
50.
Id. at 19.
51.
Id. (quoting JOHN M. HARLOW, PASSAGE OF AN IRON BAR THROUGH THE
HEAD 13 (photo. reprt. 1869) (1868).
52.
Id.
53.
Id.
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published a paper where he quoted Gage’s friends who stated that after the
accident, “Gage was no longer Gage.”54
B.

David Alfonso

David Alfonso was a family man who lived at home with his wife,
Debra, and twenty-four-year-old daughter, Malori.55 Early on the morning of
June 8, 2012, he tripped while walking up the stairs of his home, fell
backwards, and struck his skull on the wooden floor at the bottom of the
staircase.56 He spent six hours in a coma at the local hospital.57 Although a
bit disoriented upon waking, a neurologist authorized his release.58 Once
home, he began manifesting odd behavior.59 He became paranoid that
someone was coming to kill his family, refused to go outside, and spent most
of his time hiding on the couch.60
The world changed for the Alfonso family when Dante Alighieri’s
Seventh Circle of Hell opened up in their bedrooms on June 13, 2012.61
Malori was awakened just after dawn and saw a darkened figure in her
doorway.62 The man walked over to her bed and smashed the back of her
skull with what turned out to be a five-pound metal dumbbell.63 He
proceeded to strike her at least twenty additional times before turning around
and leaving the room.64 Somehow conscious, she left her bedroom and saw
her mother exiting the master bedroom.65 It was clear that her head had been
struck as well.66 When she finally saw her father, he was smashing the
dumbbell into his head and he was still hitting himself when the police
arrived.67 The neighbors described the scene as a vision out of Carrie.68
David spent the next five months in a rehabilitative hospital
recovering from his self-inflicted injuries.69 He claimed he could not
54.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 19 (quoting HARLOW, supra note 51, at 14).
55.
Id. at 67–68.
56.
See id.
57.
Id. at 67.
58.
Id.
59.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 68.
60.
Id.
61.
See id.; DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO 110 (John Ciardi trans., New
American Library 2001) (1320).
62.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 68.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 69.
68.
Id.; CARRIE (MGM Productions 1976).
69.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 72.
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remember anything that happened and did not find out until Malori told him
just before his arrest.70 He was charged with attempted murder.71 Debra and
Malori fought for David.72 In the end, he was found not guilty by reason of
insanity.73 Malori stated that on the morning of the attack she “knew right
then and there, he was not in the right state of mind, his eyes had changed . . .
[i]t was not him.”74
C.

Chris Ayres

In April 2004, Marine First Lieutenant Chris Ayres nearly died when
his amphibious assault vehicle was attacked by a rocket grenade in Iraq.75
As a result of the blast, he suffered from severe chronic leg, tooth, and mouth
pain, lost vision in one eye, and “cognitive decline, agitation, and
depression.”76 Prior to the attack, he was described as “happy all the time
[and] best friends with [his eldest] daughter” who suffers from Down
Syndrome.77 After the attack, he was diagnosed with a TBI and Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).78
As a result of his injuries, he was both distant and violent.79 He
became forgetful, and his cognitive abilities declined to the point that
according to his wife, he “wr[ote] like a third grader [and could not] manage
money.”80 At one point, he grabbed his wife by the neck and choked her.81
According to Chris, he “zoned out . . . [h]er face was crystal clear but
everything else was a blur. I was going to eliminate the threat. I had that
much rage and anger. My brain was trying to process that she [was not] a

70.
Id. at 72–73.
71.
Id. at 73.
72.
Id. at 74–75.
73.
Id. at 75.
74.
DAVIS, supra note 6, at 75.
75.
Sharon Kay, Veteran’s War Wounds Cut Deep into Family, EVERYDAY
HEALTH, (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.everydayhealth.com/emotional-health/veterans-warwounds-cut-deep-into-family.aspx.
76.
Id.
77.
Id.
78.
Id. “PTSD is a mental health problem that some people develop after
experiencing or witnessing a life-threatening event, like combat, a natural disaster, a car
accident, or sexual assault.” PTSD: National Center for PTSD, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.,
http://www.ptsd.va.gov/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
79.
Kay, supra note 75.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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threat; she’s my wife.”82 He was arrested, but his wife successfully pled with
the prosecutor to get him the help he needed.83
D.

Aaron Hernandez

Aaron Hernandez was a star Gator on the University of Florida’s
football team; was an honorable mention All-American for the 2008 National
Championship team, and named All-American the following year.84 He
joined the New England Patriots as the 113th pick of the 2010 NFL Draft.85
He was a star on the team, setting the “rookie record for tight ends with
[forty-five] catches” during his first season.86 The following year, he was
part of an unstoppable New England offense, where he participated in
“[twenty-four] touchdowns and 2237 regular-season receiving yards.”87 He
was definitely an American football hero.88 That is, until he was charged
with the June 17, 2013 murder of his friend Odin Lloyd.89
The case went to trial in January, 2015, and lasted for over two
90
months. In the end, the jury deliberated for six days, found him guilty, and
he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.91 During
this time, he was also charged and acquitted for a 2012 drive-by shooting
outside of a Boston nightclub where two men were killed.92 On April 19,
2017, at age twenty-seven, he committed suicide by hanging himself in his
prison cell with a bedsheet.93 After his death, his brain was analyzed, and he
was diagnosed with the worst case of CTE found in anyone below the age of
forty-six.94
When looking at each of the above cases, it should be clear that
horrors can befall anyone exposed to a brain injury.95 What may not be clear
is just how prevalent brain injuries are in everyday life.96
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Aaron Hernandez Biography, supra note 32.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id.
88.
See id.
89.
See Aaron Hernandez Biography, supra note 32.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Associated Press, Aaron Hernandez’s Brain Severely Affected by CTE,
Researcher
Says,
L.A.
TIMES:
SPORTS
(Nov.
9,
2017,
12:30
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-aaron-hernandez-cte-study-20171109-story.html.
95.
See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 17–18, 68; Aaron Hernandez Biography,
supra note 32; Kay supra note 75; Reed-Guy, supra note 41; discussion infra Part II.
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NEUROLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BRAIN DAMAGE

Trailing behind heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and stroke, TBIs rank
in the top public health crises that we face today.97 The American
Association of Neurological Surgeons defines TBIs “as a blow or jolt to the
head or a penetrating head injury that disrupts the normal function of the
brain.”98 The concept of the TBI is an overarching umbrella of brain
disorders that may result from anything from banging one’s head, to being
exposed to an Improvised Explosive Device, to the skull being physically
cracked open.99 The result being around 2.5 million visits to the emergency
room each year.100 In the United States alone, it is estimated that around 138
people die daily as a result of a TBI.101 However, most people survive but
suffer from temporary or permanent impairments to their emotional and
cognitive functioning.102 People who suffer from a history of TBIs tend to
have greater degrees of impairments in terms of “attention, processing speed,
working memory, episodic memory, and tasks of executive functioning.”103
Unfortunately, they also tend to demonstrate high levels of “disinhibition,
apathy, poor judgment, and limited insight into their [own] disorder[s].”104
Depending on the degree and severity of either a single TBI or a series of
TBIs, an individual can go from being a well-functioning and productive
member of society, to an impulsive, anti-social, and potentially dangerous
person.105
TBIs come in four distinct varieties: Mild, moderate, severe, and
penetrating.106 A key element of TBIs is that the individual is subjected to an
injury that in turn results in some form of concussion.107 Concussions occur
where there is an impact to the head strong enough to cause the brain to crash
96.
See Reed-Guy, supra note 41.
97.
Johnson, supra note 35, at 27.
98.
Sports-Related Head Injury, AM. ASS’N NEUROLOGICAL SURGEONS,
http://www.aans.org/Patients/Neurosurgical-Conditions-and-Treatments/Sports-related-HeadInjury (last visited May 1, 2020).
99.
Robert H. Ambrose, Assessing Soldiers’ Mental Health: Meeting the
Needs of Veterans with PTSD, TBI, and CTE — Pre-Deployment, at Home, and in Court, 41
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 886, 893–96 (2015); Wood & Agharkar, supra note 35, at 411; What
Is CTE?, supra note 3.
100.
Wood & Agharkar, supra note 35, at 411.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 415.
104.
Id.
105.
See Litton, supra note 12, at 37–38.
106.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 894–96.
107.
Id. at 895; 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note
33; Reed-Guy, supra note 41.
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into the skull due to the acceleration and deceleration forces of the impact.108
They usually result in a “short-lived impairment of neurological function that
resolves spontaneously.”109 In addition, CTE is essentially a subset of
TBIs.110 Where TBIs typically involve concussions, CTE is brought on by
repetitive sub-concussive impacts over time.111 It is not uncommon that
many people may believe that most people suffer TBIs due to accidents;
however, some of the more prevailing causes are sports injuries, domestic
violence, and military deployment.112 According to the United States
Consumer Product Safety Commission, sports-related head injuries alone
accounted for 446,799 visits to emergency rooms in 2009.113
Before delving into the different forms of TBIs, it is first important
to understand what an injury to the frontal lobe of the brain can mean for an
individual, as this is both the area most accessible to injury due to its cranial
location and it controls and maintains many of the cognitive functions that
are regularly taken for granted.114
A.

Frontal Lobe Damage

As we know, the different parts of the brain perform different
functions.115 For the purposes of this Article, a very general explanation of a
few select parts of the brain will be provided for the limited purpose of
providing a basis of comparison that will be addressed below.116
As the brain has both a right hemisphere and left hemisphere, the
brain also contains four lobes.117 The Parietal lobe processes spatial and
visual perceptions, along with the senses of touch, pain, and temperature.118
The Occipital lobe processes vision and the Temporal lobe processes
language, memory, and hearing.119 Should anything happen to any of these

108.
Reed-Guy, supra note 41.
109.
Sports-Related Head Injury, supra note 98.
110.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 896.
111.
Caleb Korngold et al., The National Football League and Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy: Legal Implications, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 430, 431
(2013).
112.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 894–96; Helen M. Farrell, Football Fallout:
The Legalities of CTE, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2018, at 4, 4–5; Reed-Guy, supra note 41.
113.
Sports-Related Head Injury, supra note 98.
114.
4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33; see also
Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 88; discussion infra Section III.A.
115.
See MAYFIELD BRAIN & SPINE, ANATOMY OF THE BRAIN 1 (2018).
116.
See id. at 3–4; discussion infra Section III.A.
117.
MAYFIELD BRAIN & SPINE, supra note 115, at 3–4.
118.
Id. at 3.
119.
Id. at 3–4.
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lobes, it seems clear what some of the outcomes may be.120 However, and
most importantly for the purposes of this Article, there is the fourth lobe:
The Frontal lobe.121 Unlike the other three lobes that mostly deal with the
processing and interpretation of physical stimuli, the primary functions of the
frontal lobe deal with executive functioning, personality, emotions and
behavior, intelligence, concentration, and self-awareness.122 Now consider
what might be the consequences of damage to this area of the brain.123
Damage to the frontal lobe has been acknowledged as a possible
causal factor for violent criminal acts.124 Persons with severe frontal lobe
damage “tend to be overresponsive to stimuli from the world around them,
lack the capacity to ignore their environment even when the response seems
bizarre or inappropriate to others, react immaturely and without foresight or
contemplation of the consequences, and make risky decisions to achieve
short-term rewards.”125
Studies show that the frontal lobes are what regulate appropriate
behavior via the executive functioning capabilities.126 Further, the frontal
lobes act as the braking mechanism for bad or inappropriate behavior.127
Therefore, an individual exhibiting bad behavior or bad character may, in
fact, be suffering from an unknown injury to the frontal lobes.128 An
individual possessing damaged frontal lobes could arguably be less culpable
for exhibiting traits of negative or poor behavior due to the individual’s
impulse controls being shuttered as a result of the structural abnormalities of
the damaged area of the brain.129 Due to the frontal lobes being located
directly behind the forehead, that area of the brain is more susceptible to
trauma.130 Individuals who suffer from frontal lobe damage tend to “display
marked apathy, tactlessness, impulsivity, irritability, and the inability to
‘empathize with the feelings of others.’”131 More disturbingly, frontal lobe
120.
See id.
121.
Id. at 3.
122.
MAYFIELD BRAIN & SPINE, supra note 115, at 3.
123.
See id. at 3–4.
124.
Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 88.
125.
Id.
126.
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “In the Wasteland of Your Mind”:
Criminology, Scientific Discoveries and the Criminal Process, 4 VA. J. CRIM. L. 304, 332
(2016); Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction Evidence in Capital
Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 396 (2004).
127.
Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 88.
128.
Wood & Agharkar, supra note 35, at 418.
129.
See Perlin & Lynch, supra note 126, at 333.
130.
Seiden, supra note 126, at 398.
131.
Id. at 400; Tiffany W. Chow & Jeffrey L. Cummings, Frontal-Subcortical
Circuits, in THE HUMAN FRONTAL LOBES: FUNCTIONS AND DISORDERS 3, 6–7 (Bruce L. Miller
& Jeffrey L. Cummings eds., 3d ed. 1999).
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damage has been shown to cause disinhibition or pseudo-psychopathic
behaviors.132 As a result, an argument can be made that a person with a
defective or damaged frontal lobe may commit violent or impulsive acts that
are out of their character.133
Now that we have an understanding of what it means for an
individual to suffer an injury to the frontal lobe, the time has come to gain a
better understanding of the different forms of TBIs and their potential
consequences.134 Each type of TBI will be addressed individually.135
B.

Mild TBI

Mild TBI is the most prevalent form of TBI.136 Based on data
compiled by the Department of Defense (“DOD”), United States troops
suffered from roughly 250,000 mild TBIs between 2000 and 2014.137
Luckily, the mild TBI is the least severe TBI form with the most common
injuries leading to concussions with a loss of consciousness of just a few
seconds, but less than thirty minutes.138 Although a loss of consciousness is
common, it is not a requirement of the mild TBI.139 Some victims merely
become dazed or disoriented.140 Other symptoms may include but are not
limited to nausea or vomiting, excess sleeping, difficulty sleeping, speech
problems, mood changes or mood swings, or feelings of depression or
anxiety.141 It is important to note that any TBI, regardless of level or
symptom, can have long-lasting effects, and many times, an injury may
occur but not appear on tests.142

III.B–E.

33.

132.
133.
134.
135.

Seiden, supra note 126, at 400.
Id. at 396; Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 88.
See Seiden, supra note 126, at 396.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 894–96; see also discussion infra Sections

136.
137.
138.

Ambrose, supra note 99, at 894–95.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895; 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note

139.
4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
140.
Id.; Traumatic Brain Injury, MAYO CLINIC: PATIENT CARE & HEALTH
INFO,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/traumatic-brain-injury/symptomscauses/syc-20378557 (last visited May 1, 2020).
141.
Traumatic Brain Injury, supra note 140.
142.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 895; 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of
Severity, supra note 33.
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Moderate TBI

As the name indicates, the moderate TBI is more serious than the
mild TBI.143 Unlike the mild TBI where a loss of consciousness is not
required, the moderate TBI includes a loss of consciousness that can last for
several hours, but less than a full day.144 Temporary memory loss is a
common side effect but should last for less than one week.145 Additional
physical symptoms include, but are not limited to, “convulsions or seizures,
[d]ilation of one or both pupils,” and an inability to wake up.146 Cognitive
symptoms may include “profound confusion; [a]gitation, combativeness, or
other unusual behavior; [and] [s]lurred speech.”147 Further, some physical,
cognitive, or behavioral complications may endure for months, or in some
cases, become permanent.148
D.

Severe TBI

Severe TBIs happen rarely and, according to the DOD, were present
in around one percent of the TBIs suffered by United States forces between
2000 and 2014.149 Typical characteristics of the severe TBI are a loss of
consciousness for more than twenty-four hours and memory loss that lasts
for more than one week.150 Many of the symptoms of both mild and
moderate TBIs are present as well.151 Some cases may result in a coma or
even death.152
E.

Penetrating TBI

Penetrating TBIs involve open head wounds.153 From a combat
perspective, these may result from skull fractures and projectiles.154 These

143.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 895; see also 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3
Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
144.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 894–95; see also 4 Types of Brain Injuries and
3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
145.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 895.
146.
Traumatic Brain Injury, supra note 140.
147.
Id.
148.
See 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
149.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 895.
150.
Id.
151.
See id.; 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
152.
Sports-Related Head Injury, supra note 98.
153.
Ambrose, supra note 99, at 895.
154.
Id. at 896.
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types of injuries may be critical with many injuries leading to death and
those who survive may not be able to return to their old lives.155
F.

Diagnosis and Treatment of TBIs

Diagnoses of TBIs are no small feat.156 Physicians employ various
methods of determining the level and type of TBI an individual is suffering
from, and one of the main methods is through the implication of the Glasgow
Coma Scale.157 This is “a [fifteen] point scale [that] estimat[es] and
categoriz[es] the outcomes of the brain injury on the basis of overall social
capability or dependence on others.”158 The test employed looks at three
categories:
Motor responses, verbal responses, and eye-opening
responses.159 Specific values per the scale are assigned based on the
responses and the score from each category is then tallied together for an
overall score.160 The higher the score the better when looking at both
survival and the degree to which an individual may return to a normal life.161
When looking at the level of the TBI, the scores range as follows: Mild will
range from thirteen to fifteen; moderate from nine to twelve; severe from
three to eight; and anything below three is considered to be a vegetative state
where the individual has “[s]leep wake cycles, [a]rousal, but no interaction
with [the] environment; [and] [n]o localized response to pain.”162
On the plus side, depending on the degree and severity of the TBI,
there are treatment options available.163 Initial treatment deals with
stabilization immediately following the injury, and the Glasgow Coma Scale
is applied to determine the state that the individual is in.164 Following this,
there are several more specific treatment options based on the individual’s
needs.165 First, there is rehabilitative care which is designed to help restore
the individual to daily life.166 Second, there is an acute treatment that “is
155.
See 4 Types of Brain Injuries and 3 Levels of Severity, supra note 33.
156.
See
Glasgow
Coma
Scale,
TRAUMATICBRAININJURY.COM,
http://www.traumaticbraininjury.com/symptoms-of-tbi/glasgow-coma-scale/ (last visited May
1, 2020).
157.
See id.
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
See Glasgow Coma Scale, supra note 156.
162.
Id.
163.
Treatments
for
TBI,
TRAUMATICBRAININJURY.COM,
http://www.traumaticbraininjury.com/treatments-for-tbi/ (last visited May 1, 2020).
164.
Id.; Glasgow Coma Scale, supra note 156.
165.
See Treatments for TBI, supra note 163.
166.
Id.

418

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

aimed at minimizing secondary injury and life support.”167 Finally, third,
there are surgical treatment options available that “may be used to prevent
secondary injury by helping to maintain blood flow and oxygen to the brain
and minimize swelling and pressure.”168
Looking past these treatment plans, it must be noted that the biggest
challenges individuals face during the rehabilitative process are those dealing
with cognitive and behavioral impacts.169 Individuals may need to “relearn
how to think, how to behave, how to control impulses and generally how to
function appropriately and productively in life.”170 Unfortunately, these
processes may never fully be relearned, even with ongoing therapy.171
A further concern for many individuals is the staggering costs related
to treatment.172 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
estimated that in the year 2000, medical costs due to TBI totaled around
$60,000,000,000.173 An individual with a severe TBI could have suffered
costs upwards of $1,875,000.174 With the costs of inflation, that same
individual would be looking at around $2,810,485 today.175
IV.

CTE: A DIFFERENT TYPE OF TBI

CTE is essentially a subset of TBIs as it is a degenerative brain
disease that is “caused by repetitive trauma to the brain.”176 Although not
limited to professional athletes or veterans, it is in these groups of individuals
that CTE tends to be most prolific.177 The repeated trauma causes a protein
called tau to form clumps that slowly buildup throughout the brain.178 As tau
spreads, brain cells die.179 This is a very slow process with early symptoms
usually first appearing in an individual’s late twenties or early thirties.180
167.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 88.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id. at 89.
173.
Id.
174.
Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 89.
175.
See
Inflation
Calculator,
US
INFLATION
CALCULATOR,
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/ (last visited May 5, 2020).
176.
Korngold et al., supra note 111, at 430.
177.
Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, BOS. U. RES.: CTE CTR.,
http://www.bu.edu/cte/about/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited May 1, 2020); What Is
CTE?, supra note 3.
178.
Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, supra note 177; What Is CTE?,
supra note 3.
179.
What Is CTE?, supra note 3.
180.
Id.
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Side effects include increased aggression, depression, paranoia, and a high
risk of suicide.181 Further, it appears that CTE causes a decline in executive
functioning which is seen by an individual’s inability to make decisions, a
lack of impulse control, and decreased memory and problem solving
abilities.182 It is thought that “CTE deprives [an individual] of the ability to
handle disputes rationally . . . [which] may . . . equate to insanity.”183 As a
result of CTE, many people with “no history of domestic violence . . .
become dangerous to their families.”184
In addition to the cognitive issues, CTE can also be linked to
physical decline as well.185 Four years prior to his death, NFL star Fred
McNiell had a scan of his brain performed on an MRI.186 Two years later, he
began experiencing significant motor deficits such as an inability to tie his
shoes or button his shirt and, eventually, he could no longer feed himself.187
He died two years later, and his autopsy confirmed that he suffered from
CTE.188
Evidence of CTE was first truly publicized by Dr. Bennet Omalu in
2005 when he published an article identifying American football hero Mike
Webster with the disease.189 This was a highly unpopular diagnosis, but as it
turns out, CTE was known to exist in boxers since 1928.190 At that time, the
condition was known as punch drunk syndrome and was diagnosed
antemortem.191 However, the extent of the disease, its causes, and
consequences were not known at that time.192 Current data shows that “[t]he
force of a professional boxer’s fist is equivalent to being hit with a [thirteen]
pound bowling ball traveling [at twenty] miles per hour, or about [fifty-two]

181.
See Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, supra note 177; Mohney,
supra note 3; What Is CTE?, supra note 3.
182.
Korngold et al., supra note 111, at 431–32.
183.
Dillard & Tucker, supra note 16.
184.
Michael O’Keeffe, Boston University Study Finds Possible Link Between
Traumatic Brain Injuries and Domestic Violence, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 18, 2014, 8:33
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/study-cte-linked-domestic-violence-article1.1978936.
185.
See Jacobo, supra note 21.
186.
Andrew Freedman, Doctors Detected CTE in a Living Football Player,
Bringing Us Closer to Next Frontier in Treatment, MASHABLE: SCI. (Nov. 16, 2017),
http://www.mashable.com/2017/11/16/cte-study-diagnosis-living-nfl-player/.
187.
Id.; Jacobo, supra note 21.
188.
Freedman, supra note 186.
189.
What Is CTE?, supra note 3.
190.
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Id.; Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, supra note 177.
192.
See Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, supra note 177; What Is
CTE?, supra note 3.
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times the force of gravity.”193 At the present, it is believed that the type of
head trauma required to produce CTE does not require the individual to
experience symptoms such as concussions, but instead subconcussive
impacts are the biggest factor.194 Further, there is little evidence that only a
few impacts are needed to cause the condition.195 Instead, the majority of
those diagnosed suffered from repetitive cranial impacts in the hundreds or
thousands over many years.196
At the current time, CTE can only be diagnosed postmortem.197
Pathologists perform a tissue analysis of the brain where they use special
chemicals to expose tau.198 They then analyze the sections of the brain
where tau is present for specific patterns unique to CTE.199 This is a lengthy
process which can take months for a complete diagnosis.200 Although the
existing test has helped to provide an understanding of the disease—when
considering the various ways in which the disease impacts an individual’s
cognitive and physical stability—the development of a viable test for a living
individual is paramount to the search for a cure.201
Although in the very beginning stages, scientists have identified two
potential ways to test for CTE antemortem.202 The first potential test
involves a new biomarker that may be used in identifying CTE.203 This
involves analyzing spinal fluid for a protein called CCL11 which is
significantly elevated in those suffering from the disease.204 Another nice
feature of the CCL11 biomarker is that it can be used to differentiate between
CTE and Alzheimer’s disease, which presents similar cognitive symptoms.205
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Sports-Related Head Injury, supra note 98.
194.
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See id.; Frequently Asked Questions About CTE, supra note 177.
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See Jonathan D. Cherry et al., CCL11 Is Increased in the CNS in Chronic
Traumatic Encephalopathy but Not in Alzheimer’s Disease, PLOS ONE, Sept. 26, 2017, at 1,
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NEUROSURGERY 237, 238 (2018).
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Freedman, supra note 186.
204.
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Cherry et al., supra note 202, at 5, 7.
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Although the mere presence of one biomarker may not be enough for proper
identification of CTE, it is a step in the right direction.206
The second potential test deals with Positron Emission Tomography
(“PET”) imaging.207 Through the use of the PET scan, it may be possible to
“identify the distinctive . . . topographic . . . distribution of brain tau
pathology.”208 This may be a useful tool in diagnosing CTE because it can
be used to identify the fingerprint signature of CTE and can be done in a
relatively non-invasive way.209 The combination of the PET scan with the
CCL11 biomarker tests may pave the way to a living diagnosis.210
Although not available now, it is likely that at some point there will
be a definitive test that will have the capability of confirming a CTE
diagnosis in a live person.211 If this occurs, there will be a potential defense
to criminal activity based on the disease, just as there is the potential for a
defense stemming from other forms of brain damage.212 As with TBIs or
other forms of brain damage, the defense would likely argue that the
defendant suffered from diminished capacity, and, therefore, could not have
had the necessary mens rea to establish criminal intent.213 “Indeed, being
afflicted with CTE may well equate to insanity.”214 Should the jury be given
an instruction to consider CTE as a mitigating circumstance, there is the
possibility that the jury would give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.215
In a 2016 study, participants found that the criminal acts of an individual
suffering from brain damage were somewhat excusable, and recommended
reduced penalties as a result.216
V.

CRIMINAL INTENT AND INSANITY DEFENSES

There are three main schools of thought for why society punishes
individuals who commit criminal acts.217 First there is retribution, where it
206.
See id.
207.
Id. at 10.
208.
Omalu et al., supra note 202, at 242.
209.
Jacobo, supra note 21.
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Cherry et al., supra note 202, at 10.
211.
See id. at 9; Omalu et al., supra note 202, at 237–38.
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(CTE) as a Criminal Defense, supra note 16.
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See Dillard & Tucker, supra note 16; Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy
(CTE) as a Criminal Defense, supra note 16; discussion infra Part V.
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Dillard & Tucker, supra note 16.
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See id.; Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) as a Criminal Defense,
supra note 16.
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Bozelko, supra note 13.
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Punishment, FREE DICTIONARY: LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://www.legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/punishment (last visited May 1, 2020).
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is “not primarily for the socially useful punishment, but for the just
punishment, the punishment that the criminal—given his wrongdoing—
deserves or merits, the punishment that the society has a right to inflict and
the criminal a right to demand.”218 The second is rehabilitation, which has
the goal of preventing future crime from existing offenders through the
treatment of an individual’s afflictions—such as mental illness or drug
dependency—along with educational programs designed to increase
knowledge and job skills.219 Finally, there is deterrence which is designed
to prevent other individuals from committing criminal acts.220 This is
accomplished by placing them on notice that a given behavior is considered
criminal and, therefore, punishable.221
When looking at the most basic criminal law level, to be deemed
guilty of a crime, an individual must normally have had the intent to commit
the crime.222 Intent is defined as a state of mind accompanied by an act.223
The first element of intent is known as mens rea, which literally translates to
guilty mind.224 It is this state of mind that is required for most convictions.225
A person suffering from frontal lobe damage should be carefully evaluated
prior to sentencing to determine if the individual possessed “the requisite
mens rea for the crimes with which [he or she is] being charged.”226 The
second element, the act, is known as actus reus.227 This is “[t]he wrongful
deed that comprises the [elements] of a crime.”228 Further, to have the intent
to commit a crime, one must have criminal capacity: “[T]he ability to
understand right from wrong.”229
Before transitioning to the insanity tests described below, the terms
insanity and mental illness need to be clarified as they tend to be used both
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Mike C. Materni, Criminal Punishment and the Pursuit of Justice, 2 BRIT.
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DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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Mens Rea, supra note 224.
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Wood & Agharkar, supra note 35, at 418.
227.
Schweitzer et al., supra note 222, at 364; Actus Reus, BLACK’S LAW
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incorrectly and interchangeably.230 The problem arises because these terms
reflect different standards.231 Insanity is a legal term, whereas mental illness
is a medical term referring to psychosis or neurosis.232 Just because an
individual suffers from a mental illness does not make that person
automatically legally insane.233 Due to the elements of the tests for insanity,
an individual diagnosed with a mental illness may be perfectly sane from a
legal standpoint.234 However, when looking from a medical perspective,
there is little difference in the behavior of an individual with a mental illness,
and an individual deemed to be insane.235 The big issue is in the way the law
treats and sentences the two categories of offenders.236 When looking at
capital punishment, there is an exception for the insane, but not for the
mentally ill.237 The rift, created in disposition, should be a clear indicator
that something needs to be done to correct the legal farce forged by the ageold argument between medicine and law.238
A.

M’Naghten Insanity Test

Society has strong beliefs concerning guilt, innocence, and
capacity.239 One belief is that criminals should be punished for their
misdeeds.240 The second is that those with diminished capacity should be
given help due to their illness.241 The first real test concerning an
individual’s capacity came from M’Naghten’s Case242 in 1843.243 In that
case, Daniel M’Naghten believed that he was the victim of a conspiracy and
accidently killed Edward Drummond while trying to murder British Prime
Minister Robert Peel.244 At trial, he pled insanity and was found not
230.
See Michelle Armstrong, Note, Addressing Defendants Who are “Crazy,
but Not Crazy Enough”: How Hall v. Florida Changes the Death Penalty for Mentally Ill
Defendants, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 743, 750–51 (2016).
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Id. at 750.
233.
Id. at 750–51.
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236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
See id.
239.
See
Insanity
Defense,
LEGAL
INFO
INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/insanity_defense (last visited May 1, 2020).
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M’Naghten’s Case (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 718; M’Naghten Rule, supra
note 34.
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M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 719; M’Naghten Rule, supra note 34.
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guilty.245 Due to public outrage, the Lords of Justice of the Queen’s Bench
formulated what would become the M’Naghten test for insanity.246 The test
states that:
[A]t the time of the committing of the act the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from [a] disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was
doing was wrong.247

This is a narrow test that helps those who, at the time of the crime, did not
understand the nature of what they were doing or did not understand that
what they were doing was wrong.248
B.

Irresistible Impulse Test

Moving on, the Iowa Supreme Court in 1868 created a new test to
determine insanity as a replacement for the M’Naghten test.249 This test,
known as the Irresistible Impulse Test, was further solidified into public
policy via the Alabama Supreme Court in 1887.250 The Irresistible Impulse
Test looks at those who commit a crime “due to their inability to exercise
behavioral control.”251 “Put simply, ‘the irresistible impulse defense is
available when “the accused’s mind has become so impaired by disease that
he is totally deprived of mental power to control or restrain his act.”’”252
Some states created a hybrid between this test and the M’Naghten Test
where this test supplements that of M’Naghten.253
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Model Penal Code Test

In addition to both of these tests, there is one additional test of
note. The American Law Institute created the Model Penal Code (“MPC”)
in 1962 and subsequently updated it in 1981.255 Although not law itself,
many states have adopted the MPC as their criminal statutes.256 The MPC
rule for insanity states that “[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”257 It is
interesting that although the MPC has the affirmative defense of insanity, the
authors chose not to define what the terms mental disease or defect mean for
purposes of the rule.258 Per the MPC’s commentary, the authors did this
intentionally in order to keep the rule open for developing medical
understanding.259
254

D.

Insanity Defense Reform Act

Since the M’Naghten Test was established in 1843, the concept of
the insanity plea has been the subject of a great deal of controversy.260 On
one hand, society demands that criminals be punished for their crimes.261 On
the other, society wants to forgive and treat.262 In light of the 1982
assassination attempt of President Ronald Reagan by John W. Hinckley Jr.,
and his successful use of the insanity defense, Congress passed the Insanity
Defense Reform Act (“IDRA”) in 1984.263 Although not applicable in state
254.
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Id.; see also Model Penal Code § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); Model
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IRESEARCHNET,
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courts, the purpose of the IDRA was to impose a uniform insanity standard
to be used in all federal trials, in which the defense of insanity is raised.264
Per IDRA:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting
the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or
defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not
otherwise constitute a defense.265

Further, it shifted the burden of proof to the defense who must show
by clear and convincing evidence that the individual was legally insane.266
VI.

THE DAMAGED BRAIN AND CRIMINAL CULPABILITY

As previously discussed, there is evidence that brain abnormalities
can both affect decision making and potentially trigger violent actions.267
When considering criminal proceedings, having an understanding of how
brain injuries affect criminal responsibility may have the effect of acting as
mitigating factors or defenses in sentencing.268 “The core principle of [our
legal] system is that a person can be held criminally responsible if he
performs a prohibited act intentionally and with a statutorily specified mental
state, such as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.”269 Research
shows that when an individual suffers a TBI, the individual will suffer from a
mental change.270 The question lies in what happens if the injury-caused
change has a profoundly negative effect on the individual’s mental state that
leads to criminal behavior.271 Being able to show the court that, as a result of
a TBI—or other brain injury—the defendant suffered a change in personality
or behavior could have a significant impact in terms of sentencing.272 It
would be very helpful if, at some point, a method is developed that has the
ability to show how a particular brain injury affected an individual’s capacity
to make good choices and exercise reasonable judgment.273
264.
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Studies have shown that TBIs are common among criminal
defendants and the overall jail and prison populations.274 The CDC estimates
that somewhere between twenty five and eighty seven percent of
incarcerated individuals suffered from some form of TBI.275 The CDC
studies also show that prisoners who have suffered TBIs are at a high risk of
reoffending post release.276 As a result of their TBIs, many prisoners exhibit
behaviors that are misinterpreted by prison staff as defiance or disciplinary
problems while the reality is that these are the secondary effects of their
TBIs.277 Prisons are not mental health institutions and prisoners who exhibit
these behaviors are more likely to receive some form of punishment, rather
than receive the help they actually need.278 Moreover, these behaviors may
lead to increased problems with other inmates, which potentially may lead to
the individual suffering further TBIs.279
VII.

POTENTIAL EIGHTH AMENDMENT AVENUE FOR BRAIN DAMAGED
DEFENDANTS

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
the Government from exercising cruel and unusual punishments.280 Justice
Warren explained that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”281 Depending on the
circumstances, capital punishment can be deemed cruel and unusual.282
Although capital punishment is not the focus of this Article, the cases
addressed below will be used to show that there should be a similarity in the
way brain damaged individuals are sentenced to those groups that American
society deems uniquely vulnerable; specifically juveniles, and the
intellectually disabled.283
Historically, common law prohibited criminal punishment for those
individuals with intellectual disabilities.284 During the eighteenth century, “it
was understood that ‘total idiocy . . . excuses from the guilt, and of course
from the punishment, of any criminal action committed under such
274.
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deprivation of the senses.’”285 Currently, the definition of who may be
characterized as possessing an intellectual disability is a bit more politically
correct as the requirement of total idiocy has been removed.286 In its place,
the current definition is “a disability characterized by significant limitations
in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior [and] originates
before age [eighteen].”287 Based on this definition, there is at least the
appearance that an individual with a brain injury may qualify.288 The
following cases illustrate the direction that the Court has taken when
considering the level of punishment appropriate for the intellectually
disabled and juvenile offenders.289
A.

Atkins v. Virginia

In 2002, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of
Atkins v. Virginia290 in a landmark decision that barred the intellectually
disabled from receiving capital punishment.291 “Petitioner, Daryl Atkins,
was convicted of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder [at which
time he was] sentenced to death.”292 Prior to trial, Atkins was evaluated by a
forensic psychologist who concluded that he was mildly mentally retarded.293
This conclusion was reached based on a series of interviews with people
Atkins knew, along with his school records and the administration of a
standard intelligence test which showed that Atkins had an IQ of fiftynine.294 The State presented a rebuttal expert witness who expressed his
belief that Atkins was not retarded but instead was of average intelligence,
at least.295 Atkins was sentenced to death and the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the imposition of the death penalty.296 In their dissenting opinion,
Justices Hassell and Koontz stated that “the imposition of the sentence of
285.
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death upon a criminal defendant who has the mental age of [nine] and
[twelve] is excessive [and] it is indefensible to conclude that individuals who
are mentally retarded are not to some degree less culpable for their criminal
acts.”297 They went on to point out that “[a] moral and civilized society
diminishes itself if its system of justice does not afford recognition and
consideration of those limitations in a meaningful way.”298
In making its decision, the Court considered the dwindling number
of states that still imposed the death penalty on the intellectually disabled.299
By the time the case came before the Court, only five states remained.300
The Court determined that, as a result of so few states willingly imposing the
death penalty on the intellectually disabled, the national consensus showed
this practice to be out of favor.301 The Court then considered other societal
reasons justifying the imposition of the death penalty—those of retribution
and deterrence—and found that executing the intellectually disabled did
nothing to further either justification.302 The Court also reasoned that
although the intellectually disabled generally understand the difference
between right and wrong, their disabilities prevent them from employing
proper reasoning and judgment.303 Additionally, they tend to lack control of
their impulses and do not understand the consequences of their actions.304
Per Justice Stevens, “[t]heir deficiencies do not warrant an exemption from
criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal culpability.”305
B.

Hall v. Florida

Twelve years following Atkins, Hall v. Florida306 provided the
Supreme Court of the United States with the opportunity to revisit the
country’s stance on executing the intellectually disabled.307 Petitioner
Freddy Lee Hall and his accomplice “kidnapped, beat, raped, and murdered
Karol Hurst, a pregnant [twenty-one]-year-old newlywed.”308 They then
297.
Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va.
2000) (Hassell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
298.
Id. at 310 (quoting Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 396–97 (Hassell, J. & Koontz, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
299.
Id. at 316; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 751.
300.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.20; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 751.
301.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 751.
302.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318–20; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 751–52.
303.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306; Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 83.
304.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306; Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 83.
305.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 305; Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 83.
306.
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
307.
Id. at 1990.
308.
Id.
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killed Lonnie Coburn, a sheriff’s deputy who attempted to prevent them from
robbing a convenience store.309 Hall was sentenced to death.310 He argued
that he could not be sentenced to death due to being an intellectually disabled
individual.311 At the time he was sentenced, there was no federal or state
prohibition on sentencing the intellectually disabled to death.312 Hall was
later resentenced after the Court held in Hitchcock v. Dugger,313 “that capital
defendants must be permitted to present non-statutory mitigating evidence in
death penalty proceedings.”314 As evidence, Hall introduced school records
that indicated that his teachers believed him to be [m]entally retarded and
his lawyer from an earlier crime for which he was prosecuted stated that he
“[could not] really understand anything [Hall] said.”315 His lawyer further
compared Hall’s mental faculties to his four-year-old daughter’s when
explaining that Hall could not assist in his own defense.316 Moreover,
medical professionals stated that Hall was significantly retarded.317 As a
result of Atkins, Hall filed a motion stating that he could not be executed due
to his being intellectually disabled.318 Five years later, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that he was not intellectually disabled per the Florida Statutes
because his IQ was seventy-one and the cutoff was seventy.319 Hall
challenged the constitutionality of the seventy-point cutoff.320
The Court began its analysis by restating its holding from Atkins.321
The twist arose when the Court addressed that Florida law defined
intellectual disability as requiring an IQ score of seventy or less.322 The
Court acknowledged the crucial role states have in “understanding how
intellectual disability should be measured and assessed,” however, “Atkins
did not give the states unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the
constitutional protection.”323 Atkins required the states to create their own
309.
Id.
310.
Id.
311.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990.
312.
Id.
313.
481 U.S. 393 (1987).
314.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990; see also Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,
398–99 (1986).
315.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 (quoting Joint Appendix, Vol. II 480, 482–83,
Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2013) (No. 12-10882)).
316.
Id. at 1990–91.
317.
Id. at 1991 (quoting Joint Appendix, Vol. II 507, Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986 (2013) (No. 12-10882)).
318.
Id. at 1991–92; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
319.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992.
320.
Id.
321.
Id. at 1993; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320–21.
322.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
323.
Id. at 1998; see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
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definition of the meaning of intellectually disabled after consultation with
medical experts.324
The issue was the IQ score cutoff.325 Due to the strictness of the
cutoff, the sentencing courts had no wiggle-room to look at additional
evidence pertaining to the claimed disability.326 Meanwhile, the medical
community accepts additional evidence due to its probative value for
diagnosing an individual with an intellectual disability, even if the individual
has an IQ score above seventy.327 Further, every state legislature—other
than Virginia—has taken a contrary position to that of Florida.328 As such,
the Court deemed the Florida statute unconstitutional.329 In the end, Hall
changed the playing field by requiring states to use the definition of
intellectually disabled created by the medical experts themselves.330
C.

Roper v. Simmons

The turn of the millennium brought important changes to the
American view of who would suffer the penalty of execution.331 Atkins was
the seminal case that denied the execution of intellectually disabled
offenders.332 Hall went on to demonstrate the Court’s resolve in seeing
justice for the harmed while maintaining and clarifying its holding in
Atkins.333 In 2005’s Roper v. Simmons,334 the Court further solidified its
stance on the prohibition of execution for mentally inculpable offenders
when it reasoned that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, juvenile offenders have not reached the level of
culpability present in adults.335 To be more precise, the issue in this case was
not whether juveniles as a whole are barred from execution.336 Rather, the

324.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999–2000; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 753; see
also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
325.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994.
326.
Id.
327.
Id.
328.
Id. at 1998.
329.
Id. at 2000; see also FLA. STAT. § 921.137(1) (2019), declared
unconstitutional by Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S 701 (1986).
330.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999–2000; Armstrong, supra note 230, at 753.
331.
See
The
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Against
the
Death
Penalty,
ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/other/case-against-death-penalty (last visited May 1, 2020).
332.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
333.
See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998–99, 2001.
334.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
335.
Id. at 570, 578; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
336.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 555–56.
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Court considered whether the Constitution bars capital punishment to
offenders in the fifteen to seventeen age group.337
At the age of seventeen, Christopher Simmons kidnapped and
murdered Shirley Crook, the woman with whom he had been involved in a
car accident.338 Simmons planned the murder with two adolescent friends
and on the night of the murder, he broke into her home, bound her arms and
face in duct tape, drove her to a state park, tied her hands and feet together
using electrical wire, covered her face in a towel, which he then completely
wrapped in duct tape, and threw her off a bridge into the waters of the
Meramec River, where she subsequently drowned.339 Prior to these events,
he assured his accomplices that they would get away with the crimes due to
all of them being minors and after the events, he bragged to his friends that
he had killed a woman “because the bitch seen my face.”340 After his arrest,
he was advised of his Miranda rights, waived his right to an attorney,
confessed to the murder, and performed a reenactment of the crime scene
that was videotaped.341 He was subsequently found guilty of murder and
sentenced to death.342 At the time of his trial and sentencing, he was
eighteen.343
As a result of Atkins, Simmons filed a new petition where he argued
that the “Constitution prohibits the execution of a juvenile who was under
[eighteen] when the crime was committed.”344 The Missouri Supreme Court
agreed and re-sentenced him to life in prison “without eligibility for
probation, parole, or release except by act of the Governor.”345 The Court
granted certiorari and affirmed.346 When considering the argument against
the execution of juvenile offenders in this age group—and below for that
matter—the Court identified three important differences between juveniles
and adults.347 First, there is “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility . . . found in youth more often than in adults and are
more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”348 The Court further
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
400 (Mo. 2003).
346.
347.
348.

Id.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556–57.
Id.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 557.
Id. at 558.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397,
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560; Roper, 112 S.W.3d at 400.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
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pointed out that due to these factors, nearly every state prohibits individuals
under the age of eighteen “from voting, serving on juries, or marrying
without parental consent.”349 The second “difference is that juveniles are
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.”350 The third “difference is that the character of a
juvenile is not as well-formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”351
The Court went on to explain that in terms of retribution,
“[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed
on one whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial
degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”352 When looking at whether
there is a deterrent effect for juvenile offenders, the Court quoted its
language from Thompson v. Oklahoma353 where it stated, “[t]he likelihood
that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit analysis that
attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so remote as to be
virtually nonexistent.”354 In its decision, the Court also pointed out that the
United States was the only country that still permitted the execution of
juveniles.355 In the end, the Court determined that the sentencing of capital
punishment to an individual that was a juvenile at the time the crime was
committed is unconstitutional.356
VIII.

INDIVIDUALS WITH BRAIN INJURIES

When comparing individuals with brain damage to both the
intellectually disabled and juveniles, there are many similarities to the ways
in which their minds either work or, more specifically, do not work.357 Many
TBIs “result in permanent cognitive, physical, emotional, and behavioral
disabilities that will greatly impact [the individual’s] lives.”358 How are
these issues so different from the other groups?359 When considering that the
Supreme Court of the United States has deemed execution as too great of a
punishment for the intellectually disabled or juveniles due to their levels of
moral culpability as a result of their mental status, logically it would seem
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 569.
Id.
Id. at 570.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
487 U.S. 815 (1988).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 572 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837).
Id. at 575; Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 85.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
See Snodgrass & Justice, supra note 29, at 82.
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See id.
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that the rationale of the cited cases should be granted to individuals with
damaged brains.360
Looking outside of the court system, various leading organizations
such as the American Bar Association and the American Psychiatric
Association have recommended that individuals with certain mental
disorders, including brain damage, be exempt from capital punishment.361
Although brain injuries, intellectual disabilities, and being a juvenile are not
the same thing, their respective similarities suggest that each of these
categories of individuals should not be subject to execution for essentially
the same reasons.362
When comparing individuals with brain damage to those with
intellectual disabilities, the similarities between the groups are to such a
degree that it boggles the mind that they would be given differing statuses
and different treatments under the law.363 The Supreme Court of the United
States specifically pointed out in Atkins that individuals suffering from
intellectual disabilities “have diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to
understand the reactions of others.”364 It is odd that if these characteristics
either remove or lower the culpability of an individual with an intellectual
disability, it seems almost discriminatory that these same characteristics in
persons with brain damage are considered any less important or
consequential.365
When considering the similarities between individuals with brain
injuries and juveniles, there are often times where their issues are one and the
same.366 “Impulsive behavior, failure to recognize the consequences of an
action, and the exercise of poor judgment are all characteristics common to
both juveniles” and brain-damaged individuals.367 This is not to say that
similar characteristics cannot be present in normal adults.368 The difference
is that individuals with brain damage and juveniles are not equipped to
control such behaviors and are therefore less culpable for their actions.369
There is a big difference between having the ingredients to bake a chocolate
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
note 29, at 89.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

See id.; Roper, 543 U.S. at 575, 578–79.
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Id. at 82.
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cake—but choosing or failing to put in the chocolate—and either not having
the chocolate at all, or not possessing the capacity to understand why it
should be used.*
IX.

CAN THE DAMAGED BRAIN POSSESS PROPER COMPETENCY?

Looking past whether neurological damage led to the commission of
a criminal act, there is the issue of whether that damage—in the interim
between the crime and the trial—caused the brain of the accused to
deteriorate to the point where the offender lacks competency to stand trial.370
Competency is required to fulfill the Constitutional rights of due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.371 A person deemed not
competent to stand trial cannot be convicted of a crime.372 Looking back at
Atkins, the Court noted that the intellectually disabled are at a severe
disadvantage at trial because they are generally unable to provide counsel
with any meaningful assistance and tend to make poor witnesses.373 As
explained, brain injuries are known to cause a steep cognitive decline.374
“Cognitive symptoms such as an inability to learn new information, slowed
information processing, and retrograde amnesia . . . can impact a defendant
both pretrial and in court.”375 Should this be the case, the accused would
likely have difficulty assisting counsel.376 The accused’s mind may not be in
a state that can comprehend the facts of the case, let alone coherently
respond to questions or even take in their surroundings.377 In a 2016
decision, World Wrestling Federation star, Jimmy Superfly Snuka, was found
“incompetent to stand trial for the 1983 homicide of his girlfriend.”378 For
decades, he was banged around . . . the ring, thus causing dementia.379 A
forensic psychologist called him a shell of a man.380 Considering the
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repeated concussive events throughout his career, it would come as little
surprise if he later received a diagnosis of CTE, let alone TBI.381
Looking back at Aaron Hernandez, his brain was so damaged from
his years on the football field that it resembled the innards of a crusty
baguette.382 Considering this level of brain damage, whether he had the
requisite mens rea to form criminal intent must be asked.383 Moreover, did
he actually understand the nature of his actions or at least that the action of
murdering Odin Lloyd was wrong?384 Could and did he provide meaningful
assistance to his counsel at trial?385 At the time of his suicide, was he little
more than a corporeal ghost?386
X.

THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE NEED FOR MENTAL HEALTH
COURTS

“It is not controversial to say that our criminal law system is not
aligned with an ethic of care, nor is it a surprise to learn that defendants feel
they are often without voice in circumstances that are certainly not
voluntary.”387 Depending on the circumstances, the law can have either a
therapeutic effect or an anti-therapeutic effect.388 The purpose of the
therapeutic jurisprudence model is to look at the impact of case law and
legislation from the standpoint of a therapeutic agent.389 The goal is to craft
legal rules and procedures that can enhance the therapeutic potential without
subordinating due process principles.390 The problem with the typical
criminal justice model is that it looks “backward, finding fault, making
accusations, and inflicting punishment.”391 The profound difference is that
the therapeutic model looks at the future consequences for the individual and
community after the case ends.392 Individuals with mental health disorders—
including brain damage—tend to go through a cycle within the criminal
justice system where they commit an illegal act, are punished by the system,
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get out, and repeat.393 Studies have shown that individuals with mental
illness are twice as likely to violate their parole as those without mental
illness and tend to return to their previous incarceration in under one year.394
The goal of the therapeutic model is to help the individual by providing the
treatment that is so desperately needed rather than submitting the individual
to yet another blanket punishment which, in the end, serves no one; thus,
ending the cycle.395 Leading the way to therapeutic stabilization are the
mental health courts.396
On June 6, 1997, Chief Judge Dale Ross of Broward County,
Florida, signed the administrative order that created America’s first mental
health court.397 “This order recognized the essential need for a new system
of justice to focus on individuals with mental health disabilities . . . and the
need for appropriate treatment in a therapeutic environment conducive to
wellness [rather than punishment].”398 Individuals permitted to access this
court included those with “neurological and cognitive disorders such as
[TBIs]” and access was to be on a voluntary basis.399
There are over 400 mental health courts in existence throughout the
United States today.400 However, not all mental health courts see the same
types of cases or operate in the same manner.401 Some mental health courts
only see misdemeanors, some only see felonies, some see both, and others
may only see nonviolent offenders.402
Mental health courts provide an important niche where historically
stigmatized and ill-treated individuals can seek community-based treatment
in lieu of criminal consequences.403 Judges in the mental health court system
are not restrained in the same ways as those who preside over regular
criminal courts.404 This allows a judge to be more malleable in sentencing,
in that the judge can “negotiate the particulars of individual cases and inspire
393.
See id.
394.
Peterson & Heinz, supra note 14, at 539.
395.
Slate, supra note 391, at 353.
396.
See id. at 354.
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Criminal Division, Fla. Admin. Order No. VI-97-I-1A (June 6, 1997) (on file with clerk, Fla.
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401.
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note 400, at 689.
404.
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offenders to adopt normative patterns of social behavior.”405 Unlike
traditional criminal courts, mental health courts are able to help the
individual not only receive the treatment they need, but also help with
housing and employment assistance so that transitioning back into being
productive members of society becomes both a realistic, and achievable goal
and reality.406 Judges in this role tend to shed the robe and work as a hybrid
of judge, social worker, and probation officer.407 The judges find ways to
motivate, question, and defend mental health court participants.408
Generally, the judge works with a team who assesses each
individual’s specific needs, and formulates a plan together.409 In a nice
contrast to the typical criminal court setting, participants in the mental health
courts generally interact with the judge personally, rather than sitting idly as
their attorney speaks on their behalf.410 This grants the individual the sense
of dignity that they deserve, which would likely be withheld in a criminal
court setting, where the individual may be treated as a second-class citizen.411
In order to maintain the effectiveness of a given program, an
individual enrolled in a court-ordered treatment plan is required to submit
reports to the court so that the judge can keep track of all progress along with
treatment compliance.412 Failure to comply will result in what will likely be
an unpleasant chat with the judge.413 Studies have shown that individuals
who participate in mental health court programs utilize crisis or highintensity services at lower rates, and often report decreases in substance
abuse as well.414
Although the mental health court system is a definite step in the right
direction, no program is without its faults.415 There is criticism that the
current mental health court model creates false success rates by limiting
participants to those individuals deemed safe.416 Granted, when the system
was first created, this was likely the best direction to go since everything was
new and untested.417 However, twenty years have passed since that first
405.
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407.
Id. at 400, 402.
408.
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Broward County mental health court came into being, and perhaps the time
has come to expand the system into accepting participants with more severe
issues—even if this means taking on individuals who have committed
violent, and even horrendous crimes.418 When looking back at the difference
between mental illness and insanity, it should be clear that they both connote
virtually the same meaning with the key difference being medical versus
legal perspective.419 The reality is that brain damage can do terrible things to
an individual’s psyche and, in turn, the individual may do heinous actions
that they never would have done, but for the neurological trauma.420 These
individuals need our help just as much as those the current system deems
safe.421 The mental health courts are an attempt to provide that help.422
XI.

CONCLUSION

Brain damage robs people not only of their minds, but of their
dignity and quality of life.423 Just as the advent of DNA changed the
criminal justice system, in time, diagnostic tools will improve, and where
CTs and MRIs help with diagnoses of TBIs today, a live diagnosis of CTE
will have a great impact as well.424 As previously addressed, the prosecution
is required to prove the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.425
This is the highest burden of proof required in the United States.426 In light
of the developments in the diagnosis of various types of brain damage, this
burden may become harder to prove.427 This is especially true in cases where
the mental health courts play a role in diverting brain-damaged individuals
from prison to treatment.428 It is through the trials and tribulations of the
judges and staff of the mental health courts that true change can take place.429
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Through their efforts, the retributive wall barring brain-damaged individuals
from rehabilitative treatment will hopefully crumble.430 As the saying goes,
“[a] mind is a terrible thing to waste.”431 However, it is even more egregious
to leave a damaged mind to shutter alone helplessly in the dark.*
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